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Abstract
This thesis involves a reading of the political problematics of the alter- 
globalisation movement. The thesis suggests that some of the fundamental 
problems faced by the alter-globalisation movement can be traced to its 
emergence in the crucible of intensive moments of political activity, at, for 
example, anti-summit protests. The expansion of political possibilities 
experienced during such moments, stands in contrast to the constricted 
sense of political possibility experienced during more quotidian times. To 
analyse the relationship between the two sets of political experiences we 
examine Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of antiproduction, the Body 
without Organs, and the socius; which we will argue carries the inheritance 
of Bataille’s concept of nonproductive expenditure. In the light of this theory 
we conceptualise intensive moments of political activity as moments of 
excess. We then examine the concept of an analytical war machine as a 
mode of organisation that can operate across the ruptures and 
discontinuities produced by moments of excess. The aim is, in part, to 
provide a mode of analysis that can operate across periods of 
transformation, even when the very presuppositions of the analysis are 
themselves subject to change. To do so we develop the concept of an 
analytical territory and examine the practices of the alter-globalisation 
movement through Deleuze and Guattari’s territorial concept of the refrain. 
This thesis, then, provides a novel and innovative reading of the political 
problematics of the alter-globalisation movement, and fundamentally 
reconceptualises some familiar repertoires and practices. At the same time, 
however, the thesis can be read as a novel and innovative interpretation of 
the political problematics contained in Deleuze and Guattari’s work.
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Chapter One 
Introduction
Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they 
please; they do not make it under circumstances directly encountered, 
given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead 
generations weighs like a nightmare upon the brains of the living. And 
just when they seem engaged in revolutionising themselves and 
things, in creating something that has never yet existed, precisely in 
such periods of revolutionary crisis they anxiously borrow from them 
names, battle cries and costumes in order to present the new scene 
of world history in their time-honoured disguise and in this borrowed 
language (Marx 1968a: 97).
This thesis is born, in part, from my own experiences within the alter- 
globalisation movement.1 In particular, it is born from the episodic
1 This movement has been known by many different names. The name used to refer to it 
might variously reflect the specific context in which particular areas of the movement 
developed, or the specific framing that the namer wants to place upon the movement. 
Perhaps the most widely used name outside the movement, and the least used inside it, is 
the anti-globalisation movement. This name arose in the context of the 1999 protests 
against the World Trade Organisation summit in Seattle. As this is commonly seen as the 
point of emergence of the movement into the public eye it has had widespread and 
persistent usage. It is unpopular within the movement, however, because it tends to frame 
the movement as localist, and against increased global ties. Indeed Graeber (2002:63) has 
called the term “anti-globalisation", “a coinage of the US media". In the UK it has been 
common to use the term anti-capitalist movement, primarily because the perceived point of 
emergence of the movement was the Carnival against Capitalism protests in London on 18 
June 1999. Within movement circles perhaps the most popular names are: the movement of 
movements, or the global justice movement. In French speaking countries, however, it is 
common known as the altermondialiste movement. This has given rise in English to the 
name, the alter-globalisation movement. We will adopt this name in this thesis because it
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experience of intense moments of collective political activity at, for instance, 
anti-summit protests. These moments have stood in contrast to my 
experience of political activity in more everyday periods, where the sense of 
political possibility is much more constricted. This thesis can be seen, in 
part, as a reading of the alter-globalisation movement through the 
problematic relationship between these two distinct experiences of political 
activity. Indeed we will argue that this distinction has formed a meta­
problematic around which the alter-globalisation movement has revolved. To 
put this into another register, we could say that the problem which the 
movement has grappled with, but been unable to resolve, is the 
development of forms of organisation that can operate across the different 
contexts of the expanded sense of possibility found in intensive moments of 
political activity, and the perceived constriction of possibility in an everyday 
experience that is conditioned by neoliberalism’s domination of common 
sense.
To some this may seem an untimely problem. Summit protests, even if 
their form persists, are hardly new; indeed the excitement about their novelty 
seems to belong to another age. Yet it is precisely this sense of untimeliness 
that provokes this revisitation. If it is impossible to draw firm boundaries 
around social movements, it is sometimes necessary to mark them with 
loose boundaries in order to gain some analytical purchase. One point with 
which we could mark the end of a certain phase of the alter-globalisation 
movement is the emergence of the severe, worldwide economic and social 
crisis in 2007. This crisis was, in many ways, a confirmation of the criticisms 
of neoliberal globalisation that the movement had put forward. It is also, 
however, a good point with which to mark the distance that has been 
travelled. The summit protests of the alter-globalisation movement, and the 
organisational and action repertoires with which they are associated,
more accurately reflects the desire for a different globalisation to that imposed by 
neoliberalism.
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emerged in the late 1990s during a period of neoliberal hubris. A prevailing 
mood at the time saw neoliberal capitalism as, not just the inevitable final 
form of society, ‘the end of history’, but also saw in it the potential to solve 
the world’s problems. The emergence of the alter-globalisation movement 
had such a dramatic effect precisely because it problematised this view. The 
movement’s slogan Another World is Possible is a rejoinder to the neoliberal 
mantra There is No Alternative.
The context within which the social movements of the present, or the 
near future, will have to operate, is quite different to the context of the alter- 
globalisation movement’s emergence. The era of neoliberal hubris has 
faded, its ideological bluster has been severely shaken and yet the 
processes of neoliberalism continue to operate and the direction of 
neoliberal reform continues largely unabated. From our position in 2010, 
however, it seems unlikely that the crisis is over. A private debt crisis has 
been recomposed into to a sovereign debt crisis. The debts have been 
socialised and the costs shifted disproportionally onto the poorest in society. 
There is a prospect of troubled times ahead.
The alter-globalisation movement’s untimeliness, then, provokes the 
desire to return to the movement, not to repeat it uncritically, but to 
understand it anew so that we may extract problematics, concepts, tools and 
technologies that can be useful in movements to come. In this respect, then, 
we can agree with Hardt and Negri (2009: 368) when they say:
Those movements have left behind, in fact, an arsenal of strategies of 
disobedience, new languages of democracy, and ethical practices... 
that can eventually be picked up and redeployed by new initiatives of 
rebellion.
We must, however, think carefully about the manner in which this inheritance 
is passed on. In the quote from The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis 
Bonaparte, with which we began this chapter, Marx (1968a: 97) notes the 
tendency for those within revolutionary situations to draw on, and repeat the 
traditions of past generations of struggle. There are, however, different
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modes in which this repetition can take place. When Deleuze (2001: 92) 
reads the same passage he finds that:
[Historical repetition is neither a matter of analogy nor a concept 
produced by the reflection of historians, but above all a condition of 
historical action itself... historical actors can create only on condition 
that they identify themselves with figures from the past... According to 
Marx, repetition is comic when it falls short -  that is, when instead of 
leading to metamorphosis and the production of something new, it 
forms a kind of involution, the opposite of authentic creation.* 2 
If present generations of struggle are to prevent the inheritance of past 
generations of struggle from weighing “like a nightmare upon the brains of 
the living” (Marx 1968a: 97), then they cannot repeat those traditions 
uncritically. However, to refuse any inheritance from past generation would 
leave you unarmed and disorientated in the face of historical conditioning. 
Authentic creation requires forms of repetition that "constantly criticize 
themselves, constantly interrupt themselves in their own course, return to the 
apparently accomplished, in order to begin anew" (Marx 1968a: 100). What 
we seek then in our return to the alter-globalisation movement is not a 
comprehensive recreation or account of the movement of the kind that would 
overcode future generations of struggle. We seek, rather, a mode of 
repetition that will allow future generations of struggle to generate ‘something 
new’ and confront the problematics of their own time. With this in mind we 
will seek to use the alter-globalisation movement to develop and illustrate 
some political problematics and concepts that, while situated and cramped 
by their context,3 have the potential to resonate with other struggles.4
2 When Deleuze speaks of comic repetition, here, he is referring, of course, to Marx’s 
(1968a: 97) famous passage: “Hegel remarks somewhere that all facts and personages of 
great importance in world history occur, as it were, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as 
tragedy, the second as farce.”
2 The concept of ‘cramped space’ can be found in the work of Deleuze and Guattari, but it is
in Thoburn (2003) that the concept is given prominence and made into a key component of
his rendering of a Deleuzian politics. Deleuze (1995:133) describes the crux of the concept
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The thesis is also cramped by its theoretical approach, in this respects 
it is a reading of the political problematics of the alter-globalisation 
movement through the prism of a conceptual assemblage that draws, 
primarily, on the work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari.5 But we might 
equally say that it is a reading of Deleuze and Guattari through the prism of 
the alter-globalisation movement’s political problematics. We also seek, 
then, to repeat Deleuze and Guattari in a particular manner. Rather than 
produce a fetishised repetition that defers to them as master theorists, we 
seek to put their concepts to work within the problematics of the present. To 
do so requires that we also return Deleuze and Guattari, and the other
when he says: “We have to see creation as tracing a path between impossibilities...
Creation takes place in bottlenecks.” This is used by Thoburn to argue for a ‘minor’ style of 
writing that uses the bottlenecks of its context to produce authentic creation. For Thoburn 
the concept of cramped space can protect us against presuppositions of plenitude; that is, 
the notion that we can make history just as we please. Thoburn’s intention is, rather, that we 
should pay attention to the limits that capital displaces on to us. We can only agree with this 
intention, while also pointing to the danger of mistaking capital as the only active element. 
We should also be wary of the concept’s potential for an essentialist reading, in which it is 
used to identify and privilege the most cramped sector, the most oppressed people. It is 
more in keeping with our thesis to say that the innovation of social movements finds its own 
cramped space. As Deleuze (1995:133) goes on to say: “A creator's someone who creates 
their own impossibilities, and thereby creates possibilities.”
*  In a similar vein I should make clear that my experiences of participation in the movement 
have also positioned and cramped my reading of it. This thesis does not, therefore, claim to 
be an entirely objective or universal account of the political problematics of the alter- 
globalisation movement. It is, rather, what Deleuze and Guatari (1988) would call a minor 
reading. This means that the problematics abstracted from the movement carry the marks of 
my involvement in, what Juris (2008: 59-60) would call, the more “autonomous” and “radical 
network-based” areas of the movement. More importantly though my reading carries the 
marks of my geographical and social position in the developed world, or global North. I 
acknowledge that the problematics of the alter-globalisation movement might look very 
different to a member of one of the large peasant movements from the global south.
5 Although we draw on the theoretical contributions of many other authors, Marx, Bataille, 
and Foucault, in particular, we do so primarily by positioning them in relation to Deleuze and 
Guattari’s approach.
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theorists we encounter, to the political problematics with which they were 
themselves entangled. In this way we can find resonances and dissonances 
between our problematics and theirs. As such we find some other historical 
repetitions in the thesis, some quite surprising antecedents, as events such 
as May ’68, the French, American and Haitian Revolutions, and even the 
German peasant revolts on the sixteenth century, appear and re-appear.
The Chapters
We begin the thesis proper in Chapter Two where we begin to develop our 
own approach to the political problematics of the alter-globalisation 
movement by positioning it in regards to some other approaches. We focus, 
in particular, on the behaviourist and pluralist inheritance that runs through 
certain strands of the treatment of social movements in political science and 
Social Movement Theory. By doing so we seek not only to develop useful 
concepts, such as ‘repertoires of contention’, but also trace certain lacunae 
within, in particular Political Opportunity Theory and Resource Mobilisation 
Theory. We will then use these lacunae to trace the transcendental 
dimensions to neoliberal forms of power. In the last section of this chapter 
we conceptualise these dimensions of power through a reading of Foucault’s 
concept of neoliberal governmentality and Deleuze’s conception of control 
societies. What we find, particularly important in these conceptions is their 
focus on neoliberalism’s ability to “compel obedience not through the 
commandment of a sovereign or even primarily through force but rather by 
structuring the conditions of possibility of social life” (Hardt, Negri 2009: 6). 
Neoliberalism’s domination of the ‘common sense’ view of the world has 
become so pervasive that it has dramatically restricted political possibility.
We begin Chapter Three by suggesting that the form taken by the alter- 
globalisation movement, in which the movement is “made present to itself” 
(Tormey 2005:340) only at intensive, episodic moments, such as summit 
protests, is a symptom of neoliberalism’s transcendental dimensions of 
power. It is only by exceeding neoliberalism’s conditioning of possibility that 
this conditioning can be brought into focus. We then move to the discussion
of a methodology that can bring these dimensions of power within analysis 
and reveal the symptomatic mode of reading that we applied to political 
science and Social Movement Theory in the previous chapter. We then 
move from a strategy of reading to Deleuze’s concept of a symptomology, 
which allows us to group experiences together on the basis of their shared 
affective qualities. Such a grouping might include experiences that would 
seem divergent if analysed etiologically, that is through an attribution of 
causality. In particular it allows us to examine moments such as summit 
protests alongside what may seem like more major events, such as, for 
example, May ’68. Drawing up this symptomology will allow us, therefore, to 
draw upon a wider range of concepts.
It is from this symptomology that we seek, in Chapter Four, to develop 
the concept of moments of excess and analyse it in relation to concepts that 
capture the transcendental structuring of experience. We do so by examining 
Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of anti-production, the socius and the Body 
without Organs, which, we will argue, attempts to resolve Bataille’s concept 
of unemployed excess and Marx’s analysis of surplus value and revolution. 
Through this we seek to recompose the analytical problematic of the 
relationship between moment of excess and the experience of everyday life, 
into organisational questions, such as: If moments of excess bring about the 
opening up of political possibility then how do we act without overcoding that 
possibility with a new instrumentality that closes us off from events to come? 
Or, how do we build lasting forms of political organisation where the lessons 
of previous events and generations provide the grounds for continuing 
innovation? When Guattari considers the concept of moments of excess he 
proposes the organisational form of the analytical war machine, which 
indicates a form of organisation that can act as an analyser of the movement 
and its desires, while simultaneously transforming its organisational 
structures in line with this analytical process. It is this proposal that marks a 
point of transition in the thesis, which now shifts from an analysis of 
moments of excess to an exploration of the diagram of an analytical war 
machine through a reconceptualisation of the practices and repertoires of the 
alter-globalisation movement
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Chapter Five begins this task by examining the alter-globalisation 
movement’s overriding concern with organisational process. We seek to 
intensify this concern by positioning it in regards to Guattari’s (1996: 260) 
definition of the left as a “processual passion”. We pose this problem as a 
means of exploring the form of analysis appropriate to an analytical war 
machine. That is to say, a form of analysis that can operate across the 
ruptures and discontinuities produced by moments of excess. Or, to put this 
differently, how can we analyse and strategise when the very 
presuppositions and assumptions of our analysis and strategy are 
themselves subject to change? To approach this problem we examine the 
literature of revolutionary transition, before moving to Deleuze’s critique of 
Kant on the grounds of his failure to include the genesis of established 
values within the scope of his analysis. This allows us to discuss the 
inclusion within our analysis of the structuring role of economic value upon 
the presuppositions of our everyday, ‘common sense’ understanding of the 
world. We end the chapter with a discussion of Spinoza’s notion of conatus, 
which, we propose, provides the ethical basis for our project of analysis. We 
will also propose that Spinoza’s ethics of affect reveal the processual 
passion of the alter-globalisation movement to be ultimately motivated not by 
a passion for certain procedures but by the joyful passions that come with 
our increasing ability to act in the world.
With this form of analysis established we turn in Chapter Six to a 
reconceptualisation of the alter-globalisation movement as a nascent 
analytical war machine. We do so by tracing Guattari’s analytical practice, in 
both political and psychiatric groups, and its subsequent influence over 
Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptions of organisation. We explore, in 
particular, the distinction they draw between subject and subjugated groups 
and the influence of this distinction on their concept of territory. We end the 
chapter by examining the alter-globalisation movement through the concept 
of an analytical territory and, in particular, by reconceptualising some of the 
movement’s repertoires as refrains. The territorial concept of the refrains, we 
suggest, might help future generations of struggle to repeat the alter-
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globalisation movement’s practice in a manner that will avoid the overcoding 
of new movements and serve as a basis for authentic creation.
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Chapter Two
The Politics of Movement
“To go through the experience of thinking differently -  in a different way or 
from a different perspective -  creates new possibilities. And perspectives 
aren’t different takes on the same thing, but each one a world in itself. 
Likewise, words aren’t different clothes for one object, but can create their 
own object.” (Turbulence 2009: 2)
Introduction
This chapter takes on the appearance of a search for analytical resources, or 
even a methodology, which we could then apply to our object, the intrinsic 
political problematics of the alter-globalisation movement. The chapter is 
indeed structured around an examination of the treatment of social 
movements within the fields of political science and sociology, assessing 
them for their adequacy in respect of the problematics with which we are 
concerned. However this characterisation, if presented as an account of an 
intellectual journey, contains a certain artifice. I would rather assert that the 
form of explication doesn’t and indeed shouldn’t follow the form of 
investigation. The first reason for this is purely formal; the more open ended 
process of analysis, which gradually identifies and refines the problematics 
of the research, must be narrowed and systematised to allow a narrative 
flow.6
Beyond this, however, is a political or methodological concern to avoid 
the presentation of the research as a disinterested and objective survey of
6 Or as Marx (1982:102) would have it:
Of course the method of presentation must differ in form from that of inquiry. The 
latter has to appropriate the material in detail, to analyse its different forms of 
development and to track down their inner connection. Only after this work has been 
done can the real movement be appropriately presented.
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the field. Indeed one of the aims of the chapter is to problematise the political 
and methodological consequences of claims to objectivity. The relationship 
between the form of analysis and its object might be better characterised as 
one of entanglement and mutual presupposition, or, in reference to the 
material to come, one of feedback. The narrative form of the chapter is not 
disinterested but is structured by the overall objectives of the thesis. In this 
light we might better characterise this chapter’s role as one of positioning for 
the purposes of explication; that is, revealing the chosen conceptual and 
methodological apparatus of the thesis by positioning it in relation to other 
conceptual and methodological approaches. This will be an ongoing process 
throughout the thesis but in this chapter we start with some approaches, 
more dominant within both political science and sociology, that are further 
away from our own, moving to analytical approaches with which we share 
more presuppositions later in the thesis as our conceptual apparatus 
becomes more refined.
The difficulty in this chapter, then, is finding points of connection and 
communication between analytical traditions that share few presuppositions 
and little conceptual lineage. We might go further and say that the usual 
incommunicability between traditions derives from divergent ontologies. To 
overcome this I employ a strategy of reading that seeks to identify 
problematics that are absent yet inherent to the texts and which become 
visible and important in relation to our own problematic. We will 
conceptualise this methodological strategy more fully, and name it as a 
symptomatic reading, in the next chapter.7
This chapter has three sections. In the first section we examine the 
incorporation of social movements within political science before moving, in 
the second section, to its treatment within the field of sociology. To some
7 So why don’t we lay out the operative methodology in detail here? This however, would 
short-circuit the positioning nature of the chapter. Instead we will allow the methodology to 
haunt this chapter before being elaborated in its own right and on its own terms in the next 
chapter.
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extent this follows a historical chronology as the main locus for the study of 
social movements moves from political science to sociology in the 1960s.8 It 
is fair to say that we shall engage in only a schematic historical reading of 
these disciplines, structured in relation to the distinct characteristics and 
problematics of the alter-globalisation movement. These readings 
emphasise a shared intellectual inheritance derived from a post-war turn 
towards behaviourism and a certain form of modelling drawn from the two 
related field of systems theory, or cybernetics, and rational actor theory. 
Tracing this lineage will allow us bring out what is most useful from these 
traditions while illustrating certain lacunae. We make this argument clear in 
the third section, which attempts a preliminary exposition of the forms of 
power with which the alter-globalisation movement has attempted to come to 
grips. We do so through Foucault’s concept of neoliberal governmentality 
and Deleuze’s conception of control societies.
The Model of Political Science
The alter-globalisation movement has certainly affected political science; the 
concept of globalisation, for instance, has become more prominent and 
problematised in its wake. Yet while its initial concerns have had some 
impact, its form and the politics intrinsic to its form have largely been elided 
in globalisation literature. If attention is paid to the alter-globalisation 
movement it is generally through typologies based on criteria relevant to the 
pre-existing ideological commitments of the authors, rather than any criteria 
intrinsic to the movements themselves. This typological or taxonomical 
approach can create some useful distinctions; the danger, however, is that, 
even at their best, they miss much of the political creation endogenous to 
movements, and at worst they create categories that are wildly at odds with 
movement experiences.
8 Social movements are, of course, discussed in other areas of writing, in particular political 
philosophy and what we might call movement writing. We will position the thesis in relation 
to these areas during the course of the thesis.
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The realist perspective in International Relations, for instance, with its 
emphasis on states as the principal political actors, has only a limited role 
within their analysis for trans-national social movements. Indeed in the years 
following the events of 9/11 the primary means of incorporating the alter- 
globalisation movement within a realist narrative has been the category of 
extremism. Bobbit (2008) for instance seeks to include the alter-globalisation 
movement within the category of ‘market state terrorists’, as, isomorphic to 
radical Islamism, it operate in networks and might seek to gain access to 
weapons of mass destruction and so gain the force of a nation state.9 
Admittedly the realist paradigm does also contain some less hysterical 
assessments of the alter-globalisation movement; however extremism 
remains perhaps the central category of analysis in neoliberal and 
neoconservative interpretations.10
Neoliberalism has so comprehensively captured the middle ground of 
political debate that its assessment has been the one to which all others 
must position themselves. As such neoliberalism provides the most general 
of taxonomies, with all political and economic approaches classified as 
orthodox, heterodox or extremist. Orthodox, of course, is merely a signifier 
for neoliberal, while what we might characterise as liberal pluralist or global 
social democratic positions have dominated heterodox views on 
globalisation. These latter approaches, while often more sympathetic to the 
movements, also construct transcendent taxonomies that insulate their 
conceptual apparatus from contamination.
For Steger (2003:113), for instance, the chief distinction within 
“antiglobalist forces” is that between particularist and universalist 
protectionism. The former “are more concerned with the well being of their
9 We will examine the role that the category of extremism plays within neoliberal ideology 
later in the thesis.
10 Let’s be clear, this is not merely a methodological issue. Such thinking has had real 
material effects as it has fallen back upon and structured much of the police and security 
service responses to the movement.
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own citizens than with the construction of a more equitable international 
order based on global solidarity” (Steger 2003:114). While the latter “point to 
the possibility of constructing a new international order based on the 
redistribution of wealth and power” (Steger 2003:115). Steger includes the 
American conservative activist Pat Buchanan amongst the particularist, 
protectionist wing of ‘antiglobalism’. This does reflect, to some extent, 
debates and distinctions raised within the movements themselves. In the late 
1990s, for instance, the Dutch anti-racist group De Fabel van de lllegaal 
critiqued the initial framing of the campaigns against the Mutual Agreement 
on Investment, and the institutions of global governance, for allowing the far 
right to influence left wing politics. A particular focus of this critique was the 
willingness of some left wing activists to share a platform with Pat Buchanan. 
Following such debates, influential organisations such as Peoples Global 
Action (PGA) changed their hallmarks to specifically exclude discriminatory 
behaviour (Davies 2005). Steger, however, also includes the Venezuelan 
President Hugo Chavez amongst the particularists. The accuracy of his 
inclusion is much more ambiguous. Chavez’s prominent, although 
controversial participation within ‘universalist’ movement spaces - such as 
the 2006 and 2008 World Social Forums - suggests the limits of the utility of 
this typology.
An alternative approach can be seen in Held and McGrew’s (2003) 
typology, which aims to illustrate the potential for a new social middle 
ground. ‘Anti-globalisation’ forces are split here into global transformers, 
statist/protectionists and radicals, while pro-globalisation forces are split into 
neoliberals, liberal internationalists and institutional reformers. As this 
typology is constructed it reveals liberal internationalists, institutional 
reformers and global transformers all occupying the overlapping political 
position of cosmopolitan social democracy. This new social middle ground 
leaves neoliberals excluded on one side with statist/protectionists and 
radicals excluded on the other.
The alter-globalisation movement suffers a double elision in this 
typology. Firstly any transformation of politics brought about by the
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movement’s emergence is elided into a typology that merely valorises Held 
and McGrew’s pre-existing political positions. The mechanism with which 
this is done produces the second elision, as the movement is reduced to a 
question of issues. The social democratic position seeks to frame the 
movement around issues, such as the democratic deficit in global 
governance structures, to which the most likely solution involves institutional 
reform. The framing of the movement around issues has been the source of 
ongoing political struggle. Hewson (2005), for instance, provides an account 
of the reduction of a far-reaching and expansive alter-globalisation 
movement into the issue of African poverty during the 2005 Make Poverty 
History campaign. For Held and McGrew (2003) the alter-globalisation 
movement is, at best, pre-political; that is to say that while it can indicate a 
failing in the present structure of institutional politics, actual political change 
must take place in a different political register, that of representative politics.
In response to the reduction of the alter-globalisation movement to 
issues, we could suggest that, in a sense, the movement constituted itself as 
an excess to issue-based politics. Klein (2000), for instance, locates the 
emergence of the movement in the disillusion with single issue and identity 
politics. Indeed one of the most popular slogans of the initial phase of the 
movement, originally attributed to the Zapatistas, reads: “Many Yeses, One 
No”. We can take this as a sign that the point of commonality for the 
movement is the one no, a rejection of neoliberal capitalism, rather than any 
amalgam of single-issues. In this thesis we argue that the alter-globalisation 
movement is, in part, a search for a means of identifying and acting against 
the form of power that accompanies neoliberal policies. In the final section of 
this chapter we will examine this form of power as a dispositif that 
transcendentally structures not just national government policies but also 
everyday life, and indeed even global governance structures. Of course from 
such an analysis a programme to merely reform the structures of global 
governance will be found inadequate.
This indicative literature, however, is merely an instantiation of a more 
general and longstanding elision of social movements within the field of
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political science. It is easy to see how the extra-institutional nature of social 
movements has led to an obscuring of much that makes them distinctive. 
There is, as Blaug (1999:33) puts it, “a tyranny of the visible” towards ‘anti- 
institutional radicalism’ in the dominant methodologies of political science. 
Indeed Eschle (2004: 62) describes, more specifically, a double elision of 
social movements in the field of international relations through:
[A] general neglect in IR of ‘social movements’ and social movement theory. 
Movements have traditionally been seen as located not in the international but 
in the domestic, and not in the political but in the social... They are, therefore, 
doubly invisible in IR and the proper subject matter of sociology. In addition, 
they disrupt the usual categories of state-centric, pluralist or structuralist IR 
and are difficult to assess through the dominant IR methodologies.
Beyond this, however, we can identify a specific framing, and elision, of 
social movements traceable to political science’s inheritance of behaviourist 
models of the political system. The emergence of political science, as a 
distinctive approach, involved a shift of emphasis away from, on the one 
hand, a traditional focus on the comparative study of institutional structures, 
and, on the other hand, from overt political theorising (Birch 2007). Barber 
(2006:541) explains the context of this development:
In the wake of World War II and its twin nightmares of totalitarianism and the 
holocaust, politics remained crucial to social science. But in the space of a 
single decade, the attractions of a political science that acquired its scientistic 
credentials by moving away from the messiness of politics and embracing the 
seeming exactitude of terms such as “behavior” and “system” came to 
dominate, and methodology appeared to displace politics as the focus of 
political science.
The premise of behaviourism is the prediction of future behaviour 
based on the empirical study of past behaviour. It involves a rejection of the 
study of an entity’s internal structure as a means of predicting behaviour. 
This approach is oriented, therefore, to questions of ‘what is happening?’ 
rather than questions of how or why. In the light of Barber’s comments we 
can speculate that part of the motivation for the emergence of this approach
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was a desire to develop a ‘value-free’ ‘science’ of behaviour that would 
transcend the messy world of politics. The project depended then on ‘value- 
free’ methodologies and throughout the 1950s there were attempts to 
develop empirical methodologies within political science by importing those 
of other disciplines. We will briefly examine the two main strands of this 
development, Rational Actor Theory and Systems Theory, before tracing 
their inheritance on the study of social movements.
The basic presuppositions of Rational Actor Theory are contained in a 
methodology imported from the field of economics. These are adequately 
summarised by Monroe (1991:78):
The traditional rational actor is thus an individual whose behaviour springs 
from individual self-interest and conscious choice. He or she is credited with 
an extensive and clear knowledge of the environment, a well-organized and 
stable system of preferences, and computational skills that allow the actor to 
calculate the best choice (given his or her preferences) of the alternatives 
available to him or her.
Such a model of the human is constructed not as an ontological claim; 
although in operation it de facto becomes one, it is, rather, posed as a 
methodological assumption. Adherents do not claim that all of human 
behaviour follows the rational actor model; they do claim, however, that it 
models enough past behaviour for it to act as a useful predictor for future 
behaviour.11
The second development in political science in the 1950s was the rise 
of a functionalist form of systems analysis deriving from the work of Robert 
Easton (1953,1992). The project here is an analysis of the political system 
derived from a reductive model of a biological organism seen through its 
interaction with its environment. Although Easton denies a relation to the
 ^1 The failure of ‘orthodox’ economics to predict the global economic crisis that began in 
2007 has caused some loss of confidence in this system of modelling.
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economism of rational actor theory, the two approaches share certain 
characteristics. As Joseph (2004:41-3) puts it:
Both systems theorists and rational choice theorists were influenced by the 
hopes of making the study of society more ‘scientific’, perhaps even making it 
possible for the social sciences to rival in prestige and achievement, the 
natural sciences.
Easton’s theory, for instance, is an importation into political science of 
Ludwig Van Bertalannfy’s General Systems Theory. Van Bertalannfy’s 
schema, closely associated with the post-war paradigm of cybernetics, is 
derived from a shift in the biological sciences away from modelling biological 
entities as closed systems towards modelling them as open systems, but 
with a focus, in particular, on the points of interaction between the entity and 
its environment. As is common to the cybernetic paradigm, the model is 
drawn at such a reductive level that an isomorphism can be identified across 
biological, mechanical and social systems.
At its most abstract the model represents the entity under study as a 
‘black box’ whose internal structure is left undetermined. The ‘black box’ has 
inputs and outputs that can be studied empirically, and most importantly, it 
has a feedback system that links inputs and outputs, allowing the entity to 
adjust its behaviour in response to its environment. When Easton applies 
this to political science he produces a model of the political system that 
matches the diagram in figure one.
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Figure 1. Diagram of Easton’s model of the political system.
As Birch (2007: 236) summarises:
In outline, the political system can then be portrayed as composed of inputs 
(articulated and aggregated) into a ‘black box; where authoritative decisions 
are made, outputs from the ‘black box’ in the form of policies, and feedback 
from the society that is affected by the policies.
The abstractness of this model has the advantage of being applicable 
to the political system at different levels of scale. It also leads, however, to a 
major problem of definition, as at this level of abstraction it is difficult to 
delineate any particular system from another. How, for instance, do you 
specify the political system as opposed to the psychological or economic 
system? This is particularly difficult when the outputs of one system form 
part of the inputs of another. As Easton is dealing with the political system 
we might expect delineation through reference to a particular conception of 
power. For Easton (1953:141), however, power is not the central 
phenomenon of political life. He provides, instead, the now famous definition 
“a political system, can be designated as the interactions through which 
values are authoritatively allocated for a society” (Easton 1992:193). We 
should note a certain functionalist circularity at work here. Easton aims to
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provide a value-neutral model of a system of value allocation. Power, and its 
relationship to the construction of values, is outside the model’s remit.
There are, of course, a number of problems with this definition. Firstly, 
the structuring effect of one system upon another is difficult to detect; indeed 
forms of power arising from the overlap of such structuring effects, or indeed 
that operate transcendentally to specific systems, become ungraspable. The 
structuring effect that the functioning of the economic system may have on 
the construction of values, for instance, is reduced to an input of the political 
system (Joseph 2004). Secondly, there is the presupposition of a limited 
model of change; feedback may modulate the system but cannot change its 
overall orientation and structure. Once again, however, accounting for 
change is not Easton’s primary concern. The structuring problematic of his 
model is to show how systems persist through challenges and crises. It is 
this that explains the primary role of the mechanism of feedback, and in 
particular, the ability of a negative feedback loop to maintain a homeostatic 
entity within an open system.
If we take as our analytic point of departure the capacity of a system to 
persist, and if we view as one of the possible and important sources of stress 
a possible drop in support below some specifiable minimum, we can 
appreciate the importance of information-feedback to the authorities (Easton 
1992:198).
From the perspective of our problematic, a systems analysis approach 
could contain some advantages. It allows, for instance, a shift of focus from 
institutions to process; that is, from a more static analysis of institutional 
structures toward a more dynamic focus on political processes. This should 
allow the inclusion of social movements within political science, at least as 
part of the social feedback mechanism that contributes to the formulation of 
political inputs into the ‘black box’ of political decision-making. However if we 
follow Robert Dahl’s (2006) development of Easton’s systems approach into 
the model of pluralism, or polyarchy, we can see that even this limited role is 
not always accepted.
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Dahl developed his model as a critique of C. Wright Mills’ analysis of 
the construction of a dominant power elite out of the overlapping elites of 
different social sectors. Dahl’s (1964) famous study of the operation of the 
political system in New Haven led him to propose a different model, in which 
competition between different groups and interests prevented any one group 
from establishing dominance. There was therefore, to expand on Easton’s 
behaviourist systems model, such a plurality of groups contributing to the 
political systems inputs that no one group benefited exclusively from its 
outputs. The idea that no group is, in principle, excluded from the feedback 
mechanisms of the political organism is central to the pluralist thesis. This 
hypothesis, however, entails a renewed elision of social movements. As 
Meyer and Lupo (2007:124) explain:
Social movement theorists attacked this theory as inappropriate and 
inaccurate for their studies. If all groups can achieve power under the pluralist 
model, then the model assumes social movements and protest politics to be 
irrational acts of insurgency that have unnecessarily skirted the more 
legitimate avenues of participation.
This assumption of an unproblematic pluralism was brought into 
question by the upsurge in social struggle in the late 1960s. We can, 
therefore, see Social Movement Theory, as it has developed within the field 
of, primarily American, sociology, as an attempt to adapt the theory of 
pluralism in the light of this upsurge in social movements. As such it makes a 
certain sense to trace some of the consequences of the influence of both a 
systems theory-derived pluralism and a rational actor, methodological 
individualism. This is of more than just historical interest as these 
shortcomings are still visible within contemporary treatment of the alter- 
globalisation movement. The tendency within political science, for instance, 
is to treat global social movements as either pathological, in neoliberal and 
neoconservative accounts; or pre-political, in the accounts of global social 
democrats. It was precisely the desire to rescue social movements from 
castigation as either pathological or pre-political that spurred the original
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development of US Social Movement Theory. It did so, however, while 
carrying the inheritance of political science’s behaviourism.
The Model of Social Movement Theory
Moving our focus from the discipline of political science to that of sociology 
follows the trajectory of the principal site of social movement study from the 
1960s on. Indeed we can see the impetus for the development of Social 
Movement Theory in the United States as, at least partly, rooted in attempts 
to build on the pluralist models of political science while avoiding its 
perceived shortcomings (Lupo, Meyer 2005). It should be noted that Social 
Movement Theory is often placed within a lineage of different, although 
related antecedents. Early treatments of social movements tended to 
conceptualise them alongside such phenomena as crowd behaviour, fads 
and panics (Le Bon 2001, McKay 1995).12 Other models, such as Collective 
Behaviour Theory viewed social movements as socially pathological 
episodes. In this view social movements arise with the breakdown of the 
social structures that would normally channel behaviour towards non- 
contentious paths (McAdam, Snow, 1997). Kornhauser (1959), for instance, 
sees social movements as irrational behaviour brought about by the 
psychological frustration and social dislocation that occur during exceptional 
periods of breakdown and material uncertainty. Similarly Smesler’s (1962) 
strain theory sees social movements as products of the fear and uncertainty 
let loose by rapid social change. This, for Semsler, is one of the external 
preconditions for the development of social movements, which needs a 
structural strain, such as a grievance, a shared understanding of that 
grievance and an inability on the part of existing power to address it.
It is easy to understand how the characterisation of movements as 
irrational, aberrant and disorganised fell out of favour towards the end of the 
1960s. US universities were themselves swept by social movements,
12 We examine the related antecedent of Crowd Theory in Chapter six.
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providing the impetus for a more sympathetic conceptualisation (Tarrow 
1998). This social movement theory was a response to the political need to 
legitimate social movements and reject their characterisation as self- 
indulgent, irrational outbursts (McAdam, et al 2001). The desire, instead, 
was for a conceptualisation of movements that shows the participants as 
ordinary people acting rationally and in an organised fashion towards a 
collective goal. The intellectual context in American universities, however, 
carried the inheritance of both rational actor theory and systems theory.
We can bring out this inheritance by exploring the role of Mancur 
Olson’s (1965) book, The Logic of Collective Action. Olson’s starting point is 
the classic formulation of rational actor theory. The principal unit of 
experience is the individual, who on the whole acts rationally and 
autonomously towards a goal of utility maximisation. From this starting point, 
groups can only be an aggregation of individuals who happen to have a 
shared interest. The problem this perspective has in accounting for group 
behaviour arises because any collective interest is strictly subordinated to 
individual interests. If these interests become separated then individual 
interests assert themselves and collective behaviour breaks down. From this 
Olsen constructs a version of the classic problem of the free rider. There is a 
rational unwillingness to bear the costs of acting if the same benefit can be 
gained by free riding on the actions of others. As Olson (1965:16) puts it:
The rational individual has no incentive to act as his own efforts will not have 
a noticeable effect on the situation of his organization, and he can enjoy any 
improvements brought about by others whether or not he has worked in 
support of his organization.
This problem is exacerbated when the benefits of group action aren’t 
limited to the members of the group, or, to use Olsen’s terminology, when 
the aim is not a selective interest but a public good.
[Ojnly a separate and 'selective' incentive will stimulate a rational individual in 
a latent group to act in a group-oriented way. In such circumstances group 
action can be obtained only through an incentive that operates, not
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indiscriminately, like the collective good, upon the group as a whole, but 
rather selectively toward the individuals in the group (Olson 1965:8).
This of course creates a certain difficulty in accounting for social 
movements oriented towards public goods - civil rights movements, for 
example, or the emergence of environmentalism. If, however, collective 
action and social movements are only possible if people are willing to bear 
the costs, then we could create an explanation through reference to factors 
that could reduced the costs of participation and therefore affect a 
cost/benefit analysis. We can use this problematic to position the two main 
strains of social movement theory that have developed, primarily in the US, 
from the late 1960s; Resource Mobilisation Theory and Political Opportunity 
Theory.
Both theories retain many of Olsen’s presuppositions, positing goal- 
orientated movements and utility-maximising participants but each offer 
slightly different explanations of the mechanisms with which the costs of 
participation are lowered. For Political Opportunity Theory, as Tarrow (1998: 
20) explains, “Changes in political opportunities and constraints create the 
most important incentives for initiating new phases of contention.” This can 
mean that social movement emergence is explained through reference to 
changes in the structure of the existing political system.13 The concept of 
political opportunity can, however, extend to wider conceptions of 
transformations brought about by struggle.
By political opportunities, I mean consistent but not necessarily formal, 
permanent or national dimensions of the political struggle that encourage 
people to engage in contentious politics. By political constraints, I mean 
factors like repression, but also like authorities' capacity to present a solid 
front to insurgents that discourage contention (Tarrow 1998: 20).
13 We can see here how such a conceptualisation would fit with a pluralist conception as in 
this perspective movements should not emerge if political institutions are functioning 
properly.
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A change in political opportunity structures, then, can reduce social 
movement start-up costs or make them prohibitively expensive. The initial 
agency for the emergence of movements is located externally, although 
initiator movements can create new opportunities for subsequent 
movements.
Resource Mobilisation Theory, which we can associate initially with the 
work of McCarthy and Zald (1973,1977), is closely related to Political 
Opportunity Theory and to some extent overlaps with it. The key distinction 
is that whereas, “writers in the political opportunity tradition emphasize the 
mobilization of resources external to the group” (Tarrow 1998:77), Resource 
Mobilisation Theory emphasises the mobilisation of internal resources. The 
latter seek a solution to Olsen’s collective action problem through reference 
to the ability of movement initiators, or ‘movement entrepreneurs’, to 
mobilise resources that would reduce the cost of movement participation and 
raise the potential for benefit. The emphasis, therefore, is on the enabling 
effects of shared resources. Resource Mobilisation Theory, then, has the 
advantage of moving the focus of enquiry away from the question of ‘why 
social movements occur’ towards the question of ‘what they do’ (Tarrow 
1998).
As it’s rarely the case that constraints can be imposed or selective 
incentives provided by movement initiators, one of the major resources 
available is innovation around established forms of action (Tarrow 1998).
The most useful, and influential, way of conceptualising these forms of action 
is as ‘repertoires of contention’, which Tilly (1995: 26), defines thus:
The word repertoire identifies a limited set of routines that are learned, shared 
and acted out through a relatively deliberate process of choice. Repertoires 
are learned cultural creations, but they do not descend from abstract 
philosophy or take shape as a result of political propaganda; they emerge 
from struggle. People learn to break windows in protest, attack pilloried 
prisoners, tear down dishonoured houses, stage public marches, petition, 
hold formal meetings, organise special-interest associations. At any particular
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point in history, however, they learn only a rather small number of alternative 
ways to act collectively.
Such a conception allows a delineation of movements around the forms 
of action they adopt, and, in addition, carries an emphasis on the creativity of 
social movements. As McAdam (1995: 234) says: "We often know a protest 
cycle by the innovative tactical forms to which it gives rise."14
This conception of movement repertoires suggests some dynamics 
with which to model social movements. Firstly, as Tilly (1995:26) makes 
clear, “[e]ach routine within an established repertoire actually consists of an 
interaction among two or more parties. Repertoires belong to sets of 
contending actors, not to single actors." Repertoires are, for Tilly, the means 
by which groups make claims upon others. The party to which the claim is 
made is usually the state, but there may be other contending groups making 
similar claims. There is, then, a dynamic interaction between these different 
actors, as each one adapts to the moves of the others.
Another dynamic that the concept brings into play, however, is the 
diffusion of innovative repertoires into wider society. One of the jobs that the 
concept of repertoires does is:
[To] disaggregate the popular notion of protest into its conventional and less 
conventional components. In each period of history some forms of collective 
action are sanctioned by habit, expectations, and even legality, while others 
are unfamiliar, unexpected, and are rejected as illegitimate by elites and the 
mass public alike. (Tarrow 1998).
The term strike, for instance, can be traced back to 1768 when British 
seamen struck the sails of their vessels and brought London’s commerce to
14 The concept of movement repertoire has also been extended to organisational 
repertoires and even discursive repertoires.
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a halt (Rediker 1989:110).15 Early strikes were shockingly unacceptable and 
often met with considerable violence. “As late as the 1870s it was barely 
known, poorly understood, and widely rejected as a legitimate form of 
collective action. By the 1960s however, the strike can be considered as an 
accepted part of collective bargaining practice" (Tarrow 1995: 332).
It is from these dynamics that Tarrow (1995) constructs the model of 
the ‘cycle of contention’ or ‘protest cycle’. These begin with moments of rapid 
repertoire innovation, which Tarrow (1995:328), following Zolberg (1972), 
calls “moments of madness”. These are often intensive and highly creative 
moments involving movement initiators. Social movement emergence might, 
then, be understood as the self-generation of political opportunities through 
repertoire innovation. As repertoires become more established then they 
become more modular or transferable. This dynamic can lead not just to 
widened participation in the movement but the development of spin-off 
movements by others who take advantage of the opening the repertoire has 
created. Or as Traugott (1995:3) puts it: “modularity facilitates mobilization 
by reducing start up costs.” These dynamics of diffusion combined with the 
response of the state, or the party to which the claim is made, eventually 
cause the cycle to come to an end. As Edwards (2009:213) summarises:
The protest cycle peaks with widespread diffusion and emulation, then 
declines as assimilation and neutralisation prevail; the outcome is the 
demobilisation of the new movements and the adoption of most of the new 
repertoire by existing organisations.
With this model, then, the lifecycle of a social movement describes a 
parabolic arc, from innovation, to diffusion, to resolution, leading to a 
widened repertoire and, perhaps, to the addressing of the initial claims on 
the political system. As McAdam (1995:236) makes clear “[rjepertoires,
Rediker (1989) constructs a picture of the seaman as an early example of the wage­
earning, collective worker whose early proletarianisation provides the context for the 
invention of the strike.
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then, are properly viewed as among the key cultural innovations whose 
diffusion gives the protest cycle its characteristic shape and momentum."
The concept of repertoires of contention was developed by Tilly (1995: 
28) specifically to escape from what he perceived to be teleological 
presuppositions contained in “the prepolitical/political dichotomy employed 
by E. J. Hobsbawm and George Rude.” Tilly saw in this dichotomy a form of 
developmentalism, which judged movements as either pre-cursors to, or cul- 
de-sacs from, the labour movement.16 Tilly had previously developed a 
taxonomy of movements based on the assessment of their claims as 
competitive, reactive or proactive, but rejected this as also tainted by 
developmentalism. One of the questions we might reasonably ask is whether 
resource mobilisation theory doesn’t carry its own teleological assumptions 
and as such prioritises certain struggles over others. Calhoun (1993), for 
instance, argues that Tilly’s model of the modern social movement is 
intimately tied to the rise of the nation state and perhaps even more 
specifically to the example of Chartism.
Charles Tilly... in some of the most important and influential work in the field, 
tied the study of social movements closely to state making and economic 
issues. An advance on collective behavior psychologism, this produced a kind 
of mirror image in which only directly political-economic, nationally integrated, 
and state oriented movements received full attention (Calhoun 1993: 413).
Of course if the modern repertoire of social movements is tied to the 
nation state we can ask whether it can be adapted to trans-national 
movements, and in particular a movement that focuses on the phenomena of 
neoliberal globalisation.
16 Toscano (2010:51) has a very different reading of Hobsbawm’s distinction in which the 
designation prepolitical “though by no means entirely free from the historical-materialist 
condescension towards primitive forms of anti-capitalism, rests on an understanding of 
politics in terms of its efficacy, durability and capacity to generate a new and better world."
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We can take Eschle (2004: 71) as providing a reasonable summation 
of at least the initial framing of the concerns of the alter-globalisation 
movement.
[M]ost activist accounts in recent years have focused more centrally on 
phenomena associated with economic globalisation: the increasing power of 
corporations, the growing role of international financial institutions, and the 
neoliberal policies of trade liberalisation and privatisation propounded by the 
latter and from which the former benefit. These are seen to produce economic 
inequality, social and environmental destruction, and cultural homogenisation. 
They are also accused of leaching power and self-determination away from 
people and governments -  of being anti-democratic.
We can see that such concerns would not fit easily into a schema 
oriented towards ‘nationally integrated and state oriented movements’. It is, 
however, quite feasible for the ‘democratic deficit’ caused by globalisation to 
be understood as a change in the political opportunity structure, which in turn 
could be used to explain movement emergence. Accordingly the concept of 
repertoire does seem transportable to the alter-globalisation cycle of 
protests. Indeed we will use the concept, and ultimately modify it during the 
thesis.
However, Resource Mobilisation Theory’s teleological commitments are 
not exhausted by its attachment to the nation state as the principal field of 
analysis. We will argue that there are some additional, implicit teleological 
commitments contained in some lacunae inherited from the behaviourist turn 
in political science. Firstly, Resource Mobilisation Theory’s conception of 
repertoires is understood as a mechanism of claim-making; the political 
problematic that structures the theory, then, is that of pluralism.17 Indeed we 
can go further here and claim that the parabolic arc of the social movement
17 This accords with the assessment of Chesters and Welsh (2006:15) when they say:
“The dominance of pluralist models of interest representation and inclusion within the United 
States are significant features of all established US approaches. These have orientated 
resource and frame-work towards prevailing national political opportunity structure."
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cycle of contention is isomorphic with the feedback loop in Easton’s diagram 
of the political system. Both Resource Mobilisation Theory and Political 
Opportunity Theory, therefore, carry Easton’s analytical focus on, and 
assumption of, the survival of the existing political system. Yet while the 
latter explains movement emergence in terms of a lack, the former explains 
it in terms of an excess, and as such remains analytically open to political 
problematics that focus on the creativity of social movements.
We can explore this by thinking through the different orientations of the 
concept of a claim, or demand, and the concept of a problematic.18 Claims 
and demands are by their very nature claims or demands to someone or 
something. They are claims or demands put to an existing state or state of 
affairs. Even if they are implicit rather than explicit they are always, to some 
extent, within the terms and sense of what exists. The analytical focus on the 
making of a claim or demand in Resource Mobilisation Theory helps to 
explain its analytic focus on the diffusion of repertoires into the normalised 
functioning of the existing political system rather than a focus on the 
mechanisms of their creation.19
In addition to claims and demands, however, we can understand social 
movements as forming around problems. This shouldn’t be understood in a 
simple functionalist fashion, as if there is a pre-existent problem which then 
produces a social movement that, in turn, forces the state or capital to 
respond and solve the problem. It is rather that social movements form their
19 There is a danger here that we are eliding the distinction between a claim and a demand; 
however, in relation to the political problematic that we are trying to develop, claims and 
demands function similarly enough to make this a legitimate move. It is, after all, a small 
enough leap from a political problematic based on claim making to Della Porta and Diani’s 
(1999:233) claim that, “all movements make demands on the political system”.
19 This also returns us to the orientation towards the nation state. Within the field of 
globalisation, however, there is an additional problem of who it is exactly demands could be 
put to.
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own problematic at the same time as they are formed by them.20 Social 
movements usually involve a moment of rupture through the creation of a 
new problem. That is, they problematise a certain area of the social field that 
was previously treated as unproblematic. With this rupture comes a whole 
new set of questions and problems that don’t fit with existing sense and 
cannot be removed with a simple solution. As Rajchman (2001:105) puts it: 
“there is no form of government that can rule out or completely silence those 
problems that are not obstacles to be removed but rather are points around 
which new ‘becomings’ arise, new ways of thinking take shape”. As this new 
way of thinking, or new sense, takes hold it produces its own problematics 
and questions and it is in the interrelation between this new sense and the 
sense of the existing socius that movements move. This concept of 
movement problematics, therefore, can help us to think about movements in 
terms of their attempts to break with existing sense and ask their own 
questions on their own terms. The central concern of our thesis is precisely 
the conceptual, political and organisational consequences of this difficult 
relationship between the existing sense of society, or the socius, and a 
movement’s creation of its own sense.21
To think this through in terms of repertoires we could say that a 
movement innovates a repertoire that imperfectly expresses a certain 
problematisation of the existing state of affairs. The movement must then 
problematise its own modes of acting as it attempts to pose questions that 
don’t make sense from within the sense of the existing socius. We can say, 
then, that the development of repertoires carries an additional dynamic to the
20 We could even say that, apart from their performative aspects, demands are 
redundancies when thought in relation to problems. As Deleuze (2006b: 380) says: “You 
always get the solutions you deserve depending on the problems that have been posed.”
21 In subsequent chapters we will conceptualise this as about the creation of new sense 
through escaping the fetishisation of existing values. When we problematise different effects 
of capital, for instance, we are trying to get to the problems that can’t be posed from within 
the socius of capital. But we can only do this through the creation of new values, or as De 
Angelis (2007) would say, the creation of new value practices.
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ones identified previously. The movement must try new innovations in 
repertoires as it tries to grasp the wider problematic of the complex social 
field within which they operate.22
This is not to dismiss demands and claim making as unimportant. We 
might instead propose the image of movements as doubly articulated. 
Demands are the side of the movement that is orientated towards what 
already exists. Demands are the appeal for recognition of new problems. 
Problematics, however, are the side of social movements that face away 
from the existing world and towards new ones. In addition, we can say that 
problematics move more quickly than demands, which function, in some 
ways, as the freezing of movements. We can illustrate this point anecdotally 
before, in later chapters, we explore it conceptually. In 2006 Olivier 
Marcellus (2006:1), a founding participant in the important alter-globalisation 
network People’s Global Action, wrote: “People have been saying for some 
time that what the movement needs are some real victories. But -  it’s a 
strange but frequent phenomenon -  when movements finally win them, they 
often go unnoticed.” The context for this statement was the collapse of the 
Doha round of trade talks, which seemed to signal that the World Trade 
Organization was effectively defunct. One of the slogans of the initial cycle of 
anti-summit protests was ‘Kill the WTO’. Yet when this demand was 
effectively achieved there seemed to be no widespread feeling of victory in 
the movement; there was rather a feeling of impasse. We would suggest that 
by the time the demand to ‘Kill the WTO’ had been achieved the problematic 
of the movement had moved on - that is to say, the movement had new 
problems to deal with.
22 We should point out that there is some overlap here with some elements of the concept 
of repertoires. We could look to Tarrow (1998:41), for example, when he says:
Like the demonstration and the strike, the barricade had an internal, as well as an 
external logic. As they faced off against hostile troops, the defenders came to know 
each other as comrades, developed a division of labor of fighters, builders, and 
suppliers, forming networks of comrades that would bring them together in future 
confrontations.
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Within the field of Social Movement Theory the reading of the alter- 
globalisation movement that comes closest to this conception can be found 
in Chesters and Welsh (2006), who create a theoretical assemblage from the 
work of Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, Gregory Bateson and Alberto 
Melluci.23 Of particular pertinence here is their concept of reflexive framing, 
which they define as, “the sense making practices of actors necessary to 
situate themselves in relation to a domain” (Chesters, Welsh 2006:9). This 
concept is distinguished from the frame analysis, derived from the work of
23 Melucci’s work represents a quite different strand of Social Movement Theory to the 
traditions of Resource Mobilisation and Political Opportunity Theory. His work is perhaps 
amongst the most useful of the tradition known as New Social Movement Theory. This 
developed not in the pluralist dominated atmosphere of the United States but, primarily, 
within a 1980s European post-Marxist milieu. As such the perhaps paradigmatic 
characterisation of a New Social Movement lies in the distinction created by a perceived 
shift from material or class based ‘old’ movements towards normatively based or even 
identity based ‘new’ movements. The danger in such a characterisation is that it 
universalises the political concerns of a particular period and fails to encompass the 
concerns of movements to come. The alter-globalisation movement, for instance, could be 
characterised as a complex mix of both ‘old’ and ‘new’ social movement concerns. It carries 
many of the characteristics described by Calhoun (1993:404):
One of the most striking features of the paradigmatic NSMs has been their insistence 
that the organizational forms and styles of movement practice must exemplify the 
values the movement seeks to promulgate. This means, at the same time, that the 
movements are ends in themselves. Relatedly, many NSMs are committed to direct 
democracy and a nonhierarchical structure, substantially lacking in role differentiation, 
and resistant to involvement of professional movement staff.
Indeed Melucci (1996:30) comes close to our own problematic when he says:
[A social movement] does not just restrict itself to expressing a conflict; it pushes the 
conflict beyond the limits of the system of social relationships within which the action 
is located. In other words, it breaks the rules of the game, it sets its own non- 
negotiable objectives, it challenges the legitimacy of power, and so forth".
Yet, as we have already argued, the alter-globalisation movement could be seen as a move
away from the seriality of identity politics towards a renewed concern with the effects of
material production. Indeed this distinction has provoked the creation of the category, ‘newer
social movements’ (Murray 2006).
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Erving Goffman, which is usually deployed in the study of social movements. 
As Chesters and Welsh (2006:16) make clear the usual conception of frame 
analysis employed in the study of social movements is orientated towards 
placing social movement organisations “on the path towards realisable ends 
within a national polity-, as such it is developed “explicitly against adopting 
abstract master frames such as capitalist inequality on the grounds that 
these could not be transformed into credible grievance frames capable of 
resonance and amplification.” Chesters and Welsh (2006:16) critique this 
empirically, pointing to the alter-globalisation movement’s successful 
mobilisation of “millions of people in hundreds of countries” using “a neo­
liberal capitalist axiomatic as its ‘master frame’”.
To produce a reflexive frame analysis adequate to this task Chesters 
and Welsh (2006) re-emphasise Bateson’s work in respect to Goffman’s. 
That this creates certain overlaps with our own problematic can be seen in 
this summary:
Bateson’s take on framing then is a wide-ranging one that relates to both 
individual processes of psychological framing and the collective 
consequences of these frames in selecting certain differences as categories 
of fact that structure human activity on the basis of both cognitive and 
affective processes (Chesters, Welsh 2006:13).
We can link this conception of framing with a critique of Easton’s model of 
the political system through Bateson’s involvement in cybernetics and, in 
particular, his conception of second order cybernetics.
We earlier identified Easton’s ‘black box’ concept of the political system 
as an application of Von Bertalanffy’s General Systems Theory. We could 
also associate it, and the more general turn towards behaviourism in political 
science, with the closely associated paradigm of cybernetics. The term 
cybernetics, popularised by Nobert Wiener, is taken from the ancient Greek 
word kybernetikos, meaning ‘good at steering’ or steersman (Gere 2002:
52). Easton’s diagram of the political system as a black box, with inputs, 
outputs and a feedback mechanism, is isomorphic with the electrical 
engineering circuit diagram drawn up by Wiener during his Second World
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War work to develop a feedback mechanism which would allow anti-aircraft 
gunners to predict the trajectory of their target acros the delay between the 
firing of the ordinance and its arrival.24 As Lafontaine (2007: 29) explains:
Based on his work on the AA predictor, Wiener and his colleagues began an 
epistemological revolution by rejecting the intrinsic study of beings and things 
and focusing the analysis instead on interactions between objects, regardless 
of their nature (physical, biological, artificial or human).
Central to the establishment of the paradigm of cybernetics were a 
series of cross-disciplinary meetings held between 1946 and 1953, known 
as the Macy conferences. Both Wiener and Bateson were part of the core 
group of participants at the conferences.25 The set of theories that arose, 
however, had specific limitations, as Gere (2002:121) summarises:
(T)he cybernetics that emerged out of the Macy Conferences and elsewhere 
in the 1940s and ‘50s was typical of the period. It was largely based on 
engineering paradigms, and was interested in idealized systems of 
homeostasis and feedback. It adhered to the traditional scientific view of the 
observer as standing outside of the system being observed.
In 1968 Bateson organised a new conference aimed at incorporating 
questions of reflexivity and the position of the observer within cybernetics. 
This approach , which became known as second order cybernetics, aimed, 
“to understand how the human activity of representing and modelling both 
natural and social processes inevitably contributed to shaping and altering 
those very same processes” (Holmes 2009). In 1973, during an interview
24 The human pilot was just one of the heterogeneous elements that had to be made 
equivalent as information so as to be incorporated into ballistic trajectories. Indeed, as 
Lafontaine (2007:32) explains, “the concept of feedback provides the basis for the 
theoretical elimination of the frontier between the living and the non-living.” We could trace a 
line here through information theory to, among other things, Donna Haroway’s (1991) 
conception of the cyborg.
2® Another member of the core group was John von Neuman, the inventor of game theory 
and therefore an intellectual precursor to Olsen (Lafontaine 2007).
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with Stuart Brand (1976), Bateson and his wife Margaret Mead drew the pair 
of diagrams in figure two as an explanation of the distinction between first 
and second order cybernetics. The first diagram is recognisably isomorphic 
with Easton’s ‘black box’ model of the political system, with Easton, as the 
modeller, taking the place of the engineer outside, and transcendent to, the 
circuit. In the lower diagram the engineer, in this case Wiener is entrained 
within the system. As the interview continued Bateson and Mead added 
themselves within the circuit, as they themselves are the modellers or the 
circuit with Wiener inside. This is, of course, a recursive dynamic.
In p u t_______________ O utput
f Feedback J
Engineer
7 + (  Feedback Ì \
—  4 '
Feedback - J
Wiener, Bateson, Mead
Figure 2. Diagram of first and second order cybernetics.
Second order cybernetics is an ambiguous paradigm; it is antecedent 
to many subsequent developments, such as complexity theory or cognitive 
science (Protevi 2009). It could potentially, however, involve a re­
politicisation of cybernetics, as the values, and their consequent structuring 
effects, are brought within the scope of analysis.26 The collapse of second 
order cybernetics in the late 1970s, due, in part, to the difficulty of resolving 
its recursive nature leads us away from following this path directly.
26 Indeed Holmes (2009) suggests that Bateson’s movement from a cybernetic to a more 
ecological conception of systems has strong parallels with Guattari’s later conceptions of 
ecosophy and meta-modelling.
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Rather than follow the concept of reflexive framing, however, we will, in 
Chapter Four, use Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of the Body without 
Organs and the socius as a means of approaching the problematic of sense 
making.27 Before that, however, we will follow the alter-globalisation 
movement’s anti-neoliberal problematic through Foucault’s conception of 
neoliberal governmentality, and Deleuze’s conception of control societies. 
These concepts open up an analysis of neoliberalism through reference to 
its sense-making, while simultaneously grasping its relation to cybernetic 
mechanisms of feedback.
The Neoliberal Steersman
Foucault (2008) developed his conception of neoliberalism through a series 
of lectures delivered from 1978-1979 and latter published as The Birth of 
Biopolitics. In these lectures Foucault conceives neoliberalism as a mode of 
governmentality, a concept succinctly defined by Read (2009: 29) as “a 
manner, or a mentality, in which people are governed and govern 
themselves.” Foucault (2008) locates the novelty of neoliberalism in the 
transformation it effects within the liberal mode of governmentality and its 
attendant subjectivity homo economicus. The subjectivity of homo 
economicus, or economic man, involves the extension of the mode of 
rationality that we associate with the economic realm across the whole of 
society. For an example of such thinking in the political sphere we can look 
to the public choice theorists James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock when 
they declare that “[t]he average individual acts on the basis of the same 
overall value scale when he participates in market activity and in political 
activity” (cited in Surowiecki 2004: 263).
In contradiction to many conceptions of neoliberalism, and indeed to 
the implications of its name, Foucault (2008:131) states that we should
27 The concept of the Body without Organs could, in part, be thought of as a means of 
putting a stop to the recursive search for the conditioning of the present.
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“avoid at all costs” mistaking neoliberalism for a mere repetition of the 
classical liberalism of, for example, Adam Smith. For classical liberals the 
market is a natural form, which requires only the absence of government 
interference, and the upholding of the right to private property. Under these 
conditions markets will allow the invisible hand of individual self-interest to 
maximise social utility. The rationality of homo economicus, in this schema, 
is based on man’s natural “propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one 
thing for another” (Smith 1991:117). For neoliberalism, however, homo 
economicus is based not on exchange but competition. This produces an 
important distinction, as the purely competitive market is, in some ways, 
artificial. It requires state intervention to produce the right conditions for 
competitive markets and more intervention to spread market forms through 
the rest of society. This intervention to create market forms turns 
components of the state into entrepreneurial entities in competition for 
resources. In the university sector, for example, neoliberal reform has 
created a situation in which not only is each university in competition with 
other universities but each department within the university is in competition 
with each other and other departments in other universities. Not only this but 
each individual member of staff or student is constructed to be in competition 
with each other. The result is a proliferation of bureaucratic mechanisms of 
measure, which falls back upon its object, structuring, and corrupting 
productive activity.
By participating within these proliferating markets, individuals are 
constantly forced into cost/benefit judgments based on economic value. 
There is constant pressure to behave as though the individuals themselves 
were competitive entities, or indeed, human capital. This constant, enforced 
participation in markets act as a kind of training, which naturalises the notion 
that individuals are enterprises who should invest in themselves to maximise 
their utility. For Foucault (2008:226), then, under neoliberalism: “Homo 
economicus is an entrepreneur, an entrepreneur of himself.
Foucault’s analysis, then, portrays neoliberalism as a paradoxical entity 
that intervenes into society to create its own presuppositions, or as Lemke
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(2001:202) says, it is “a political project that endeavours to create a social 
reality that it suggests already exists.” Neoliberalism’s presuppositions, then, 
fall back upon society and begins to structure society’s sense of itself or, as 
David Harvey (2005:3) puts it: “Neoliberalism... has pervasive effects on 
ways of thought to the point where it has become incorporated into the 
common-sense way many of us interpret, live in, and understand the world.” 
The creation of a neoliberal common sense involves the imposition of a 
manner of living, and indeed of a certain kind humanism, by which we mean 
a model of the human. This has many overlaps with the behaviourism that 
we find in political science. As Lemke (2001:201) explains:
Whereas in the classic liberal conception, homo economicus forms an 
external limit and the inviolable core of governmental action, in the neo-liberal 
thought of the Chicago School he becomes a behavioristically manipulable 
being and the correlative of a governmentality which systematically changes 
the variable "environment" and can rightly expect that individuals are 
characterized by "rational choice”.28
We can see here some connections to a cybernetic system in which 
the expectations of the modeller influence the system they are, apparently, 
observing. This connection, however, is brought out much more clearly in the 
concept of control societies that Deleuze (1995) detects as a latent concept 
in Foucault’s work.29 Deleuze (1995) outlines the diagram of control by 
contrasting it to the diagram of disciplinarity. In the latter, individuals move 
through an array of institutions each containing their own distinct logic, laws 
and practices; their distinct ‘dispositif’, which provides its own limits to 
thoughts and action, and its own distinctions of normality and deviancy. 
Throughout their life a person might be a pupil at school, a soldier in the
28 Despite rational choice theory’s protestations that its assumptions are merely 
methodological we can see through its entrainment within neoliberalism that it is operatively 
ontological.
29 Deleuze borrows the term control from William Burroughs, who wrote a series of essays 
on the concept (see Burroughs 1984).
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army, a worker at the factory, a father in the family and a patient at the 
hospital. Each dispositif, however, is a variation on a common diagram of 
power that takes the form of the ‘panopticon’ (Foucault, 1977).30 Deleuze 
(1995) detects in Foucault’s later work, however, the notion that the hard 
striations of distinct disciplinary institutions are being replaced with hybrid, 
and “ultra rapid forms of free-floating control” (Deleuze, 1995:178). The 
disciplinary institution of the school, for instance, gives way to the 
environment of life-long learning and continuous assessment that is needed 
to maintain the individual as a competitive entity. As Deleuze (1995:181) 
says: “Control is short-term and rapidly shifting, but at the same time 
continuous and unbounded, whereas discipline was long-term, infinite and 
discontinuous.”
Existence within control societies, then, requires continuous 
participation within its circuits of communication. It incorporates and 
manages populations through mechanisms of feedback, but these 
mechanisms do not allow the participants to reach or control the overarching 
parameters of that participation or the conditions under which it takes place. 
We could look to the rise of the focus group as the paradigmatic form of 
political participation in societies of control. The focus group provides 
feedback but it never gets to set the questions or make the decisions about 
how that feedback is incorporated within the political system. If the feedback 
does breach the parameters set by the political ‘engineer’, of course, it can 
simply be discounted. Isn’t this precisely the way that contemporary 
structures of power would like to incorporate social movements? As 
mechanisms of feedback whose excessive components are ignored in the 
reduction of the movement to issues that fit within existing sense.
This does not necessarily imply fully conscious control over the system 
by some kind of ‘engineer’. Of course the ‘engineer’ is also entrained within
33 The model of the panopticon, developed by Jeremy Bentham, has a series of cells all of 
which can be observed from a central point. The inhabitants of the cell, however, can never 
know when or if they are being observed.
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the system and its modulations are, to a large degree the result of self- 
modulatation. As Deleuze (1995:178) makes clear, “Confinements are 
molds, different moldings, while controls are a modulation, like a self- 
transmuting”. In disciplinary societies the diagram of the panopticon ensures 
that the subject never knows when they are being watched; as a 
consequence the subject has to internalise this judgment of their behaviour. 
In control societies the assessment is similarly indeterminate but now the 
criteria for judgment are also in constant modulation and subject to feedback 
mechanisms. As a consequence we can never be sure what the criteria for 
judgment is or what the norm is. We find ourselves in a Kafkaesque maze of 
cybernetic bureaucracy in which final judgment is indefinitely postponed. “In 
the disciplinary societies one was always starting again (from school to the 
barracks, from the barracks to the factory), while in the societies of control 
one is never finished with anything” (Deleuze, 1995:179).31
In the light of these analyses, of governmentality and control, the 
problem with neoliberal globalisation becomes more than merely trans­
national corporations, governance structures, or flows of finance capital, 
acting beyond the purview of the nation state, and therefore structuring the 
conditions of possibility for national policy. Neoliberalism is now revealed as 
a dispositif of power that, by conditioning our common sense understanding 
of how to live a life, has transcendental dimensions unreachable by a 
political strategy of global governance reform. As Hardt and Negri (2009: 6) 
put it: “Such transcendental powers compel obedience not through the 
commandment of a sovereign or even primarily through force but rather by 
structuring the conditions of possibility of social life.” From this premise the 
political problematics of the alter-globalisation movement look very different.
Similarly we can see how an analytical methodology containing the 
humanist presuppositions of behaviourism creates certain lacunae, which
31 It is these characteristics that lead to Deleuze’s (1995:175) warning: “Compared with the 
approaching forms of ceaseless control in open sites, we may come to see the harshest 
confinement as part of a wonderful happy past."
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remove the transcendental conditioning of possibility of social life from the 
scope of analysis. In the next chapter we will examine a more appropriate 
methodology before moving to an examination of the political problematic of 
the alter-globalisation movement in regards to neoliberalism’s transcendental 
dimensions. We do this in Chapter Four by developing the concept of 
moments of excess in relation to Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of the 
Body without Organs and the socius. In Chapters Five and Six we will go on 
to examine some of the movement’s organisational and action repertoires as 
moments in the potential construction of a diagram of an analytical war 
machine, which, we will propose, is an organisational form adequate to this 
problematic and, at an abstract enough level, transportable to future 
generations of struggle.
- 4 3 -
Chapter Three 
Syptoms of Excess
The first impression was of a gigantic lid suddenly lifted, of pent-up thoughts 
and aspirations suddenly exploding, on being released from the realm of 
dreams into the realm of the real and the possible. In changing their 
environment people themselves were changed. Those who had never dared 
say anything suddenly felt their thoughts the most important thing in the world 
-  and said so. The shy became communicative. The helpless and isolated 
sudden discovered that collective power lay in their hands. The traditionally 
apathetic suddenly realised the intensity of their involvement. A tremendous 
surge of community and cohesion gripped those who had previously seen 
themselves as isolated and impotent puppets dominated by institutions that 
they could neither control nor understand. People went up and talked to one 
another without a trace of self-consciousness. This state of euphoria lasted 
throughout the whole fortnight I was there. An inscription scrawled on the wall 
sums it up perfectly: “Deja dix jours de bonheur” (ten days of happiness 
already) (Dark Star Collective 2001:76).
It’s a physical thing. The hairs on the back on your arms stand up. You get 
goosebumps. There’s a tingling in your spine. Your heart is racing. Your eyes 
shine and all your senses are heightened: sights, sounds, smells are all more 
intense. Somebody brushes past you, skin on skin, and you feel sparks. Even 
the acrid rasp of tear gas at the back of your throat becomes addictive, whilst 
a sip of water has come from the purest mountain spring. You have an 
earnest conversation with the total stranger standing next to you and it feels 
completely normal. (Not something that happens too often in the checkout 
queue at the supermarket.) Everybody is more attractive. You can’t stop 
grinning. Fuck knows what endorphins your brain’s producing, but it feels 
great. Collectivity is visceral! (Free Association 2005a: 569).
- 44 -
Introduction
The alter-globalisation movement is commonly accused of incoherence.32 In 
part this Is provoked by the movement’s style of politics -  the lack of a formal 
political programme, for instance -  but there is, in addition, a perceived 
inconsistency in the identification of grievances and adversaries. Indeed the 
criticism ‘they don’t know what they are for’ is entangled with the idea that 
‘they don’t now what are they against’. Protests have taken place against a 
wide range of governance structures, from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) to the World Trade Organization (WTO) to the G8 (group of eight 
leading industrialised countries) and even the summits of the European 
Union. Although we might point to a shared general direction of policy 
amongst these institutions, the so-called Washington consensus, the 
variation in targets has left some observers with the impression of a lack of 
focus. It has lent itself, in extremis, to the then UK Prime Minister Tony 
Blair’s caricature of summit protesters as “an anarchists' travelling circus that 
goes from summit to summit with the sole purpose of causing as much 
mayhem as possible” (BBC News 2001). While these criticisms are 
ultimately misplaced we could use them to illustrate an important 
characteristic of the movement. Its coherence does not develop in a linear 
fashion. If we follow our previous argument that movements cohere around a 
shared set of problematics, then we can say that movements move through 
the development of these problematics. This development, however, 
contains moments of rupture and disjunction, as the movement seeks to 
break with the existing sense of political possibility in order to pose its own 
questions on its own terms.
The protests against the WTO meeting in Seattle in November 1999 
are commonly seen as the alter-globalisation movement’s moment of 
emergence. In fact the Seattle protest was one of a series of global days of
32 See, for example, Fotopoulos (2005).
- 4 5 -
action called by the organisation People’s Global Action (PGA).33 Indeed the 
London J18 Carnival against Capitalism preceded Seattle, taking place, as 
the name indicates, on 18 June 1999. The idea of a global day of action was, 
in part, an attempt to grasp and figure the forms of power brought to the fore 
by neoliberal globalisation.34 The symbolism of a global governance summit, 
such as the G8 or the WTO, provided a date for a coordinated series of 
protests across a range of countries. 18 June 1999 was chosen as a PGA 
global day of action to coincide with the opening of the G8 summit in 
Cologne. Protests took place in 40 countries around the world but, as it 
turned out, the most significant protest took place not in Cologne but in 
London (Ainger 2009). In the period after Seattle the idea of global days of 
action, with simultaneous protests across different countries, began to lose 
purchase. The perceived success at Seattle, with the protests significantly 
disrupting the summit, meant that subsequent protests became focused on 
the city or region in which the summit was taking place.
One of the implicit arguments of the previous chapter is that the form a 
movement takes reflects its object and context, and in particular, the specific 
forms of power with which the movement participants are entangled and 
from which they are attempting to break free. One of the initiating 
problematics of the alter-globalisation movement was the attempt to get to 
grips with a form of power whose operation transcended forms of 
representative democracy, and indeed the related political imaginaries, 
centred on nation states. Seen through the prism of this problem a 
concentration on summit protest might seem a reductive move. Indeed 
Tormey (2005:338) highlights the danger of “the fallacy of ‘summitism’ (the 
view that summits are major occasions for elite deliberation and governance
33 Of course we could trace the point of emergence back further, perhaps to the Zapatista 
uprising of 1 January 1994. The PGA emerged out of a series international meetings, called 
encuentros, initiated by the Zapatistas in 1996 (P.G.A. 2002).
34 A prominent slogan used on publicity for the J18 protests in London, for instance, read: 
‘Our Resistance is as Transnational as Capital.’
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and hence that shutting down summits represents a substantive and 
meaningful blow to global elites).” However despite this danger, and it is a 
danger that has been widely acknowledged in movement literature, summit 
protests have been a stubbornly persistent movement form.* 35
Perhaps this persistence can be better understood if we change our 
perspective to look at Seattle’s compositional, rather than overtly 
oppositional, effects. That is to say, the Seattle protests weren’t just 
significant for the effects they had on their adversary, the WTO; the most 
dramatic effects were on the composition of the movement itself. Seattle is 
forever associated with the startling alliance of ‘turtles and teamsters’. The 
image of environmentalists dressed as turtles finding themselves side by 
side with members of labour unions with whom there may previously have 
been some tension, has been used as a stand-in for a much wider array of 
participants who suddenly found they could act in common.36 It would be a 
mistake, however, to see this in terms of formal alliances between pre­
existing and unchanging political identities. The ‘turtles and teamsters’ could 
only come together in such numbers because a significant amount of union 
members disobeyed their own stewards, left the route of their permitted 
march, and joined those blockading the streets (Solnit, Solnit, 2009). Events 
such as Seattle create an excess; they are more than the sum of their parts.
35 So persistent indeed that we can trace a direct line of development through to the 
December 2009 protests at the Copenhagen COP15 summit on climate change and indeed 
the June 2010 protests against the G20 in Toronto.
33 The protestors dressed as turtles were seeking to highlight one effect of the WTO’s
policy of removing barriers to trade. In the case of the Sea Turtles the WTO overturned US
environmental protections.
Four Asian nations challenged provisions of the US Endangered Species Act 
forbidding the sale of shrimp caught in ways that kill endangered sea turtles. In 1998, 
the WTO ruled that the US was not acting in compliance of WTO rules. Requiring 
shrimp nets be fitted with inexpensive ‘turtle excluder devices’ has been ruled ‘WTO- 
Illegal’ (Solnit, Solnit, 2009:117).
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We use the term ‘compositional effects’ to refer to this difference created by 
the event.37
The sense of new possibility created by Seattle was a significant factor 
in the subsequent expansion of the movement. More than this, however, I 
would argue that the shift of emphasis from opposition to composition 
actually allows a better grasp of dominant contemporary forms of power. 
Neoliberalism, treated as a dispositif of power, is too deterritorialised to be 
accurately figured through opposition. Hardt and Negri (2000:190), who 
want to give the name Empire to this deterritorialised form of power, argue 
that this “smooth space” contains “no place of power”. In this light, summit 
protests can be seen as a means of putting a place on the non-place of 
power, which, despite the dangers of reductionism, allows the compositional 
effects of the movement to take place.38 It is, in turn, these compositional 
effects that reveal the transcendental dimensions of neoliberal forms of 
power. If, as argued in the previous chapter, neoliberalism operates, in part, 
through “structuring the conditions of possibility of social life” (Hardt, Negri 
2009:6) then it is only by exceeding these possibilities, and indeed creating 
new ones, that this conditioning can be brought into focus. We will argue 
then that the prominence of the evental form in contemporary social
37 We should add that this approach is not merely prompted by theoretical concerns but 
also reflects how such events are often experienced. See for instance this testimony from a 
participant in the 2001 Genoa protests against the G8:
One of the best things had been simply spending five days In Genoa living politics, 
meeting people, discussing ideas, just being there, smelling the tear-gas, feeling the 
adrenalin, watching the banks burn, being part of a militant and huge gathering. And 
feeling the shock of Carlo’s death, the anger at the fascist behaviour of the police, the 
relief at getting away without being nicked. And lastly a feeling that we are at the 
centre of what is rising, not at the fringe of what is dying. (Hughes 2001:28)
38 Again I would argue that such a position is broadly reflective of movement thinking:
The G8 is, if anything, a convenient excuse for us rebels to demonstrate our power -  
after all, capitalism and the state exists every day of the year, not just on days of 
action. The importance of these days lies not in shutting the summit down, but in 
inspiring people to demonstrate to take action into our own hands. (Trocchi, et al, 
2005:99)
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movements can, then, be seen as a symptom of the dominant role of 
transcendental dimensions of power.
Such events have played a structuring role in the development of the 
alter-globalisation movement. Indeed Tormey (2005: 340) has argued that, 
along with Social Forums, summit protests are “one of the key moments 
when what is otherwise disaggregated crystallises... There are not many 
other moments when the movement is made present to itself’. If we return to 
our definition of social movements as the movement of problematics, then 
such events are key moments of disjuncture, which provoke dramatic shifts 
in these problematics. More than this though, we will argue that the shifts in 
the problematics to which the alter-globalisation movement has applied itself, 
revolve around an unsolved meta-problematic. This is the question of how 
these moments of excess relate to the politics of everyday life. Or, “how do 
we take those new worlds that felt so possible during the week of protests 
and generalise them so that they make sense in the rest of our lives?” 
(Harvie, et al 2005b: 15).
In this chapter we seek to open up such events by examining their 
affective qualities, or to put that in more familiar language, by examining 
what it feels like to be within such an event. We do so as a means of access 
to an event’s compositional effects, in order, in subsequent chapters, to draw 
out renewed political problematics and, in turn, re-conceptualise movement 
repertoires. By concentrating on the affects that are produced within 
expansive moments of collective action we hope to group them alongside 
the problematics produced by more overtly revolutionary moments, allowing 
us to clarify the movement problem in relation to other political and 
philosophical literatures. In particular, we want to recompose the movement 
problematic of the relation between moments of excess and everyday life 
into an organisational question: Can we conceive of a form of organisation 
that can help us act around the expansion of political possibility that comes 
in moments of excess without eliding that expansion within a new 
instrumental utility that closes us off from events to come? In the following 
chapter we read this problem through Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of
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antiproduction, the socius, and the Body without Organs, which, we will 
argue, seek to resolve Bataille’s concept of unemployed excess with Marx’s 
conceptions of surplus value and revolution. In Chapter Five we shift 
perspectives to examine the movement problem through reference to 
literatures on revolutionary transition and transvaluation before shifting again 
to examine institutional resources with which to reconceptualise movement 
practice. Before we get to this, however, we will establish a methodology 
appropriate to our problematic.
Another argument implicit in the previous chapter is that the 
methodology with which we study a movement should be adequate to the 
movement’s form and object. More specifically, anti-neoliberal movements 
need a methodology that can bring neoliberalism’s transcendental 
dimensions of power within the scope of analysis. To grasp this we can refer 
to the structuring problem we observed in second order cybernetics: the 
problem of the entanglement of the observer within the system they are 
observing. As transcendental forms of power operate through structuring the 
conditions of everyday experience, an empiricism based purely on our 
quotidian understanding of that experience is inadequate. We need instead a 
form of empiricism that can incorporate the transcendental structuring of 
experience. Indeed Deleuze calls his instantiation of this project a 
transcendental empiricism.39
We began the thesis with a reading, and critique, of some approaches 
to the study of social movements and in particular their conceptions of the 
alter-globalisation movement. In doing so we deployed a specific strategy of 
reading capable of relating this literature to the problematic of the thesis; we 
named this a symptomatic reading. Now that we have established the 
problematic of the transcendental dimensions of neoliberal forms of power, 
even though at the moment in a still quite schematic fashion, we can 
examine that reading strategy and its related epistemology in more detail.
39 This is, of course, a Kantian and indeed post-Kantian problematic and in Chapter Five 
we position Deleuze's instantiation of this problematic in relation to Kant.
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Reading Symptomatically
The concept of a symptomatic reading was developed, primarily by 
Althusser, in the seminal book Reading Capital (Althusser, Balibar 2006).
The book itself was the product of an intensive group reading of Marx’s 
Capital: Volume One, the aim of which was to unearth Capitats underlying 
philosophy. Such an approach ran counter to the then dominant reading of 
Capital, in which it was treated as an empirically based work of political 
economy, with Marx’s philosophical contribution consigned to his early 
works. We should recall, however, that Capital's subtitle is 'A Critique of 
Political Economy’. As such, Althusser asserts, the aim of Marx’s critique is 
not to correct the errors of the classical political economists, such as Adam 
Smith and David Ricardo, but to critique the project of political economy tout 
court. We should not treat Capital as an attempt to provide a new solution to 
the problems posed by political economy, but rather as a refusal of both the 
solution and the problem. Althusser and his students sought a methodology 
in the form taken by Marx’s critique of the classical political economists. This 
methodology, which they named a symptomatic reading, was then, in turn, 
used to read Capital itself.
Althusser’s strategy of symptomatic reading is based on a rejection of a 
model of knowledge that he calls naïve empiricism, which is unable to grasp 
the abstract dynamics that structure experience. In a naïve empiricism, 
reading is conceived as an act of interpretation that aims to penetrate a veil 
of formal properties and inessential impurities that separates the author’s 
explication from the text’s essential logos. A symptomatic reading does not 
seek to unearth the author’s real intention or meaning. It seeks, rather, to 
unearth those points when the text’s meaning breaks down. It is a reading 
that is oriented towards a text’s gaps and lacunae because these moments 
can reveal an author’s un-stated, and perhaps unconscious,
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presuppositions. It is in the moments of non-sense that an absent yet 
structuring problematic can be detected.40
In our examination of Social Movement Theory and its behaviourist 
inheritance, we noted that such lacunae originated from the construction of 
black boxes. In this light, however, the concept of a black box, with its origins 
in engineering, reaches the limit of its adequacy. As Galison (1994:246) 
explains: “Black boxes, as Wiener used the term, meant a unit designed to 
perform a function before one knew how it functioned.” Black boxes are 
epistemological placeholders. When their internal workings become known, 
then the gap in knowledge becomes filled and they become, in engineering 
parlance, white boxes. By retaining systems as black boxes, however, 
behaviourism erases the possibility that the internal workings of black boxes 
could reveal other potential functions. In fact sometimes these functions 
could exceed or disrupt the overall orientation of the system within which 
they are placed. Behaviourism obscures the fact that black boxes can 
contain discontinuities leading to quite different systems, with different sets 
of knowledges and different fields of possibilities.41
Althusser makes a similar point in terms of the history of philosophy, 
calling for the rejection of “the ideology of the philosophy of the 
Enlightenment, i.e. in a teleological and therefore idealist rationalism”42
40 Deleuze (1995 N: 136) explains a similar strategy of reading when he says:
Philosophers introduce new concepts, they explain them, but they don't tell us, not 
completely anyway, the problems to which those concepts are a response... The 
history of philosophy, rather than repeating what a philosopher says, has to say what 
he must have taken for granted, what he didn't say but is nonetheless present in what 
he did say.
41 This of course overlaps with another problem that arises with the transfer of engineering 
concepts to social systems. In engineering systems the engineer provides the teleology, 
while with social systems the social scientist is entangled within the system he is studying. 
This means that accounting for the presuppositions of the research must be included as part 
of the object of research.
42 Although we have no room to elaborate here we should note a certain isomorphy 
between this idea and Deleuze’s (2001) critique of the dogmatic image of thought.
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(Althusser, Balibar 2006:44). Indeed history, like written texts, must be read 
symptomatically if we are to escape from the conception of history as the 
inexorable movement towards an essential end point. Such a teleological 
imputation of intention contains a residual religiosity and it is Hegel that gives 
“the systematic form of the development of the concept” (Althusser, Balibar 
2006: 44). As Althusser elaborates: ‘Th(e) immediate reading of essence in 
existence expresses the religious model of Hegel’s Absolute Knowledge, 
that End of History in which the concept at last becomes visible” (Althusser, 
Balibar 2006:16).43
History does not, therefore, follow a progressive path towards fulfilled 
reason. As Althusser (2006: 44) argues:
[T]he history of reason is neither a linear history of continuous development, 
nor, in its continuity, a history of the progressive manifestation or emergence 
into consciousness of a Reason which is completely present in germ in its 
origins and which history merely reveals to the light of day. We know that this 
type of history and rationality is merely the effect of the retrospective illusion 
of a given historical result which writes its history in the ‘future anterior’, and 
which therefore thinks its origins as the anticipation of its end.
If, however, we see the history of reason as “a history punctuated by 
radical discontinuities” (Althusser, Balibar 2006:44) then lacunae are not 
simply black boxes waiting to be filled in and turned white. They can,
This quotation reflects Althusser’s wider project to establish an epistemological break in 
Marx between the Hegelian, humanist early work and his mature, later work, primarily 
Capital. To cite such a project today might seem obtuse, perhaps anachronistic: however 
the contemporary resonances of the phrase “The End of History” should indicate that this is 
far from the case. It is after all the positioning of neoliberalism at the end of history from 
which the alter-globalisation movement has sought to escape. Francis Fukuyama’s (1993) 
The End o f H istory  might now, in turn, seem anachronistic, as the pinnacle of early 1990s 
neoliberal hubris. Yet Zizek (2009:88) captures something of our age when he declares:
It is easy to make fun of Fukuyama’s notion of the “End of History", but most people 
today are  Fukuyamean, accepting liberal democratic capitalism as the finally found 
formula of the best possible society, such that all one can do is to try and make it 
more just, more tolerable, and so on.
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instead, be markers of a disjunction in reason, revealing a problem 
previously obscured by an author’s presuppositions.
In Capital Marx finds that Smith and Ricardo have answered the 
question of the value of labour correctly when they find it is equal to the 
value of the subsidence goods necessary for labour’s reproduction. The 
strange element in this, as Althusser (2006: 22) points out, is that “it is the 
correct answer to a question that has one failing: it was never posed.”
Behind this anomaly Marx finds the problematic of surplus value, which 
proved to be a limit to both Smith and Ricardo’s political economy. Grappling 
with this problematic leads Marx to distinguish labour from labour power and 
so recomposes the question ‘what is the value of labour?’ into ‘what is the 
value of labour power?’ Labour power is the “invisible problematic contained 
in the paradox of an answer which does not correspond to any question 
posed' (Althusser, Balibar 2006: 28J.44
It is not that the classical political economists made a simple mistake of 
oversight; it is rather that the concept of labour power just wasn’t visible from 
within their conceptual framework, or as Althusser would rather call it, from 
within their problematic. The lacunae are the key to breaking with one 
problematic and moving to another. “At certain moments, in certain 
symptomatic points, this silence emerges as such in the discourse and 
forces it against its will to produce real theoretical lapses” (Althusser, Balibar 
2006: 86). A symptomatic reading, then, is one that can reopen a text from 
within the problematics of the present.
44 The classical economists struggled with the problem of where profit or surplus came 
from. Marx’s distinction between labour and labour power allowed him to show that surplus 
value derived from the surplus labour. Labour power is the capacity to labour and it is this 
that the worker sells; surplus labour is the difference between this and the actual labour 
done. Foucault’s analysis in The Birth o f B iopolitics shows how neoliberal theorists 
recognise the lacunae  around the figure of labour in classical political economy. The 
neoliberal solution, however, is to efface labour altogether and replace it with the concept of 
human capital, which means in effect the persona of capital, hom o economicus. As such 
productive surplus is attributed to the competitive, entrepreneurial spirit.
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When Althusser applies this symptomatic reading to Marx he discovers 
an unstated but structuring problematic in capital’s operation, that of 
“immanent causality”, in which every cause is also an effect. This is a difficult 
concept and we shall examine it in more detail and from a different angle 
later in the thesis through the concept of the Body without Organs. However 
for now we can use this brief explanation from Jason Read (2003:32): 
“Elements of the capitalist mode of production that would appear to be its 
effects, such as the desire for accumulation on the part of the capitalist, or 
‘rationalized’ hoarding, must equally be thought of as causes and elements 
of its functioning.” Capital does not have an essence that is hidden behind its 
effects. Capital is a social relation, and as such it is merely a series of 
abstract dynamics, it is an abstraction but one that has concrete effects. 
Capital is all too real but it is, as Marx would say, a real abstraction.
The Non-sense of Social Movement Theory
The alter-globalisation movement is explicitly anti-neoliberal, and indeed at 
times explicitly anti-capitalist. We have put forward the argument that 
neoliberalism relies on the transcendental structuring of experience. It seems 
appropriate then that our methodology incorporates these modes of the 
operation of power.
After this elaboration on the methodology of our reading of social 
movement theorising in both political science and sociology, we are in a 
position to rethink the lacunae that we found there. Although we initially 
traced these lacunae in terms of certain intellectual lineages, this is not the 
primary concern of the thesis. We are more interested in the transformation 
of political problematics that the lacunae make possible. Tracing an 
intellectual inheritance from the behaviourism of post-war Political Science 
through to the sociology of Social Movement Theory allowed us to highlight 
its analytical focus on the mechanisms by which social movement concerns 
and repertoires are fed back into the existing political system and its
- 55 -
institutions.45 Their structuring problematic is, ultimately, the question of how 
political systems can sustain themselves.46 This orientation towards 
equilibrium comes at the expense of an analytical focus on social novelty, 
specifically the creation of social novelty within movements. This seems an 
important lacuna, as the question of the excess of social movements is 
essential to the question of how social movements move or develop.47
These lacunae were initially obscured by the traces of Social 
Movement Theory’s behaviourist inheritance and, in particular, the 
transcendental commitments that this entails. Behaviourism and systems 
theory, which treats a system as a black box in order to analyse its inputs 
and outputs, tends to eternalise and naturalise existing systems and 
experience. On the level of social systems, for instance, there is a tendency 
towards an organic functionalism. If social movements are reduced to 
pluralistic feedback mechanisms for the existing social and political system, 
then the overall orientation of that system, and indeed the values that orient 
it, are placed beyond analysis and transformation. There is, therefore, no 
room for systemic disjunction or discontinuity.
The second transcendental commitment that we found in Social 
Movement Theory was identified as an underlying humanism; by which we
45 We should again make clear that when we refer here to social movement theory we are 
referring primarily to the traditions of resource mobilisation and political opportunity theory. 
We are not claiming that there are no resources with which to approach our problematic 
from within the wider field of social movement theory, and in particular within some elements 
of new social movement theory. We are, rather, using important, and perhaps dominant, 
tendencies within the field as a means of illustrating and positioning our own thesis, which 
then goes on to draw from quite distinct areas of knowledge.
46 This is, famously, the orientation of Easton’s (1953,1992) seminal systems theory 
approach to Political Science.
47 We can see this problem as an iteration of the central problematic of post-structuralist 
theory. As Deleuze (1991a: 167) comments in relation to Foucault’s work: “The critique of 
universals can be translated into a question; how is it possible that anything new might 
come into the world?”
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mean a universalised model of human nature. Indeed we have traced the 
influence of Olsen’s (1965) introduction of the free-rider problem as the 
proposed central paradox of collective action. This problematic, and its 
ontological commitment to methodological individualism, has had a 
foundational role in both Resource Mobilisation and Political Process 
theories. Such a conceptual framework, however, cannot analyse the 
abstract dynamics that structure quotidian experience and so cannot 
conceptualise any potential for transformations in subjectivity that changes in 
those abstract dynamics might bring about.
These transcendental commitments are, of course, related. As we 
mentioned above, it is difficult to account for change within an organicist 
functionalism and one means of doing so is through recourse to a 
transcendental humanism. In such a conceptual framework, as Read (2003: 
36) explains, “subjectivity is capable of acting on history only insofar as it is 
placed outside of history as timeless possibility. Change and transformation 
can only be imagined by resorting to the image of a transcendental subject 
who is not touched by the violence of history.” For a clear example of this we 
can refer back to Foucault’s (2008) analysis of the conceptual framework of 
neoliberal theory in which social change occurs through the testing of 
imperfect institutions against an, in effect, eternalised human nature. In 
neoliberalism the result is the elevation of the competitive market and the 
liberal democratic state. Humanism functions not just as origin but 
simultaneously as destination.
The traces of this problematic became apparent when we looked at 
accounts of social movement emergence. While Political Opportunity Theory 
looks to changes in political opportunities external to social movements to 
explain their emergence, Resource Mobilisation Theory looks to internal 
factors, such as the innovation and adoption of repertoires and framing. 
These factors lower the cost of movement participation and make collective 
action possible. Again change here is explained through reference to a 
model of human behaviour, which functions as a transcendental 
determinant. But, while Political Opportunity Theory explains movement
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emergence in terms of a lack, Resource Mobilisation Theory explains it in 
terms of an excess; as such, the latter remains analytically open to the 
creativity of social movements. More than this, although innovation is 
sometimes explained in terms of the initiative of movement entrepreneurs, it 
also provides a point of contact with the idea of the event as an intensive 
moment of collective creativity.
When Tarrow (1995,1998) talks about movement structure he does so 
through reference to Aristide Zolberg’s (1972) seminal article Moments of 
Madness. As Tarrow (1995:92) explains: “Cycles of protest are crucibles in 
which moments of madness are tempered into permanent tools of a society’s 
repertoire of contention.” However, while Zolberg’s article has been built on 
as a point of emergence for the parabolic structure inscribed on to 
movements, it is still something of an anomaly. Resource Mobilisation 
Theory has a tendency to treat initiatory events as black boxes from which 
social novelty, in the form of new action, organisational or framing 
repertoires, is an output. Indeed there is a related tendency to treat Zolberg’s 
article as a black box, the mention of which stands in for a more rigorous 
treatment of intense moments of social movement creativity. When we read 
the article in detail, however, we find that there is much that points away 
from the analytical orientation of Resource Mobilisation Theory.
Zolberg’s problematic is laid out in an introductory passage:
If politics is ‘the art of the possible,’ what are we to make of moments when 
human beings living in modern societies believe that ‘all is possible’? We 
know with assurance that such moments occur, if only because those who 
experience them are acutely conscious of their unusual state. Speaking with 
tongues, they urgently record their most intimate feelings. Furthermore, they 
are often aware of affinities across time and space with others in similar 
circumstances (Zolberg, 1972:183).
Zolberg draws on this urgent record and compares testimony from six 
Parisian events, beginning with the revolt of 1848. The article, written in 
1972, is undoubtedly a response to the Paris evenements of 1968, and 
taking his cue from the awareness he found there “of affinities across time
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and space with others in similar circumstances” Zolberg (1972:18) seeks out 
what is common in the experience of these moments. In 1968 there were 
living links to both the 1936 factory occupations that accompanied the 
Popular Front government, as well as the contagious enthusiasm that 
followed the 1944 Liberation of Paris. Contemporary commentators on May 
68 also raised the antecedents of the revolutions of 1848 and the Paris 
Commune of 1871. Zolberg treats the commonality of experience he finds in 
these Parisian events as an example of a much wider phenomenon.
There is a tendency, within political science and theory, to either 
dismiss such moments as epiphenomenal, or, in the case of the French and 
American Revolutions, to treat them as foundational but exceptional (Negri 
1999). As Zolberg (1972:183) says: “Since we cannot ignore them, we 
segregate them from our main concern, the universe of normal political 
events.” By way of contrast he goes on to outline his own approach:
It is possible, however, that this prejudgement as to what is normal and what 
is not hampers our understanding of politics, and that the meaning of 
moments when ‘all is possible’ can be better apprehended if we seek instead 
to share the experience of participants in order to understand the place of 
these moments in the political life of modern society (Zolberg 1972:183).
While this seems a most useful approach it is hard to square with his 
characterisation of these events as Moments of Madness. This 
conceptualisation, despite any ironic intent, can’t help but erect the image of 
a homeostatic social normality. This, in turn, leads us back to Social 
Movement Theory’s analytical orientation towards the integration and 
normalisation of the madness. Rather than moments of madness, then, we 
might see these events as moments of non-sense, as lacunae within 
dominant sensibility.
Further more we might understand such moments when ‘all seems 
possible’ as the exceeding of existing subjectivities, that are premised on a 
more limited range of possibility. This means that we can characterise the 
phenomenon with which Zolberg is grappling as the transformation in 
subjectivity that occurs within intensive, collective events that expand the
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sense of political possibility. It is this focus on the producibility of subjectivity 
that makes the article an anomaly when positioned within forms of Social 
Movement Theory that carry the inheritance of behaviourist forms of 
humanism. In this reading Moments of Madness is a lacuna within the 
corpus of Social Movement Theory, one that opens it up to other political 
problematics. Indeed we might say that Zolberg’s article provides an answer 
to a question that pluralist Social Movement Theory doesn’t pose.
So how are we to analyse the experience of these moments? One 
danger is that we renege on our critique of a humanist empiricism by 
adopting a methodology based on a competing transcendental model of the 
human. To do so would be to assert one experience as more real or pure 
than another. This is, in many instances, the trap classical anarchism can fall 
into, if it views the behaviour that occurs in such moments as corresponding 
more closely to a human nature that is essentially good but which has been 
corrupted by existing institutional forms, in particular the state.48 In order to 
continue with our methodological approach we will have to shift its 
conceptualisation away from the textual focus of an Althusserian 
methodology of symptomatic reading to one that more easily incorporates 
the visceral embodied element of moments of excess. For this we turn to 
Deleuze’s conception of a Symptomology.
A Clinical Approach
Deleuze extracts a philosophical concept of symptomology from clinical 
practice in the fields of medicine and psychiatry. “Perhaps there are three 
different medical acts: symptomology or the study of signs; etiology, or the
We can also see Rousseau’s noble savage in such a formulation, while Lefebvre's 
Marxist humanist analysis also risks such a position when he sees what he calls irruptions 
as a potentially unproblematic perpetual state in which: “Politics and political society will 
disappear by merging into civil society. The political function, as a specialised function, will 
no longer exist. Daily life will be transformed into a perpetual festival. The daily struggle for 
bread and work will no longer make sense” (cited in Zolberg 1972:190).
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search for causes; and therapeutics, or the search for and application of a 
treatment.” (Deleuze 2004:132). The first medical act relates to the 
diagnostic role, and involves the grouping or linking of symptoms. Smith 
(2005:183) explains the procedure:
What a doctor confronts in an individual case is a symptom or group of 
symptoms and his diagnostic task is to discover the corresponding concept 
(the concept of the disease). No doctor would treat a fever or headache as a 
definitive symptom of a specific illness; they are rather indeterminate 
symptoms common to a number of diseases, and the doctor must interpret 
and decipher the symptoms in order to arrive at the correct diagnosis.
What interests Deleuze is the creative element of symptomology, and 
in particular the process through which clinicians reinterpret and rearrange 
symptoms to create new medical concepts; called syndromes in medicine 
and complexes in psychoanalysis. The symptomologist “distinguishes cases 
that had hitherto been confused by dissociating symptoms that were 
previously grouped together and juxtaposing them with others that were 
previously dissociated” (Smith 2005:184). For Deleuze this creative element 
shows that symptomology does not function on the level of representation; 
its aim is not to replicate a part of the world through the medium of words. It 
is rather an active intervention into the world. A novel grouping of symptoms 
creates something new; a new way of understanding the world. This creates 
new possibilities which, in turn, fall back onto experience and structure it. As 
Guattari (1995:205) argues:
Freud and his successors always wanted to present themselves as scientists 
who were discovering the universal structures of the psyche. The truth is they 
invented the unconscious and its complexes as great visionaries in other 
epochs invented new religions, new ways of experiencing the world and social 
relations.
Such creativity is distinctly possible in symptomology because it 
involves the interpretation, or reinterpretation, of signs and as such it allows
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the extraction of its methodology from the medicinal field. As Deleuze 
(2004a: 132) explains:
Whereas etiology and therapeutics are integral parts of medicine, 
symptomology appeals to a kind of neutral point, a limit that is premedical or 
sub-medical, belonging as much to art as to medicine; it's all about drawing a 
"portrait." The work of art exhibits symptoms, as do the body or the soul, 
albeit in a very different way. In this sense, the artist or writer can be a great 
symptomologist, just like the best doctor.
Indications of symptomology’s appeal to a neutral point can be found in 
the naming of syndromes. They are often named after the clinician who 
isolated the symptoms; occasionally they are named after indicative patients. 
Deleuze, however, is interested in those instances when the name reflects a 
literary influence.49 We can think, for example, of Freud’s use of Sophocles 
and Shakespeare in the creation of the Oedipal complex.50
49 Deleuze was particularly interested in Kraft-Ebbing’s isolation of the symptoms of 
Masochism and Sadism from the literary work of Leopold von Sacher-Masoch and the 
Marquis de Sade. Deleuze (1991) argues that Freud’s conception of Sadomasochism is 
based on a premature etiology, in which a diagnosis is developed through speculation on 
causality. Returning to Kraft-Ebbing’s symptomology Deleuze Identifies *the contract’ as a 
key symptom of Masochism, disrupting Freud’s conflation of the two perversions. The 
contract complicates the play of power in the Masochistic relationship by allowing the 
Masochist control over the transformation of another individual into a ‘cold and cruel’ figure. 
As such a Sadist would not want a Masochistic victim nor vice versa. So Freud’s conflation 
of the two complexes must be seen as mistaken. Deleuze’s approach here prefigures a 
more recent activist and practitioner lead counter-symptomology which has led to the 
widespread adoption of the acronym ‘b.d.s.m.’ to variously incorporate the terms ‘bondage- 
discipline’ and ‘dominance-submission’ alongside ‘sadism-masochism’, this more 
accurately reflects the divergent practices while refusing their pathologisation.
50 “From the perspective of Freud’s genius, it is not the complex which provides us with 
information about Oedipus and Hamlet, but rather Oedipus and Hamlet who provide us with 
information about the complex.” (Deleuze 2004b: 273). We can see from this that the 
theoretical approach of reading works of art, film and literature through the application of 
psychoanalytical concepts is in fact a reversal of the method Freud employs. “All too often
- 6 2 -
We should make clear that symptomology is “not just about identifying 
an illness, but about the world as symptom” (Deleuze 2004a: 132).51 As 
Deleuze explains: “It’s not just a matter of diagnosis. Signs imply ways of 
living, possibilities of existence, they’re the symptoms of life gushing forth or 
draining away.” A symptomology is a method, which can “isolate a particular 
‘possibility of life’, a certain way of being or mode of existence” (Smith, 1997: 
li). Nor should we limit symptomology to the textual or the medicinal. Guattari 
(1996:137) for instance seeks to analyse institutions in this manner; a form 
of analysis that:
consists in marking the indicative elements, the experienced sequences of 
non-sense as a symptom, as institutional lapses which, instead of being 
pushed to the side, marginalized, will see themselves confer a field of 
expressions, a gamut of possibilities that they did not have before.
By extracting the symptomological methodology from the medical, the 
pathological and indeed the literary, we can place it within Deleuze and 
Guattari’s wider project of breaking with the hypostatisation of concepts into 
transcendent forms, including essentialist conceptions of the human. Their 
watchword here is the Spinozan notion that: Nobody knows what a body can 
do.52 To avoid the unnecessary closure of potential, they advocate 
experimentation with a body’s affects, by which they mean a body’s 
capacities to act or be acted upon, that is to affect or be affected.53 If we
the writer is still considered as one more case added to clinical psychology, when the 
important thing is what the writer himself, as a creator, brings to clinical psychology” 
(Deleuze 2004a: 133).
51 ‘The world can be treated as a symptom and searched for signs of disease, signs of life, 
signs of a cure, signs of health.” (Deleuze 2004a: 141).
B2 r \tOf course the concept of a body operating here is not limited to that of an individual 
person, we can also think of it as a collective body: a body of people for example.
CQ
“We know nothing about a body unless we know what it can do, in other words, what its 
affects are, how they can or cannot enter into composition with other affects, with the affects 
of another body, either to destroy that body or to be destroyed by it, either to exchange
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seek to define bodies through their affective qualities we can create 
groupings that are very different from those, such as species or genera, that 
are deduced from their extensive qualities, such as height, width, number of 
legs, etc, which indicates a body’s extension in time and space. For 
example, when grouping bodies through shared affects: “A racehorse is 
more different from a workhorse than a workhorse is from an ox” (Deleuze 
Guattari 1988:257). 54
A symptomology then can allow us to create a diagram of a possibility 
of life through an examination of heterogeneous situations that share similar 
affective qualities. We can treat experience of states of affairs not according 
to their extensive properties but by their intensive ones; that is, by the 
potential for change. A definition via intensive qualities seems appropriate 
when we are dealing with intensive situations, which involve “a splitting off 
from, or a breaking with causality” (Deleuze 2006: 233).55 Zolberg’s (1972:
183) article then can be read as the isolation of a certain possibility of life, as 
a symptomology of those “moments when human beings living in modern
actions and passions with it or to join with it in composing a more powerful body” (Deleuze, 
Guattari 1988: 257).
Deleuze and Guattari refer to this grouping by affect as the machinic phylum. We can 
see in this as a machinic ontology similar to that found in cybernetics but pushed beyond 
any residual humanism.
55 “In historical phenomena such as the revolution of 1789, the Commune, the revolution of 
1917, there is always one part of the event that is irreducible to any social determinism, or to 
causal chains. Historians are not very fond of this aspect: they restore causality after the 
fact. Yet the event is itself a splitting off from, or a breaking with causality: it is a bifurcation, 
a deviation with respect to laws, an unstable condition which opens up a new field of the 
possible” (Deleuze 2006: 233).
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societies believe that ‘all Is possible’”.56 The advantage of this reading is that 
it allows us to position these events alongside other experiences containing 
similar affective qualities, a grouping that might escape us if we concentrated 
merely on extensive qualities and causality. Such groupings are not arbitrary 
of course but are determined by the problematic with which they are 
engaged. In the next section we want to use this symptomological 
methodology in order to group the experience of summit protests, and other 
intensive events within the alter-globalisation movement, alongside the more 
infrequent and sometimes much larger events that Zolberg describes as 
moments of madness. Our reading of Zolberg, then, is from within the 
problematics of the alter-globalisation movement.57
The Affects of Excess
As Blaug (2000:147) argues these sorts of moments, which he calls 
Outbreaks of Democracy, “have attracted... little serious scrutiny”. The 
accounts that do exist, however show a remarkable degree of consistency.58
Despite his occasional fall into etiology Zolberg (1972:186) seems aware of the 
appropriateness of this approach when he says: “ Indeed, we must rid ourselves temporarily 
of our compulsive concerns with causes and consequences to empathize properly with the 
phenomenon under consideration which itself is characterized by a suspension of these 
concerns."
57 It should be mentioned that once again the resort to a symptomology is not purely the 
result of fidelity to a theoretical lineage. The notion of symptoms of excess also seems 
appropriate because it matches the powerful and visceral nature of the experiences with 
which we are concerned, which often feel not just excessive to our existing subjectivities but 
also to our corporeal bodies. There is much talk, for instance, of the need to ‘come down’ 
after such intensive political events.
58 Blaug (2000:148) presents us with an attractive notion of “democracy as an immediate 
and transgressive moment which occasionally erupts in our everyday lives.” He talks of 
“democracy as something that happens to people, something immediate, something 
characterized not by a form for participation, nor by an institutional design, but precisely by a 
loss of form, and by a breach of design” (Blaug 2000:148). In this aspect he is close to
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Although accounts might disagree strongly about the appropriate 
conceptualisation of such moments, about their causality, or the assessment 
of their significance there is a large degree of overlap in the description of 
symptoms.59 When Zolberg discusses May 68, for instance, he draws on two 
contemporary commentaries from either side of the political spectrum: Morin, 
who is sympathetic to the events, sees symptoms of ecstasy; Aron, who is 
hostile, sees symptoms of delirium. Despite divergent diagnoses, however, 
the symptoms coincide. As Zolberg summarises:
Ecstasy or delirium, the thing happened and it was unmistakably political. The 
recurrence of these moments over one hundred and twenty years, 
recognizably the same in spite of variations, gives the phenomenon a 
persuasive concreteness each event may not possess individually. The 
evidence contained in the purposely heterogeneous testimony gathered in this 
essay is remarkably consistent. Whatever the attitudes of the writers at the 
time of writing, they record intense moments of festive joy, when an immense 
outpouring of speech, sometimes verging on violence, coexists with an 
extraordinary peaceful disposition. Minds and bodies are liberated: human 
beings feel that they are in direct touch with one another as well as with their 
inner selves. The streets of the city, its objects, and even the weather take on 
harmonious qualities. Falsehood, ugliness, and evil give way to beauty, 
goodness, and truth. Factions and parties appear unreal while personal 
networks appear as strong as steel. The private merges into the public; 
government becomes a family affair, a familial affair. Simultaneously, there is
Hardt and Negri’s (1999) discussion of constituted and constituent power. The 
conceptualisation of these moments as Outbreaks o f Dem ocracy though doesn’t quite 
capture our problematic. By using the word democracy we risk its misinterpretation as the 
extraction of a new universal mode of organisation, a new model of democracy. On the 
other hand, excess is always situational, positioned in relation to what it exceeds, while 
simultaneously attempting to flee it.
59 In addition to Zolberg (1972) and Blaug (2000) we might add Lefebvre's writings of 
irruptions (Merrifield 2006), Chesters and Welsh (2006) on plateaus, Debord (2004) on 
situations, Bookchin (1986) on forms of freedom, Friemon (2002) on orgasms of history, and 
Bey (1991) on temporary autonomous zones.
- 66 -
a disposition to encounter the déjà vu; through the medium of collective 
memories recorded in sophisticated or demotic culture, from historical works 
or in folklore, human beings connect the moment with others. Liberated from 
the constraints of time and place, and circumstances, from history, men 
choose their parts from the available repertory or forge new ones in an act of 
creation. Dream’s become possibilities (Zolberg 1972:193).
In this section we will re-read these symptoms alongside their iterations 
within recent social movements and, most importantly, through recent 
movement problematics.
For Zolberg (1972:183) the characterising symptom of such moments 
is the sense that for once “all is possible”. Such a perceived expansion of 
possibility, as we have mentioned previously, has also been central to the 
experience of recent movements, an importance that we might figure 
through the slogan Another World is Possible.60 However this “abyss of 
possibility” (Bonefeld and Holloway 1995:6) is intimately linked to other 
symptoms. Firstly we might point to the importance of the experience of 
collectivity. As this participant in a summit protest road blockade recalls: “i 
[sic] remember looking back and seeing a sea of hundreds of us and it filled 
me with a sense of pride and of confidence, the feeling that we could 
achieve anything.” (Anonymous 2005:361). As a supplement, however, we 
might point to the necessary condition that this collectivity is an active rather 
than passive affect.61 At summit protests it is the attempts to disrupt the
60 The slogan Another W orld is Possible  was actually popularised by its adoption by the 
World Social Forum. However, it reflects the more general affect created by the emergence 
of the movement and its widespread collective action.
61 We could point, for example, to the huge anti-war demonstration in London on 15 
February 2002. It was without a doubt politically significant -  indeed the sheer size of the 
crowds together with the knowledge that simultaneous protests were occurring in many 
other countries provided the feeling that this was something out of the ordinary. However, at 
least as I experienced it, there were few of the other active affects discussed in this section. 
While there was a general feeling of seriousness and goodwill the crowd was more
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summit that provide the focus for action, and the danger and uncertainty that 
this direct action involves plays an important role in increasing the level of 
intensity.62 Just as important, though, is the political process of planning and 
coordinating in the run-up to and during the actions. The talking and in 
particular the intensity and nature of the talking are just as central to the 
affect of collective creativity as the doing. Indeed during these intensely 
political moments the oft-perceived tension between talking and doing tends 
to resolve.63 As Solnit (2004: 268) says:
Unlike in society generally, we get a taste of what it would be like to 
participate democratically in decisions. This was seen quite powerfully in 
Seattle in the organization of the direct action: thousands of people got to 
taste thousands of people making decisions in an openly democratic way. 
Those experiences then translated into liberating the streets for a day. That 
taste of how things could be left a lot of people with a strong thirst for what 
they tasted.
All such events involve, as Zolberg (1972:191) puts it, “a torrent of 
words”. As Flaubert writes of the1848 Parisian uprising: “Men possessed by 
a frenzied eloquence harangued the crowd on street corners” (cited in 
Zolberg 1972:191). What is most remarkable about this conversational 
“torrent” is the sheer level of participation, as this testimony from May 68 
makes clear:
reminiscent of the passive, spectating crowds experienced at large sporting events. Perhaps 
we could figure this passivity in the prevalent adoption of the slogan N o t in  M y Name.
62 A Spanish activist Joan expresses similar sentiments in relation to a large march in 
Barcelona in 2002:
The mobilization was a success, but not an epic experience. There were epic 
moments, but not like in Prague, Genoa, or last year in Barcelona... The 
demonstration was a numerical success, and it produced an Image that makes our 
critiques acceptable, but it wasn’t a life-changing experience where you radically 
confront the system and live through dangerous situations full of adrenaline, at least 
not for me (cited in Juris 2008:154).
63 This is to say that such moments seem to undermine the usual denigration of theorising 
amongst both activist and the public.
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Those who had never dared say anything suddenly felt their thoughts the 
most important thing in the world -  and said so. The shy became 
communicative. The helpless and isolated sudden discovered that collective 
power lay in their hands. The traditionally apathetic suddenly realised the 
intensity of their involvement (Dark Star Collective 2001: 76).
This contagion of eloquence may well reflect a certain sense of 
responsibility provoked by an active participation in history, the “feeling that 
we are at the centre of what is rising, not at the fringe of what is dying” 
(Hughes 2001:28).
It is an excess experienced not just intellectually but also physically, 
corporeally, indeed we can associate such events with a state of heightened 
sensory awareness and excitation. Participants readily recall this intensely 
embodied experience, where skin gets goosebumps and the hairs of the 
arms stand on end.64 A Spanish activist recalls a Reclaim The Streets action 
in Barcelona: “It was a moment of incredible personal liberation, fantastic, 
total corporeal liberation; it was amazing!” (Pablo cited in Juris 2008:148).
This accords with the analysis of a participant in a movement 
workshop: “Opening up, expanding possibilities is grounded in the body. It 
appears in riot situations, in street parties, it's a physical thing with a change 
in consciousness, like through trance, yoga, drugs, etc.”65
The strongly felt embodied nature of these experiences help account for the 
phenomenon of a sensory memory triggering the revisiting of the affects. Something as 
simple as a song, an odour, an image, a fleeting glimpse can transport veterans back into 
the moment. Ross (2002:103), for instance, cites a militant being transported back to the 
events of ‘68 by the Proustian madeleine of the “odor of ink, of carbon paper, a particular 
odor, at once acidic and sweet, peppery and sugary, the odor of hours, days, nights passed 
mimeographing tracts.”
c c
03 The participant, Neil, was taking part in a workshop at the 2004 European Social Forum 
in London. The notion of the hairs of the arms standing on end is also drawn from a 
memorable contribution to this workshop. A transcript of the workshop is available at 
http://www.nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/agp/free/wsf/london2004/lds-excess.htm
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Indeed this corporeality also affects our experience of temporality. 
“When the effects of one’s actions infinitely supersedes one’s expectations, 
or when a local initiative is met with impromptu echoes from a hundred 
different places at once, space compresses and time goes faster” (Ross 
2002:102). This general affect of temporal acceleration undermines our 
habitual conceptions of the orderly progression of time. In this vein Dansette 
talks about the liberation of Paris from German occupation in 1944 as “a 
moment of communion” in which “the rhythms, habits, modes of thought and 
of feeling of daily life are engulfed in the intoxication of the present moment” 
(cited in Zolberg 1972:185). Similarly De Angelis (2007:249) talks of 
participation in the convergence camp at the Gleneagles G8 protests as 
being dominated by a praxis of “phase time”, which he defines -  opposition 
to “linear time” and “circular time” -  as “the time of sudden changes in social 
and experiential ‘phases’”. “We could sense the buzz of chaotic order, the 
vibes typical of a laboratory of social and relational experimentation. Entering 
the camp was to enter a collective phase time” (De Angelis 2007:19).66
All of these symptoms contribute to what we might characterise as a 
meta-symptom, a high level of intensity. Take this testimony of the days 
leading up to the attempted disruption of the G8 summit opening in 
Gleneagles, Scotland, on 6 July 2005:
It’s the intensity of it that makes you feel so a live .... [Everywhere you looked 
there were groups of people gathered in intense and passionate discussion.
66 Indeed the passage on phase time is worth quoting further:
To clarify, by phase time I mean the time dimension peculiar to phase transitions. I 
borrow this from physics, which defines phase transitions in terms of sudden changes 
in one or more physical and organisational properties of matter. In my use, I intend to 
evoke the time of sudden changes in social and experiential ‘phases’ that are 
pervasive in human experience. A man or a woman falling in love, soldiers in the heat 
of battle, demonstrators reclaiming a square for a carnival under the watchful eye of 
powerless riot police, a car accident, a community of squatters preparing to resist 
eviction, or, at larger scales of social action, the sudden change in co-production of 
livelihood (De Angelis 2007:249).
We could position this use of phase time alongside Deleuze and Guattari’s (1988:262) 
discussion of “Aeon: the indefinite time of the event”, which they distinguish from “Chronos: 
the time of measure”.
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Talking, thinking, planning, arguing, agreeing, cooperating. Intense 
communication permeated the whole [convergence centre] like an electric 
charge. It comes from that realisation that no one’s in charge, that there’s no 
secret committee with a secret plan who are going to come and save us. If 
this summit is going to be blockaded it’s down to us, collectively. We were all 
moving so fast. One evening we emerged from one meeting at 11.30 and 
realised we needed to rush to grab something to eat as we had to be at 
another in half an hour. Who on earth arranges meetings at midnight? We 
had to, time was tight. It all made perfect sense. Meetings are normally painful 
exercises in frustration, but here it was different. There was such an intense 
concentration of effort, such focus, that creativity, wit, imagination, flexibility 
and good sense seemed to come naturally. You could stagger out of a 
meeting drunk on the sense of connection with the other people. Vibrating 
with it. It was that visceral. Then, on the Wednesday of the blockades, in the 
fields next to the road that intensity was ten-fold. Decisions were made so 
quickly you barely had time to think (Free Association, 2005b: 18).67
We might attribute this affect of intensity to a variety of factors including 
the time-limited nature of the event, the novel mixtures of participants and 
the very real dangers of arrest, injury or even death. In addition, however, 
this intensity is intimately linked to the réintroduction of politics back into life. 
People are forced to make ethical decisions from an incredibly open range of 
possibilities. The consequences of these decisions can have real importance 
and the collective fashion in which they are made can provoke affects of 
tremendous new capacities which can carry over into everyday life. As a
67 I should make clear that the Free Association, quoted here, is a collective writing project 
that I am involved with. This testimony, then, is partly my own. We can, however, find 
confirming testimony in other places. See, for instance, the similar sentiment of intensity in 
this account from the anti-WTO and IMF protests in Prague in 2000:
It’s difficult to find words to describe my experience when I arrived at the convergence 
centre. It was fascinating, incredible -  color, imagination, desire, work -  people never 
stopped working. At first it was like a beehive, and you didn’t understand what was 
happening, you had no idea where to go. But then you penetrated further and 
recognized the different movement currents; you began to see how affinity groups 
came together, combined, transformed, and interacted. There was mutual learning 
and exchange. (Pablo, cited in Juris 2008:129)
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Spanish activist says in relation to the Prague protests: “There are times 
when something surges up from inside, as if your body were saying, now 
you are living something truly important” (Nuria cited in Juris 2008:132).
We might define such moments, then, as the exceeding of pre-existing 
subjectivity and indeed they are often powerfully experienced as this. As 
Adek says of his experiences of the Parisian May: “Everyone was living 
beyond their intellectual, emotional, and sensorial limits: each person existed 
above and beyond himself” (cited in Ross 2002:101). This can be a joyous 
experience but it can also provoke a feeling of precariousness. With the 
shattering of the subjectivities relied on in the habitual world it can feel as 
though the ground has been cut from beneath your feet. Either way, though, 
there is a transformation in subjectivities or even the creation of new ones. 
Importantly these tend to be collective subjectivities, the historical 
significance of which is evoked by Jameson (1998:10):
In the 1960s many people came to realize that in a truly revolutionary 
collective experience what comes into being is not a faceless or anonymous 
crowd or ‘mass’ but, rather, a new level of being... in which individuality is not 
effaced but completed by collectivity. It is an experience that has now slowly 
been forgotten, its traces systematically effaced by the return of desperate 
individualisms of all kinds.
These are then also moments of defetishisation, in which previously 
solid and eternalised subjectivities are revealed as socially specific and 
contingent. This defetishisation effect is produced as pre-existing 
subjectivities are found to be inadequate in the face of the new situation, 
prompting the collective invention of new roles and repertoires.68 As Zolberg
68 We might examine this improvised invention of roles through reference to what Zolberg 
(1972:192) calls “the theatrical qualities of it all”. Flaubert in his account of 1848, 
fictionalised yet drawing on his own experience, has his hero feeling “as if he were watching 
a spectacle” (cited in Zolberg 1972:192). Tocqueville remarks on the same spectacular 
qualities in his account of the same revolt. “Our French, especially in Paris, easily mix 
memories of literature and of theatre into their most serious demonstrations." This process 
“often lends support to the belief that the sentiments are false, while they are in reality
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(2002: 206) points out “the ‘torrent of words’ involves a sort of intensive 
learning experience whereby new ideas, formulated initially in coteries, 
sects, etc., emerge as widely held beliefs among much larger publics.” This 
makes them moments of emergence: of new technology, new tactics, new 
modes of expression, and of new subjectivity.69
But if these are moments of intense, even excessive, productivity, they 
are also, in apparently contradictory fashion, moments of rupture. They 
undoubtedly contain a break with pre-existing sense and possibility, and they 
are often deeply conflictual, but they have a strange relationship to 
antagonism. While pre-existing and inherent antagonisms become clarified 
in these moments, the antagonisms also lose their motivating force. People 
become animated, instead, by the affect of increasing collective capacity.
We can see this transformation occurring in testimony from the Argentinazo 
popular rebellion of the 19-20 December 2001 :
People were coming down e n  m a s s e  from the buildings and making bonfires 
on street corners. What began angrily, with people coming out on the street in 
rage, quickly turned joyful. People smiled and mutually recognized that 
something had changed. Later came euphoria. It was a very intense feeling 
that I’ll never forget. (Sitrin 2006: 26).
Indeed the huge wave of strikes and workplace occupations that 
accompanied the 1936 election of the French Popular Front government are 
an example of a moment of excess sparked not by an immediate grievance
merely awkwardly adorned... the imitation was so visible that the terrifying originality of the 
events was hidden by it” (cited in Zolberg 1972:193). Perhaps this is where the theatrical 
metaphor breaks down, as people reach for whatever is at hand to help them cope with a 
moment that exceeds them. In Chapter Six we will follow this line of thought when we 
reconceptualise repertoires as refrains, as the snatches of song we whistle to make 
ourselves feel at home when we are abroad.
fiQ
In this sense, then, moments of excess are similar to what Ana Dinerstein (2004) would 
call “moments of subjectivity” or E.P. Thompson “moments of becoming" (Thompson 1978: 
103).
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but by a contagious optimism. History’s biggest wave of workplace 
occupations began after the Popular Front was elected but before they took 
office. The mere prospect of change was enough to free up a previously rigid 
world (Mason 2007). As Simone Weil makes clear: “As soon as one felt the 
oppression weaken, immediately the suffering, the humiliation, the bitterness 
silently accumulated over the years became a force strong enough to loosen 
the bonds. That’s the whole story of the strike: there is no other” (cited in 
Mason 2007: 260).70 The collective action produced a wave of enthusiasm 
that overwhelmed the antagonism inherent in the situation, as Bertrand de 
Jouvenel’s account confirms:
For three days I went from factory to factory... I didn’t see a single case of 
brutality... of damage to a single machine. The ‘sit-down strike’ is a protracted 
picnic.
An effort must be made to remember that we are witnessing a battle. Who is 
the enemy? Where is the enemy? (cited in Zolberg 1972:187).
Can’t we understand this phenomenon as the production of an excess? 
As the engulfing of previous problems and antagonisms by more 
fundamental questions such as: What sort of life do we want to live?71 The 
expansion of possibility makes previous problems seem less relevant. As 
John Thrasher, a participant in the 1937 Flint sit down strike, says: “Nothing
70 Weil links this affect to the reassertion of dignity: “After having always bowed, suffered 
everything, taken it all in silence for months and years, it is a matter of finally having the guts 
to stand up. To stand upright. To take one’s turn to speak. To feel like men, for a few days” 
(cited in Zolberg 1972:187). The Zapatista Subcommandante Marcos (2002:12) seems to 
agree with Weil when he says, “It appears that dignity is contagious”. Dignity is also an 
important concept for John Holloway (2002) who links it with the emergence of the alter- 
globalisation movement.
71 Todd May (2005) proposes a similar question: How might one live? as the central 
problematic for Deleuze, and perhaps the whole post-Nietzschian tradition of continental 
philosophy. He contrasts this with the question: How should one live?, which he attributes to 
ancient philosophy, and Socrates in particular; and the question: How should one act?, 
which he attributes to modern philosophy following Kant and Bentham.
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that happened before the strike began seemed to register in the mind 
anymore. It is as if time itself started with this strike” (cited in Mason 2007: 
271). The things that seemed important before the event don’t retain their 
purchase, for example, “amidst the general exaltation, money is no longer a 
thing of value” (Zolberg 1972:185). Even movement demands, that had 
recently been so vital in mobilisation, quickly become superseded:
In those few hours we were in control of the situation -  at least that’s how it 
felt, and it seemed to me that everyone felt the same way. When the fall of De 
La Rua was announced, it was already irrelevant -  at least where I was, 
people didn’t rejoice, didn’t erupt in joy. At this point it was an annoyance, a 
little thing that was not so important (Sitrin 2006: 27).
This superseding of old problematics might also account for the 
strangely harmonious nature of such events. As Blaug (2000:150) explains, 
in such a moment “conflict works. It somehow generates cohesion, it causes 
people to re-evaluate their preferences and needs”. Simone de Beauvoir 
called the 1944 liberation of Paris a “moment of political harmony” amongst 
the normally fractious French political scene. “Gaullists, Communists, 
Catholics, Marxists, fraternized. A common thought was expressed in all the 
papers” (cited in Zolberg 1972:186). Such an affect was also detectable at 
the Stirling convergence camp during the 2005 protests at the Gleneagles 
G8. The meetings on strategy in the days running up to protests were 
incredibly productive. Despite a wide range of participants with a wide range 
of political backgrounds there was a general fluidity of thought, and a 
genuine willingness to engage and find common ground. The most important 
decision to be made was where to focus the road blockades to disrupt the 
opening of the summit. Some wanted to focus on the M9, which was closer 
to the convergence camp; others wanted to focus on the A9, which was 
closer to the summit. After a long meeting involving several hundred people 
a broad consensus was reached to focus on the A9, which entailed leaving 
the camp the day before the protests and spending the night in the woods. 
This didn’t stop those who stayed behind from organising a march to the M9. 
In the post-action briefing as reports of all the different dispersed actions
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came in, there was a real sense of unity of purpose beyond any 
disagreements.72 A similar affect was reported at the Prague 
demonstrations: “Although our networks were engaged in distinct protest 
performances, expressing contrasting political visions and goals, as I 
listened to the action report, I began to feel connected across our differences 
as we worked toward a common goal” (Juris 2008:136).
Perhaps the difficulty of confronting new and fundamental problematics 
also accounts for one of the most unusual phenomena associated with 
moments of excess, the participants “awareness of affinities across time and 
space” (Zolberg, 1972:183). In Zolberg’s article we might account for the 
awareness of affinities through reference to the particularities of French 
culture and history but the phenomenon seems more widespread. In a 
situation where suddenly everything seems possible, then normal reference 
points and habitual guides can seem no longer useful. In these 
circumstances it appears that people seek out antecedents, and 
contemporaries, who have confronted a similar problematic as reference 
points that can help orientate themselves.
We can see examples of this in the context of the alter-globalisation 
movement. In the build up to the Genoa protests of 2001, the activists and 
collective authors Wu Ming (2001) wrote a widely circulated text claiming an 
inheritance for the movement from, amongst others, the Diggers, Captain 
Swing and the sixteenth century peasant followers of Thomas Muntzer. They 
intended the piece as a mythic creation of antecedents that would help build
72 We can counterpoint these experiences with those on the day after the protests when, in 
the aftermath of the 7/7 bombings in London, the affect had changed. There was a general 
feeling that we should ‘take a position’ on the bombings and draw up a collective press 
release. In this task all the old ideological positions re-emerged, the meeting became 
interminable and common ground ungraspable.
Taking a position’ means standing still and losing the initiative. It also means that it’s 
hard to reconcile the different speeds and directions people are travelling in. After [the 
bombings] the mood, affect, feeling, buzz -  call it what you like -  was defensive and 
closed, compared to previous days: the desire had gone, and with it the energy (Free 
Association 2005b: 25).
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the protests at Genoa. Interestingly they have since criticised this text for 
erecting a false historical analogy, which constructed the G8 as the princes 
within a castle and the movement as a horde of peasants laying siege. 
Following the horrendous state violence at Genoa, Wu Ming felt the wrong 
historical lesson was drawn. “Thomas Muntzer spoke to us, but we couldn’t 
understand his words. It wasn’t a blessing, but a warning" (Wu Ming 2010: 
xxxvi). Just as Muntzer lead his followers to be massacred at 
Frankenhausen in 1525, so Wu Ming feel responsible for encouraging 
protesters into a massacre at Genoa. This is perhaps an overly harsh 
judgment but it does illustrate the dangers of fetishising past events. While 
we must carry the inheritance of past generations, we must do so in a way 
that allows each generation to create their own problematics.73 In the next 
section we want to take up these questions and further explore this mode of 
repetition, and, in particular, the appropriate temporal orientation through 
which we should revisit such events.
The Reprise
We might say this is all very well but we can still anticipate further objections 
to our approach. While we might recognise certain shared affects across 
these events isn’t it still a mistake to group a major event such as May ‘68 
together with what seem like minor protests, such as those against the G8 in 
Gleneagles? Shouldn’t we make distinctions based on the level of an event’s 
significance? Judgements about historical significance, however, have a 
different temporality to the one operative in our approach so far. Historical
73 This is of course the problem that we raised in the thesis introduction. To emphasise this 
connection lets repeat the quotation from Marx (1968a: 97) that we deployed there:
Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not 
make it under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the 
past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare upon the brains 
of the living. And just when they seem engaged in revolutionising themselves and 
things, in creating something that has never yet existed, precisely in such periods of 
revolutionary crisis they anxiously borrow from them names, battle cries and 
costumes in order to present the new scene of world history in their time-honoured 
disguise and in this borrowed language.
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significance can only really be attributed in retrospect; that is after the event. 
Any judgement on historical significance made from within an event can only 
be based on pre-existing social presuppositions. This can only be a pre­
judgement made in denial of the opening-up of political possibility within the 
event. It is a denial of the eventness of the event. Indeed many major events 
can seem insignificant when they begin. The Parisian events, which came to 
a head in May 1968, began with seemingly insignificant struggles over 
visiting rights to the single sex dormitories then prevalent in French 
Universities (Cohn-Bendit, Cohn-Bendit 1968). Similarly one of the initial 
moments in the 1905 Russian Revolution was the ‘Comma Strike’, in which 
typesetters, who were paid piecemeal, began a dispute over payment for 
punctuation (Moorehead 1989).
Retrospective judgements on historical significance are equally 
problematic. The judgement on an event’s significance is never closed. In 
the book May ’68 and its Afterlives Ross (2002) explores how the event of 
May 68 has been continually reinterpreted to fit within contemporary social 
presuppositions. In the 1980s, for instance, commentators began to separate 
the general strike from the protests and occupations that accompanied it.
The orientation towards worker struggles, widespread amongst leftist 
political militants of the time, was separated from “the festival of May”. The 
former became framed through the abjection of the sad militant, as an 
“extreme example of a now obsolete way of life (‘militancy’)” (Ross 2002:
99). By contrast the latter “becomes the préfiguration of the possessive 
individualism of the 1980s, a purely ludic instance of self-expression -  in the 
first case, politics, no pleasure and no self; in the second, festival, only 
pleasure and only self.” (Ross 2002:100).74 Such re-interpretations affect 
judgments of historical significance, as the history of one event is 
recomposed by the events that follow it. Ross (2002:19) quotes a 
respondent to a paper he had given on the subject: “But nothing happened in
74 On the important role that revisionist interpretations of 68 played in the transformation of 
the anti-totalitarian New Philosophers from libertarians to neoliberals see Lecourt (2000).
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France in ’68. Institutions didn’t change, the university didn’t change, 
conditions for the workers didn’t change -  nothing happened... '68 was 
really Prague, and Prague brought down the Berlin Wall.”
In response Ross returns to the testimonies, documents and footage of 
the time to show that the “public happiness”, associated with the sense of 
festival in which “each person existed above and beyond himself” (Ross 
2002:101), was in fact intensely political and collective. A central, and 
indeed structuring, point in the book is taken by Ross’s discussion of two 
films. The first film, La reprise du travail aux usines Wonder (The Return to 
Work at the Wonder Factory) consists of ten minutes of raw footage from 
July 1968. It captures the moment when workers at the Parisian Wonder 
Battery Factory return to work at the end of the general strike. The central 
figure in the footage is a young, female worker who: “cries out that she won’t 
‘go back into that prison’ that she won’t take up the rhythm of the line again, 
that the vote to end the strike has been rigged” (Ross 2002:138). Union 
officials try to persuade her to go back to work while she tries to persuade 
the other workers to stay out.75 “The woman continues her cries of refusal; 
other workers can be seen in the background, slowly filing into the factory 
entrance. What could she have possibly been dreaming of?” (Ross 2002: 
138).
The woman’s refusal is testimony to the political excess, the expanded 
sense of political possibility, which even seemingly economic struggles
An official from the CGT union tells her: “All your friends, your fellow workers have 
decided to go back in. Go back in with them.” To which she replies: “No. I’m not going back 
to get fucked again. I’m not going to work in there. I’m not walking back in that place. I’m not 
putting a foot back in that cell. You go back in, you can see what a shithole it is. It's 
disgusting, we’re all black from it. The pretty boss is in the office. It’s good for him..." (Clover 
2008).
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create. What was previously tolerable has become intolerable.76 As Deleuze 
(2006: 233-4) says:
May '68 is more of the order of an event, free of all normal, or normative 
causality. Its history is a “series of amplified instabilities and fluctuations.” 
There were a lot of agitations, gesticulations, slogans, idiocies, illusions in '68, 
but this is not what counts. What counts is what amounted to a visionary 
phenomenon, as if a society suddenly saw what was intolerable in it and also 
saw the possibility for something else. It is a collective phenomenon in the 
form of: “Give me the possible, or I'll suffocate...” The possible does not pre­
exist, it is created by the event. It is a question of life. The event creates a 
new existence, it produces a new subjectivity.
The second film to which Ross (2002) refers is a 1995 documentary by 
Herve Le Roux which documents his attempts to track down and interview 
the participants in the 1968 Wonder factory footage.77 The title of the film, 
Reprise, plays on its dual meaning. Reprise in French means both to return, 
as in the moment in which the world is returned to normality and, to reprise,
76 Interestingly in a review of the footage Joshua Clover (2008) notes a certain theatrical 
quality. “You will have noted that some time during this vehement exchange, the woman 
seems to have noticed the camera, ambiguously— and has perhaps inhabited her position 
more fully, more self-awarely. Perhaps from a certain point, she is playing ‘the woman who 
cries ’No." She is a historical actor." He also notes that the woman’s hair was styled like the 
contemporary pop star and actress Anna Karina. Despite these marks of a mediated life the 
shocking originality of the situation breaks through. As Clover concludes “we know from this 
footage, from Karina's iconic presence at the Wonder Factory, that styling yourself after a 
pop star does not bar you from a politics of greatest clarity.” We might take this as 
confirmation of the argument about the theatricality of such moments made in a previous 
footnote.
77 The punchline of the film is that Le Roux can trace all the participants of the original film 
except for the young woman. Ross talks about the second film as an enquete, which uses 
the structure of the detective novel, “the uncovering of what has been lost" (Ross 2002: 
146). ‘The recent past, it seems, has been lost or concealed, perhaps even confiscated. 
The crime consists of that confiscation, the crime of excluding, or of having one group -  the 
experts -  to stand in for a mass movement.” (Ross 2002:146)
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as in a reprisal of events. This conception of the reprise is central to the 
book. Ross’s problematic is very close to that of Badiou; he is concerned 
with the creation of a reprise that would permit fidelity to the truth of May 68, 
its collective “public happiness”.78 The temporality and conceptual persona 
from which the problematic is drawn is that of the militant who must struggle 
to remain faithful to the truth experienced in an event, which has profoundly 
altered their subjectivity. It is a problematic informed by the long years of 
winter experienced by ‘60s militants through the 1980s and early 1990s as 
neoliberalism established itself and effaced the very notion that Another 
World is Possible.
The operative temporality of Ross’s problematic is not the temporality 
of the event but that of the reprise. We can tease out this distinction through 
a discussion of Ross’ (2002:104) conception of the pleasure of the events 
as:
a multiform pleasure, one of physical and social transgression, of new 
friendships or complicities to be gained... The pleasure of overcoming social 
compartmentalisations... transmit a sense of the urgent, immediate 
transformation being lived not as future reward but at the very moment.
Such pleasure, however, is “not pursued as an end in itself not even 
necessarily conceptualised at the time as pleasure” (Ross 2002:104). The 
temporality of Ross’ (2002:106) conception of the pleasure of the event is 
apparent here: “If the pleasure was experienced primarily après coup, or 
after the fact, if it was felt indirectly, laterally, and mostly at the painful 
moment of the reprise, the moment of re-integrating back into one’s own 
habits or milieu, it was no less strong”. For Deleuze (2006:131), however, 
the pleasure recognised in retrospect during the reprise is caused by the 
interruption of the event:
7ft
/0 Rather than deal directly with Badiou’s complex view of the event, which would require a 
considerable amount of explication and would distract from the focus of our thesis, we will 
position our approach to the event through a discussion of Ross’ operative temporality.
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I cannot give any positive value to pleasure because pleasure seems to 
interrupt the immanent process of desire... Pleasure seems to me to be the 
only means for the person or subjects to orient themselves in a process that 
exceeds them. It is a re-territorialization. From my point of view, this is how 
desire is brought under the law of lacking and in line with the norm of 
pleasure.79
Deleuze’s perspective on the event is not derived from the pleasure, 
pain or the subjectivity of fidelity that comes with an event’s interruption. It is 
instead rooted in the excess of the event itself.80 The eventness of an event
79 This quotation is actually drawn from a letter, addressed to Foucault, in which Deleuze 
(2006) lays out some points of agreement and divergence between their two philosophies. A 
central point of contention is the difference between Deleuze’s concept of desire and 
Foucault’s concept of pleasure. It has since been published as Desire and  Pleasure.
80 This may seem an arcane distinction but it has dramatic consequences for political 
analysis and practice. For Badiou the events of ‘68 were followed by a restoration, which re­
imposed the old order and closed off the event’s excess and problematics from all but those 
who maintained a subjectivity of disciplined fidelity to its truth. This fidelity has to be 
maintained according to a strict formula, In order to resist the corruptions of fatigue, 
confusion, and dogmatism (Badiou 2002). For Badiou the only traces of the event of ‘68 are 
those rare subjectivities of fidelity. Such a conception, however, effaces the event’s effects 
beyond the moment of reprise and risks the dismissal of the truth of events to come. In 
relation to the alter-globalisation movement, for instance, Badiou (2003:126) says:
All we’ve seen are very ordinary performances from well-worn repertoires of petit- 
bourgeois mass movements, noisily laying claim to the right to enjoy without doing 
anything, while taking special care to avoid any form of discipline. Whereas we know 
that discipline, in all fields, is the key to truths.
Doesn’t this dismissal amount to Badiou pronouncing: B ut noth ing happened in Seattle in
‘997
Eric Alliez, on the other hand, strongly influenced by Deleuze and Guattari, refuses the 
conception of a restoration after the event of 68, preferring the concept of:
counterrevolution [as it] means there has been an on-going revolution, that 68 existed 
as an opening of new radical possibilities... the social mutations it embodied have 
been repressed as much as depotentialised in the process of their capture by an 
extended capitalistic valorization that did not put an end to the crisis. And the fact is 
that high and massive conflictuality remerges in Europe in the mid-1990s, before 
inventing this new global political dynamic that crystallized at Seattle, and with the 
multiplication of World Social Forums that directly addressed the realities of trans­
national capitalism and the post-68  organisational question of the ‘movement of
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exceeds the manner of its reprise and Deleuze is interested in the new 
potential for life shown in this excess:
Will all this be in vain because suffering is eternal and revolutions do not 
survive their victory? But the success of a revolution resides only in itself, 
precisely in the vibrations, clinches, and openings it gave to men and women 
at the moment of its making... The victory of a revolution is immanent and 
consists in the new bonds it installs between people even if those bonds last 
no longer than the revolution’s fused material and quickly gives way to 
division and betrayal (Deleuze, Guattari 2001:177).
We can see from this that the event is firstly a sense-event, the 
sensation that something is anomalous. As Williams (2003:154) explains:
The event has to be individual, in the sense where a sensation within an 
individual is the sign of an ideal event. So the shift from one set of scientistic 
laws to another is not the event, neither is the new species. The event is the 
first sign of mutation or the first sensation (in a scientist, a spectator, an actor, 
animal, plant or molecule).
movements’... You can criticise, show that this anti-model reached its limits to explain 
its reflux, etc -  but... it reveals that ’68 never completely ended. (Alliez, et al 2010: 
169-70).
More than this we might argue that Badiou's analysis denies the very conditions that 
allowed an increased interest in his work during the late 2000s, namely the expansion of 
interest in anti-capitalist theory sparked by the alter-globalisation movement. Indeed we 
might position the attractiveness of Badiou’s theory to the seeming supercession of that 
movement by an attempted neo-conservative counter-revolution, whose violence appeared 
to close the space for the movement’s continuation. During such years o f  w inter Badiou’s 
platonic conception of communism allowed some to gain a measure of orientation. With the 
economic crisis that began in 2007, however, the weaknesses of Badiou’s analysis are fully 
exposed. Alliez’s Deleuzian autonomism allows us to think through the connection between 
struggle and capitalist restructuring, allowing the collapse of 2007 to be seen as the latest 
instantiation of capital’s inability to resolve the crisis of 68. Badiou’s post-Maoist 
conceptualisation, however, closes off the continuing economic effects of ‘68 by raising the 
political above the economic: “I think what is Marxist, and also Leninist -  and in any case 
true -  is the idea that any viable campaign against capitalism can only be political. There 
can be no economic battle against the economy” (Badiou 2002:105).
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A symptomology seems a useful methodology for isolating a certain 
kind of sense-event, which we want to call a moment of excess. For Deleuze 
(2004b: 25), however, this would only hold true: "on the condition that the 
event is not confused with its spatio-temporal realization in a state of affairs.” 
There is an aspect of the event, a pure-event, in contrast to a sense event, 
that is not captured in any individual instantiation in a state of affairs or in 
lived experience. It is in this light that Deleuze (2004b: 64) says: “The mode 
of the event is the problematic.” As Patton (2006:113) explains:
Specification is necessary for the production of particular solutions, but the 
pure problem-event is not thereby dissolved or exhausted since there always 
remains the possibility of other specifications and other solutions. We must 
distinguish between the empirical event, which is a particular determination of 
the problem, and the problem-event that, in its pure form, remains 
“immaterial, incorporeal, unliveable: pure reserve”.
The task of our symptomology then is “to extract the non-actualizable 
part of the pure event from symptoms” (Deleuze 2004b: 273). In this way we 
can reopen the event, to re-inhabit it, in order to extract its problematic, and 
allow a renewed experimentation with alternative solutions. The temporality 
and conceptual persona in operation here is not the post-reprise subjectivity 
of the militant but the revolutionary-becoming of the event itself, beyond the 
outcome of any specific revolution, or moment of excess. As Deleuze (1995: 
175) explains:
May 68 was a demonstration, an irruption, of a becoming in its pure state. It’s 
fashionable these days to condemn the horrors of revolution. It’s nothing new; 
English Romanticism is permeated by reflections on Cromwell very similar to 
present-day reflections on Stalin. They say revolutions always turn out badly. 
But they’re confusing two different things, the way revolutions turn out 
historically and people’s revolutionary becoming: the only way of casting off 
their shame or responding to what is intolerable.
There is a reversal of temporal disposition here. Rather than the 
creation of a militant subjectivity based on fidelity to the truth of a past event, 
the task is to re-open the past event in order to remain faithful to the
- 8 4 -
possibility of events to come.81 For Deleuze the ethical framework of 
judgement must be applicable both within an event and within quotidian 
experience. It must, therefore, also operate on a pre-subjective level. As 
such, Deleuze insists, rather than rooting ethical judgement in pleasure, it 
must be rooted in affect, in particular, the affect of joy that accompanies an 
increase in a body’s capacities counterpoised with the affect of sadness that 
accompanies a decrease in capacities.82
This doesn’t mean we escape the problem of the reprise but it does 
recompose the problem. The political problematic is now the construction of 
institutional forms that can operate during more quotidian times while 
remaining open to events to come.83 Such a form of organisation would 
involve a relay between the affective judgement that takes place within the 
intensity of events and the analysis that is possible in more extensive 
conditions. In Chapter Six we seek to use this problematic to reconceptualise 
the repertoires that have been developed by social movement activity 
around summit mobilisations.
Before we reach that point, however, we need to move on from our 
symptomology of moments of excess. It might not, however, be appropriate 
to move directly from the grouping of symptoms to the next task of the 
clinical doctor, etiology or a concern with causes. We cannot continue to act 
in the manner of the clinician not least because what we are concerned with
81 Hardt and Negri (2009:60-1) accord with this treatment of Badiou when they say: “A 
retrospective approach to the event in fact does not give us access to the rationality of 
insurrectional activity, which must strive within the historical process to create revolutionary 
events and break from the dominant subjectivities. Without the internal logic of making 
events, one can only affirm them from the outside as a matter of faith".
82 We elaborate on this ethical framework in Chapter Five, through a discussion of the 
Spinozan concept of conatus.
83 To return to Deleuze's (1991) discussion of Masochism, we might see the masochist’s 
contract as an institutional form that allows the persistence of desire by warding off its 
interruption in a climax of pleasure. We seek institutional forms, then, that allow us to 
sustain the desires produced by moments of excess.
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here involves “the rupture with causality that forces a rewriting of history on a 
level with the real, and produces this strangely polyvocal moment when 
everything is possible” (Deleuze, Guattari, 1984:378). In their final 
collectively authored book What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari (1994) 
distinguish the concerns of Science, Art and Philosophy. Scientific 
endeavour “concerns itself only with states of affairs and their conditions.” As 
such “Science needs only propositions or functions” (Deleuze, Guattari 1994: 
33). The role we have given to states of affairs in the thesis, so far, has been 
the not strictly scientific one of the abstraction of problematics from particular 
stages of actually existing social movements.
For Deleuze and Guattari (1994:162-3) Art has a separate role. “Art 
preserves, and it is the only thing in the world that is preserved... What is 
preserved -  the thing or the work of art -  is a bloc of sensations, that is to 
say, a compound of percepts and affects.”84 We might want to connect this 
artistic function with our symptomology of excess -  remembering that for 
Deleuze (2004b: 273) “[t]here is always a great deal of art involved in the 
grouping of symptoms” and it was just such a grouping of affects we have 
been concerned with. Now, however, we must move from an artistic mode to 
a more properly philosophical one, so that we can trace the conceptual 
outlines of moments of excess and isolate the problems that the 
symptomology has raised.
For Deleuze and Guattari (1994: 2): “philosophy is the art of forming, 
inventing, and fabricating concepts.” We can see philosophy, then, as a 
creative task, which can help us move beyond experience, enable new
84 Percepts and affects are used as concepts here to counter our usual bias toward the 
individual as the privileged units of experience. As they go on to say:
percepts are no longer perceptions: they are independent of a state of those who 
experience them. Affects are no longer feelings or affections; they go beyond the 
strength of those who undergo them. Sensations, percepts, and affects are beings 
whose validity lies in themselves and exceeds any lived. They could be said to exist 
in the absence of man because man, as he is caught in stone, on the canvas, or by 
words, is himself a compound of percepts and affects. The work of art is a being of 
sensation and nothing else: it exists in itself. (Deleuze and Guattari 1994:163).
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possibilities for thought and call forth events to come.85 Philosophical 
conceptualisation becomes necessary as we move from the isolation of a 
sense-event to the examination of a problem-event. As Deleuze and 
Guattari (1994:16) explain: “All concepts are connected to problems without 
which they would have no meaning and which can themselves only be 
isolated and understood as their solution emerges.” Cesare Casarino, 
however, raises a pertinent critique of What is Philosophy?-.
I would say that in it they do not emphasize nearly enough the fact that 
philosophy understood as the production of concepts is a necessary element 
intrinsic to any practice, or, put differently, that any practice involves 
something like a philosophical moment to the extent that it needs to produce 
its own concepts in order to function. (Casarino, Negri, 2008:187).
To more accurately characterise the task in hand then, we should say 
that we wish to extract, and then intensify, concepts and problems that are 
already operative in social movements.
In the next chapter we seek a conceptualisation that brings out and 
intensifies the movement problematic of the relation between intensive 
moments of excess and the politics of everyday life. In doing so we broach 
the question posed by Blaug (2000:153): “What use then are such 
extraordinary and ephemeral moments?” This is a difficult question to 
approach as putting such moments to use risks obscuring their full potential 
behind the fetish of a totalising notion of utility. If moments of excess bring 
about the opening up of political possibility, then how do we act without 
prematurely closing that possibility within a new instrumentality? We will 
seek a solution to this problem through Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of 
antiproduction, the socius and the Body without Organs, which, we will 
argue, attempts to resolve Marx and Bataille; that is the everyday excess
QC
3 “The concept is the contour, the configuration, the constellation of an event to come" 
(Deleuze, Guattari 1994: 33).
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found in Marx’s theory of surplus value and the unemployable, festive 
excess that can be found in Bataille’s concept of expenditure.
The analytical problematic, then, is the relation of moments of excess 
to the false totalities and fetishisms of the socius of capital. The movement 
problematic is the relationship between moments of excess and wider 
change in habitual life. The question we might ask is: How do we analyse 
and act in the more extensive situations of everyday life while keeping open 
to events to come? Or to phrase it differently: “how do we take those new 
worlds that felt so possible during the week of protests and generalise them 
so that they make sense in the rest of our lives?” (Harvie, et al 2005b: 15).
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Chapter Four 
Moments of Excess
“And what is the phantom fuzz screaming from Chicago to Berlin, from Mexico 
City to Paris? ‘We are REAL REAL REAL!!! as this NIGHTSTICK!’ as they 
feel, in their dim animal way, that reality is slipping away from them ...” William 
Burroughs (2003: 246), commenting on the police beating of protesters at the 
Democratic convention, Chicago 1968.
“Money is shit. And what does the money machine eat to shit it out? It eats 
youth, spontaneity, life, beauty and above all it eats creativity. It eats quality 
and shits out quantity... the more the machine eats the less remains... This 
process is escalating geometrically” (Burroughs 1984:73-4).
Introduction
On 15 June 2001 the Swedish police shot three unarmed demonstrators 
during protests against the summit of the EU heads of state in Gothenburg. 
One protester, shot through the stomach, was lucky to survive (Days of 
Dissent 2004). A few months later Carlo Giuliani was shot in the face and 
killed during the protests against the G8 in Genoa. This shooting took place 
in the context of a brutal police assault on the protests, with large-scale 
disturbances and widespread, indiscriminate beatings of protestors. On the 
night after the shooting the Italian police attacked the Diaz school, which had 
been hired by the Genoa Social Forum and was being used by some 
protesters as sleeping quarters and a media centre. During the raid scores of 
sleeping protesters were savagely beaten, with many hospitalised and three 
put into comas. Those arrested there, along with others arrested during the 
events, were taken to the Bolzaneto detention centre, where they were 
subjected to a regime of beatings and humiliations which was subsequently 
defined as torture by an Italian court (BBC News 2008). While we could 
argue that these incidents are exceptional and singular, reflecting their own
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specific circumstances, the speed with which they followed one another 
seemed to indicate a trans-national hardening of attitudes in the policing of 
protests.86
In previous chapters we have argued that the episodic and evental 
nature of contemporary movements, including the prevalence of what we 
have called moments of excess, are symptomatic of the dominance of 
transcendental forms of power based on the conditioning of possible 
experience. However, the experiences of moments of excess during summit 
protests have been accompanied by displays of power based on a much 
more direct application of force. This is something that needs both 
accounting for and incorporating into movement strategy. While 
acknowledging that this shift has restricted the movement’s space of 
operation, we will argue that this has not been the primary problematic faced 
by the movement. Instead the overarching problem, and the one that the 
movement has been unable to fully resolve, is the failure to generalise the 
expanded sense of political possibility produced in moments of excess into a 
society in which politics has been reduced to the concern of a technocratic 
elite and in which the very conception of collective political action has fallen 
into disrepute.87
Although these levels of brutality weren’t reached again there has been a generalised 
and trans-national militarisation of the policing of such events. Indeed following 9/11, and 
the neoconservative exploitation of that event, the militarisation of policing segued 
seamlessly into the War on Terror. As a consequence the alter-globalisation movement, 
particularly in US, found the political space within which it operated began to close up. This 
was due not just to the general atmosphere of intolerance of dissent, with, for example, the 
invention of the invidious category of domestic extremist, but also because the analytical 
focus of politics moved away from the concerns of the movement.
Indeed we would argue that the need for the movement to deal with the problematic of 
sovereign violence has tended to exacerbate the gap between movement experiences and 
everyday life. As such it is only after we have worked through a conceptualisation of the 
relation of moments of excess to the transcendental forms of power operative under 
neoliberalism that we will return to the problematics of sovereign violence.
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This problem has provoked much discussion amongst the movement’s 
participants and fellow travellers. For many it has led to a critique of ‘summit 
hopping’, in which the movement’s evental form is cast as a distraction from 
a more direct engagement with the concerns of everyday life.88 Yet despite 
this, summit protests, as well as other protests utilising their form and 
repertoire, have persisted. In addition, and perhaps even more importantly, 
many struggles not directly related to summit protests have continued to re­
present the affects and problematics of moments of excess.89 Indeed, 
despite many original and productive attempts to reposition the movement 
onto the terrain of everyday life, overcoming the movement form has not 
proven easy.90 What we propose in this thesis is not a rejection of the form
88 We can find such sentiments not just within the activist milieu but also within 
contemporary continental philosophy. See for example these comments by Simon Critchley 
(2004):
Perhaps it is at th[e] intensely situational, indeed local level that the atomising force of 
capitalist globalisation is to be met, contested and resisted. That is, it is not to be 
resisted by constructing a global anti-globalisation movement that, at its worst, is little 
more than a highly-colourful critical echo of the globalisation it contests. It is rather to 
be resisted by occupying and controlling the terrain upon which one stands, where 
one lives, works, acts and thinks... That is, politics begins right here, locally, 
practically and specifically, around a concrete issue and not by running off to protest 
at some meeting of the G8. You shouldn’t meet your enemy on their ground, but on 
your own, on the ground that you have made your own. Also, think of the money and 
time you save on travel!
While we would agree with Critchley’s ambition to control the terrain “where one lives, 
works, acts and thinks” it is precisely the difficulty of doing so that has spurred the form 
taken by alter-globalisation protests, and it is precisely through these protests that some 
ground has been made our own. While accepting the need to go beyond that ground we 
should not reject it but treat it, precisely, as some ground from which to experiment with new 
forms of politics. We should also make clear that the presupposition upon which Critchley 
(2004) draws his politics is that “for good or ill, let’s say ill, we are stuck with the state, just 
as we are stuck with capitalism."
88 We might think here of incidences as varied as the Cochabamba Water Wars in Bolivia 
in 2000, the Argentinazo of 2001, the uprising in Oaxaca, Mexico in 2006, the 2008 and 
2010 Greek riots, as well as many other instances.
The most interesting experiment in this direction has been the EuroMayday movement, 
which sought to use the concept of precarity to figure the affects of neoliberalism on our
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of politics established by summit protests but a re-examination that may 
allow us to supersede them. We aim to reconceptualise these experiences in 
order to abstract concepts, technologies and problematics that we can use to 
gain collective traction on the terrain of the (re)production of everyday life. To 
allow us to do so we try, in this chapter, to conceptualise moments of excess 
in relation to the role they might play in political and social organisation. The 
chapter is split into five sections. In this first section we set up the 
problematic we are addressing through comparison with other conceptions 
of the political role played by social movements and moments of excess. In 
the second section we use the problematic of moments of excess as a prism 
to discus the theory of George Bataille, whose concept of the expenditure of 
excess, and the central role that this expenditure plays in social organisation, 
allows us to consider moments of excess as ruptures in what is reasonable 
and productive. In the third section we examine Deleuze and Guattari’s 
concepts of the Body without Organs, the full body and the socius. These 
concepts are developed in relation to the concept of antiproduction, which 
Deleuze and Guattari derive from Bataille’s concept of expenditure but which 
they position within a non-teleological universal history. In the fourth section 
we develop a theory of the moment of excess in the light of the previous two 
chapters and in the final section we ask what is to be done with such 
moments.
To set up the problematic of the chapter, let’s start with the image of 
the alter-globalisation movement provided by the Italian activist and theorist, 
Paolo Virno:
The global movement ever since Seattle resembles a half-functioning voltaic 
battery: it accumulates energy without rest but does not know how and where 
to discharge it. We face a marvelous hoarding to which no adequate 
investments correspond at this time... Every activist is aware of this: the
everyday lives. Interestingly the primary form with which this movement has spread has 
been Mayday parades, which draw on many of the repertoire’s developed during the alter- 
globalisation cycle of protests (on EuroMayday see Foti 2009).
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global movement does not yet manage to have an effect— I mean, to have an 
effect with the grace of corrosive acid— on the current capitalist accumulation 
(Joseph, Virno 2005: 34-5).
By rendering the problematic in the form of an energetic circuit Virno 
raises the question of where and how the energy accumulated might be 
invested, or indeed discharged. The most orthodox answers declare that the 
energy of the movement must be displaced into the sphere of representation 
if it is not to be wasted. In such a schema the energy provided by social 
movements must be channelled and siphoned off to fuel more conventionally 
organised, and ‘serious’ representative politics. One version of this posits a 
vanguard political party as the necessary component to guide the 
spontaneous spark of revolt provided by the movement. Alex Callinicos 
(2002), for instance, has derided the failure to accept this as 
‘movementism’.91 A different version of a similar schema is to be found in 
attempts to draw up a unified programme of demands for the movement, as 
a means of constructing a more coherent political subject. The most 
prominent of these efforts was the 2006 Bamako appeal, drawn up by a 
group of intellectuals close to the World Social Forum process, including the 
Egyptian economist Samir Amin (Waterman 2006). Of all the efforts to 
institutionalise the movement through representation it is, perhaps, only in 
Latin America with its Pink Tide of governments, that the movement has 
managed to inscribe itself in constituted politics.92 The problem that haunts 
these experiences is how to prevent the process of institutionalisation from
9  ^ We could, of course, add to this example the various attempts to construct the alter- 
globallsatlon movement as impetus for the construction of a new global social democratic 
compact (see for example, Held, Mcgrew, 2003).
92 The story of the relation between the Latin American social movements and their 
governments is actually a varied and complex one. We can see the most direct transfer from 
movement to institutions in the election of Evo Morales, leader of the Cochabamba water 
wars, as president of Bolivia. In many countries the relationship has been more complex 
and less direct. Lula’s presidency of Brazil, for instance, was preceded by the decline of the 
movements rather than their highpoint (Turbulence collective 2007).
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demobilising the movements. Or to return to Virno’s energetic metaphor, 
how can a movement take effect and institutionalise itself without the 
mobilising energy being spent in the process?
For others, such as Zizek, this failure to have an effect on current 
capitalist accumulation reveals the movement’s real, though disavowed, 
desire.93 Zizek constructs the alter-globalisation movement as the 
embodiment of what he calls the politics of ‘resistance’, which, for him, is 
founded on the impossibility of liberation and so the reduction of politics to a 
moralism. For Zizek the movement is a form of acting out, allowing the 
settling of consciences, and thus the smoother continuation of the system.
“[A]ll is needed is a slight shift in our perspective, and all the activity of 
‘resistance,’ of bombarding those in power with impossible ‘subversive’ 
(ecological, feminist, antiracist, antiglobalist...) demands, looks like an internal 
process of feeding the machine of power, providing the material to keep it in 
motion." (Zizek 2006: 334).
To return to our energetic register, we can grasp Zizek’s argument as a 
variation of his critique of carnivalesque moments, in which the world is 
turned upside down for a restricted period in order to release the excess 
energy and frustrations that might otherwise trigger less controlled 
explosions. In essence Zizek’s approach reduces the alter-globalisation 
movement and “minoritarian politics to its failure and defines it as an 
ideological supplement to capitalism” (Diefenbach 2007).
The limits of Zizek’s stance becomes apparent when he says:
Better to do nothing than to engage in localized acts whose ultimate function 
is to make the system run more smoothly... The threat today is not passivity 
but pseudo-activity, the urge to ‘be active’, to ‘participate.’ to mask the
93 We can loosely include Badlou in these dismissals of the alter-globalisation movement in 
its minoritarian aspects. His project however is subtler and more nuanced that Zizek’s 
characteristically provocative overstatement. For Badiou the contemporary problem is that of 
separation from the politics of liberal democracy.
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Nothingness of what goes on... Those in power often prefer even a ‘critical’ 
participation, a dialogue, to silence — just to engage us in a ‘dialogue,’ to make 
sure our ominous passivity is broken. (Zizek 2006:334)
There is a strong temptation to dismiss such a statement as a 
weakened repetition of Baudrillard’s (1983:105) argument that: “The 
absence of response can be understood as a counter-strategy of the masses 
themselves in their encounter with power and no longer at all as a strategy of 
power.” After thirty years of neoliberalism and the incredible redistribution of 
wealth from the poorest to the richest that has accompanied the collapse in 
political participation, we might say that passivity has proved a little 
ineffective as a counter-strategy.94 The problematic that Zizek is attempting 
to address, however, does have more merit than this. We have already 
discussed the tendency to reduce social movements to feedback 
mechanisms for the contemporary socius. We have also discussed feedback 
as a primary means of incorporating populations within control societies. 
Indeed when Deleuze (1995:175) discusses control societies in a well- 
known interview with Negri he makes a statement that seems close to 
Zizek’s position: “The key thing may be to create vacuoles of 
noncommunication, circuit breakers, so we can elude control.”
In our discussion of the social application of cybernetic feedback 
circuits, however, we discovered that although a feedback model allows the 
modulation of a system, it does not allow the fundamental transformation the 
system’s overall orientation and structure. The creation of vacuoles of 
noncommunication, then, should not be construed as an injunction against 
acting or speaking. It is rather a warning against acting and speaking in 
ways that fail to break with the cybernetic circuits of communication, which 
set the ultimate boundaries of what it is possible to do and say. Following 
this could we look to moments of excess as examples of vacuoles of
Indeed if there has been a switch from the imposition of passivity by ‘power’ to the 
embrace of passivity as a counter-strategy by the ‘masses’ then neither the ‘masses’ nor 
‘power’ seems to have noticed the reversal.
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noncommunication when they break with contemporary sense and pose their 
own questions on their own terms.95
We have already seen that neoliberalism operates in a way that 
obscures its genesis. It constructs the sense that it is, in some way, natural 
and eternal. There is No Alternative. It is this that makes the expansion of 
the sense of political possibility found in moments of excess so politically 
significant. Another World is Possible. But how can this sense of possibility, 
and the political energy that it produces, interact with a common sense 
dominated by the neoliberal depotentialisation of life? To return to our 
energetic metaphor, how can we use this energy without short-circuiting its 
continued generation, that is, without bringing the movement to a halt? In the 
next section we reconceptualise these questions through reference to 
Bataille’s theory of the expenditure of excess, in which nonproductive 
expenditure can be central to either the persistence of a system or its 
transformation. This use of nonproductive expenditure must in turn 
destabilise common sense assumptions about what constitutes rational 
action and so disrupt the colonisation of our lives by neoliberal conceptions 
of utility. It is only through breaking with such conceptions of common sense 
that we can begin to think of a political body that can incorporate a moment 
of excess in a manner that doesn’t cut us off from new events and new 
problematics to come.
The Judgement of the Solar Anus
George Bataille was a contemporary of the Surrealist movement and though 
he had a famously fractious relationship with central Surrealist orchestrator 
Andre Breton they shared a similar problematic (Kendall, 2007). Bataille, like 
the Surrealists, was concerned with the interplay between the ‘rational’ and
Indeed their rejection of passivity as a strategy becomes clear when Deleuze and 
Guattari (1994:108) return to this problematic in a later work: “We do not lack 
communication. On the contrary, we have too much of it. We lack creation. We lack  
resistance to the present.”
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the ‘irrational’ in creative and transformative events. In fact we could usefully 
trace this problematic further back to the proto-surrealist artistic movement 
Dada. The explosion of Dadaist ‘irrational’ behaviour at the Cabaret Voltaire 
in 1916 was spurred by the World War raging around it; the war was, after 
all, an unprecedented apocalyptic display of the irrational deployment of 
rationality. Set back in this context Dada appears as a hard realism, 
revealing the disavowed irrationality of contemporary society. Yet at the 
same time we can see a search for new and better forms of sociality in 
Dada’s probing of the borders and thresholds of the existing regime of 
rationality.96 Similarly the Surrealist movement, that followed Dada’s 
collapse, was not the fantastical escapism to which popular culture has now 
reduced it. It was, rather, an attempt to create a super- or over-realism, a 
sur-realism that rose above the limited horizons of contemporary sense. 
Surrealist practices, such as the introduction of the element of chance into 
art, or the creation of pre-rational juxtapositions derived from a Freudian 
theory of the unconscious, were attempts to gain just such an overview by 
breaking with habitual connections and patterns of thought.97
Punk rock, whose inheritance from Dada is traced by Greil Marcus (1997), also 
contained this realist strand, ‘the word from the street', drawing out the nihilism of 
contemporary society. ‘No Future’ as diagnosis not program. This break with piety allows a 
renewed experimentation with more active forms of life: ‘Do It Yourself’.
To develop this point we might trace, in an admittedly reductionist manner, two lines of 
artistic development that follow from Dada and Surrealism. The first running from 
Surrealism, to Situationism, to Punk and beyond, involves what Deleuze and Guattari (1988: 
123) call the “double turning away that draws the positive line of flight” in the passional 
regime of signs. To follow this argument we can construct the first turning away as a rupture 
with what exists; in artistic practice this often involves the use of shock, perhaps through 
revelation of the disavowed, to break with habitual patterns of thought. We might then think 
of the second turning away as the turning towards new thought, to new worlds and to new 
modes of sociality. The second line of artistic development might then be described as the 
failure to complete this double turning away. In this case the shock is followed by a turning 
back to existing society, to existing modes of thought. We could trace this second line of 
artistic development as moving through the advertising industry’s incorporation of Surrealist
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Bataille’s writing, and indeed his organisational practice, involved 
similar attempts to escape the bounds of utilitarian rationality. He 
distinguished himself from the Surrealists, however, on the very possibility of 
an overview.98 In his essay The ‘Old Mole’ and the Prefix Sur in the Words 
Surhomme [superman] and Surrealist Bataille (1985) critiques Sur-realism 
precisely on its prefix. Reading sur as over, he suggests it signifies an 
idealist desire to soar above the messiness of the world. This desire for total 
overview is likened to an imperialist ‘super eagle’, which is destined for an 
Icarus-like fall in the obscuring glare of the sun.99 Bataille’s preference was 
to grub like a mole amidst more base material, with all the restricted vision 
and discontinuous visibility that this implies.
Indeed Bataille’s use of the phrase “old mole” also signals a certain 
position within a dispute over historicism. Bataille is referencing Marx’s great 
text on historical repetition The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. 
Hegel, however, had preceded Marx in the use of this analogy. For Hegel 
(2010:547) the ‘old mole’ symbolises the subterranean progression of 
reason, which he termed ‘the spirit of world history’, as it tunnelled 
dialectically but inexorably towards the light of the surface. This mole then is 
the inheritance of past generations of thought in its movement through the 
present. Its work is to push history onwards until it broaches the surface, 
brings reason’s underlying unity into full consciousness, and achieves
derived techniques of shock, Andy Warhol’s turn to advertising and celebrity as artistic 
subject, and ultimately the Young British Artist’s adoption of the relation between shock, 
sensation and the art market as the privileged subject of artistic enquiry.
The utilitarian rationality mentioned here, does not necessarily refer to the philosophical 
system of utilitarianism associated with Bentham, Mill, etc but is used in a more general 
sense to indicate an instrumentalism based on a conception of an unproblematically 
universal notion of utility.
99 For Bataille, as will become apparent, the sun is the figure of an irreducible excess which 
will ultimately bring any pretensions to total knowledge back down to the messy earth.
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panoramic vision.100 As finite individuals we are trapped amidst history and it 
is only the work of this mole that connects us to the whole:
[Individuals are like blind men, who are driven forward by the indwelling spirit 
of the whole... We have to give ear to its urgency -  when the mole that is 
within forces its way on -  and we have to make it a reality... consciously to 
bring it from its natural condition, i.e. from its lifeless seclusion, into the light of 
day. (Hegel 2010: 553).
For Marx (1968a), of course, Hegel’s mole is standing on its head. 
Marx puts it back on its feet by linking ideas to the material preconditions of 
their production. Marx’s ‘old mole’ is revolution, burrowing its way to the 
surface of visibility during moments of open class conflict, submerging when 
that cycle of struggle is over, to continue burrowing out of view until it can 
emerge again. “Well grubbed old mole” (Marx 1968a: 170).101
100 Hegel’s (2010:553) ‘old mole’ makes its appearance In the conclusion of his Lectures 
on the H istory o f Philosophy, a survey of the previous 2,500 years of philosophy. It is then, 
for Hegel, quite literally the inheritance of past generations of thought.
^ 1  In his Postscrip t on C ontro l Societies Deleuze (1995:180) seems to suggest that the 
metaphor of the old mole has lost its purchase. “If money's old moles are the animals of 
confinement, then control societies have their snakes." The reference is brief and its 
mention of “money’s old mole” a little obscure — the English translator suggests that the 
passage makes reference to the European Union Exchange Rate Mechanism, commonly 
called the snake in the French press (in Deleuze 1995: 203). The overall suggestion, 
however, is that our relations with other people have been changed causing a change in the 
potential for struggle. “Disciplinary man produced energy in discrete amounts, while control 
man undulates, moving among a continuous range of different orbits" (Deleuze 1995:180). 
Hardt and Negri (2000:57) pick up this argument and remake it in more direct fashion: “(W]e 
suspect that Marx’s old mole has finally died. It seems to us, in fact, that in the 
contemporary passage to Empire, the structured tunnels of the mole have been replaced by 
the undulations of the snake." They argue that postmodernity hasn’t the depth for 
subterranean pathways and as such the horizontal communication that produces a cycle of 
struggles can no longer take place. This passage was written, however, before the 
emergence of the alter-globalisation movement, which bore all the hallmarks of a classic, 
mole-like, circulation of struggles. Indeed it was incubated in subterranean passage across
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This dispute between moles provides some intellectual context to 
Bataille’s problematic. He remained after all resolutely leftist while he 
struggled to escape the enormous influence of Alexandre Kojeve’s lectures 
on Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit over a generation of French thinkers.102 
Kojeve’s reading of Hegel was particularly systematising and teleological, 
leaving Bataille feeling “suffocated, crushed, shattered, killed ten times over” 
(Quoted in Noys 2000: 7). As Noys (2000: 7) suggests, Bataille’s subsequent 
writings can be read “as a sustained and violent dialogue with the 
overwhelming force of Hegel.”103 For Bataille (1985: 52), “the Hegelian 
doctrine is above all an extraordinary and very perfect system of reduction”. 
Bataille (1985: 51) maintains, however, that there remains something 
irreducible about the material world: “Base matter is external and foreign to 
ideal human aspirations, and it refuses to allow itself to be reduced to the 
great ontological machines resulting from these aspirations”. Base matter is 
heterogeneous, it contains an excess that escapes all attempts to totalise 
and therefore master it. Any sense of totality, any totalisation effect, is reliant 
on mechanisms to incorporate that which exceeds it and for Bataille it is 
precisely these mechanisms that provide social meaning and value. Central 
to any form of social organisation is the expenditure of excess beyond the
the world; encounters in the deep jungles of Chiapas were an Important moment in its 
circulation, before exploding into view at Seattle. The argument about the snake and mole 
has subsequently disappeared from Hardt and Negri’s conceptual armoury. From our post­
movement position we can confidently say that the rumours of the moles death have been 
greatly exaggerated.
The lectures, delivered between 1934 and 1939, were attended by, amongst others, 
Andre Breton, Jacques Lacan, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Raymond Aron, as well as 
Bataille (Kendall 2007).
103 Another intellectual lineage we can trace from Kojeve, leads to his friend and 
correspondent Leo Strauss, to Strauss' student Alan Bloom and through to Bloom's student 
Francis Fukuyama. Of course the argument to be made here is that the reliance of 
neoliberalism on transcendental dimensions of power opened it to Fukuyama’s Kojeveian 
Hegelianism. It is in this context that we can see a renewed contemporary relevance to 
Bataille’s attempts to break free from Kojeve’s systematisation.
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need for reproduction or expansion. This excess, the accursed share, must 
be wasted if it is not to irrupt in an uncontrolled manner. It is during the 
expenditure of excess, and in particular the effervescent irruptions of excess, 
that the borders of regimes of utilitarian rationality become most visible. So if 
Bataille turns to the “old mole” to portray a necessarily restricted field of 
vision he also retains a sense of the mole’s discontinuous visibility.
This base materialism presents serious difficulties for analysis. In 
Bataille it leads to a difficult body of work -  a discontinuous and anti- 
systematic theorisation that he himself admitted had escaped his attempts to 
capture it in writing (Bataille 1985). Indeed it also complicates our attempt to 
explicate Bataille’s thought. As Noys (2000: 5) suggests: ‘The irruptive 
forces which are condensed in Bataille's works threaten to destroy any 
reading that imposes a sense on Bataille or tries to place him within limits,
To do so is to destroy the thought of freedom that is central to Bataille’s 
work.” For us, however, this tension may prove productive, as it is precisely 
this problematic of the irruption of the new that we are looking for in Bataille. 
What we are looking for is an overlap between Bataille’s problematic and our 
own problematic, which we can re-state with such questions as: How do we 
maintain that expansion of possibilities that we find in moments of excess 
after we have returned to habitual lives dominated by neoliberal sense? How 
can we build on the analytical and organisational experience of past 
movements, or generations, without over determining contemporary 
experience and effacing events to come?
Bataille’s anti-systematic thought gains its most systematic exposition 
in arguably his most famous work The Accursed Share and it is here that the 
problematic nature of this analysis is most clearly exposed. Starting with an 
image of the sun as a ‘solar anus’, a promiscuous emitter of surplus energy, 
Bataille draws up a complex ontology of excess and limits. The circulation of 
excess solar energy, given without expectation of return, allows the 
proliferation of life on the limited space of the Earth. As this limited space 
becomes filled, the excess energy can no longer be expended on the self­
reproduction and growth of a system and so must be expended non­
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productively. One possible result of such nonproductive expenditure is 
difference, the emergence of new systems built around new utilisation of that 
excess energy. As Bataille (1989: 21) explains:
The living organism, in a situation determined by the play of energy on the 
surface of the globe, ordinarily receives more energy than is necessary for 
maintaining life; the excess energy (wealth) can be used for the growth of a 
system (e. g., an organism); if the system can no longer grow, or if the excess 
cannot be completely absorbed in its growth, it must necessarily be lost 
without profit; it must be spent, willingly or not, gloriously or catastrophically.
Such squandering of excess, as the precondition for differentiation, is 
the central activity of life itself. ‘The history of life on earth is mainly the effect 
of a wild exuberance; the dominant event is the development of luxury, the 
production of increasingly burdensome forms of life” (Bataille 1989: 33). At 
the summit of this differentiation, the most burdensome forms of life are the 
great predators, whose very existence represents an immense squandering 
of energy beyond simple reproduction.
William Blake asked the tiger: "In what distant deeps or skies, burned the fire 
of thine eyes?" What struck him in this way was the cruel pressure, at the 
limits of possibility, the tiger's immense power of consumption of life. In the 
general effervescence of life, the tiger is a point of extreme incandescence. 
And this incandescence did in fact burn first in the remote depths of the sky, 
in the sun's consumption (Bataille 1989: 34)
For Bataille, social organisation is part of, and therefore must be 
positioned within, the dynamics of these wider flows of energy. In a twist to 
the productivism to which Marxism is usually consigned it is the expenditure 
of this primal excess that provides the problem around which social 
organisation revolves.104 Or, as Holland (1999:62) puts it, “social
104 On this point we might think of Bataille as positioning Marx’s critique within a more 
general economy of energy transformations and, in particular, a philosophical working-out of 
the consequences of the second law of thermo-dynamics.
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organisation is always based on the expenditure of excess, and productive 
activity derives its meaning and purpose from such expenditure, not the 
other way around.” In the Accursed Share Bataille (1989) distinguishes 
between the ‘general economy’ of this circulation of excess and the limited, 
or restricted, economy of totalities and scarcity. While this produces an 
image of a cohesive general economy, within which there are many limited, 
partial economies, the exact status of the distinction is actually quite 
problematic. The limited economy can never be more than a fictional totality 
yet, as we’ve seen, there can be no access to an eagle-eyed view of the 
general economy. The only prisms through which we can glimpse the 
general economy are those discontinuous moments of the expenditure or the 
irruption of excess.
Adopting a Durkheimian vocabulary Bataille distinguishes between the 
sacred and the profane. The latter relates to the world of the limited 
economy, the world of utility where objects and subjects are separated from 
the flows of life and reified into discrete things. On the other hand, in the 
sacred, “we see a rupture opening to let out the ‘excess’ of an 
unmaintainable and thus delusive unity, whether that unity is consciousness, 
the body, a community, or even a nation” (Stoekl 1985: xxi). Bataille looks to 
moments of expenditure of excess to discover an experience of de­
reification, where excess is expended in glorious waste that moves material 
and subjectivities out of the profane world of utility. The sacred emerges in 
discontinuous episodes, often ritualised into regularly occurring festivals of 
expenditure. Through these moments of destruction, waste and violence we 
glimpse what for Bataille is an unrecoverable intimacy beneath all things.
For examples of the sacred, and the glimpse they gives us of the 
general economy, Bataille draws on anthropological studies that allow us to 
step outside contemporary notions of utility. One such example is the study, 
by Durkheim’s nephew Marcel Mauss, of northwest Native American 
practices of potlatch. As Bataille (1989:67-8) describes it:
Potlatch is, like commerce, a means of circulating wealth. But it excludes
bargaining. More often than not it is the solemn giving of considerable riches,
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offered by a chief to his rival for the purpose of humiliating, challenging and 
obligating him. The recipient has to erase the humiliation and take up the 
challenge; he must satisfy the obligation that was contracted by accepting. He 
can only pay a short time later, by means a new potlatch more generous than 
the first: He must pay back with interest.
The important point here is that excess is removed from utility in a 
ritualised festival that plays a vital role in tying society together through the 
construction of bonds of obligation. It could be argued that the gift is given in 
a straightforwardly utilitarian manner, based on the expectation of receiving 
more goods in return. However, the constant need to top the previous gift 
makes this a ruinous practice that defeats this utilitarian purpose. In fact “the 
ideal would be that a potlatch could not be repaid” (Bataille 1989:71). This, 
of course, doesn’t entirely escape a utilitarian logic as the ritual has other 
homeostatic functions. Firstly it aims to (re)create a socius by, “preventing] 
the direct and hence anti-social appropriation of life” (Holland 1999:740). 
Secondly, destroying the excess, or removing it from profane use, prevents 
the accumulation of stores of surpluses that could trigger other potential 
modes of social organisation.105
Yet while we can understand the potlatch from within a utilitarian world­
view it also contains another logic or sense. A transformation takes place 
from the profane worlds of goods and objects to the more intimate level of 
status or rank. It is the show of contempt for worldly goods, a display of the 
ability to escape the profane, that confers status. A surplus of perishable 
goods is converted into the less perishable realm of the social. Yet while 
status and hierarchy won’t perish as fast as surplus crops they certainly 
aren’t static or secure. The social needs continual renewing and each 
repetition of the intimacy of the sacred raises a potential denaturalisation of 
the contemporary socius and its attendant conceptions of utility.
This is in essence the thesis of Pierre Clastres (1990) book Society against the State, 
an anthropological study, which argues that the rituals of certain ‘primitive societies are 
aimed at warding off the development of the state and capital.
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We can better understand the importance of intimacy by looking at 
another of Bataille’s examples, the centrality of sacrifice in Aztec society. In 
the Aztec creation myth the sun was created through a sacrificial act of self- 
immolation. Human sacrifice, which was intended to feed the sun, 
represented a reconnection to this primal realm.
Sacrifice restores to the sacred world that which servile use has degraded, 
rendered profane. Servile use has made a thing (an object) of that which, in a 
deep sense, is of the same nature as the subject, is in a relation of intimate 
participation with the subject (Bataille: 1989: 55).
It is through this notion of intimacy that moments of expenditure of 
excess are linked to experiences of de-reification.106 This affect is deepened 
when we consider its temporal aspect. De-reification involves more than the 
revelation that social relations or processes lie behind objects and 
commodities; it also implies an escape from our own status as things or 
commodities. In doing so we escape from our contemporary inhabitation of 
the perspective of the commodity and thus from utility’s effacement of the 
present under the demands of the future.
What we come into, freed from slavish dependence upon things beyond 
utility, is the fullness of each moment of our lives. It is our life, fully here, in 
this moment, not deferred to the interests of production, accumulation, and 
consumption -  this moment, voided of things (Lamarche 2007: 6 6 ).
This state, which Bataille also calls sovereignty, returns us to the 
problematic of historicism. The affect of sovereignty found in certain forms of 
expenditure of excess can be understood as a potential rupture with 
historicist determination. If the profane world is the postponement of life for 
future utility then sovereignty opens the possibility of the re-potentialisation 
of life. We can think of this re-potentialisation as the revelation of an 
unemployed excess. But of course any new social forms consequently
106 w e can see here some overlap with our symptomology of excess in which we found an 
affect of (re)connection not just with co-present participants but also with the wider world.
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created from that excess will necessarily involve a de-potentialisation. In this 
sense we can see an overlap between unemployed excess and the 
problematic of the event. The state of sovereignty is an excess to pre­
existing conceptions of causality, to pre-existing assumptions and pre­
existing expectations. Bataille’s problematic then is to think through the 
relation between the sacred and the profane, between the general economy 
and the limited economy. And of course we want to put this problematic to 
use in thinking through the relation between the movement experiences of 
moments of excess and the subsequent return to de-potentialised habitual 
lives.
Bataille is very clear that the relationship between the sacred and the 
profane is one of radical otherness. ‘The world of intimacy is as antithetical 
to the real world as immoderation is to moderation, madness to reason, 
drunkenness to lucidity” (Bataille 1989: 58). It is, however, a strange form of 
radical otherness in which the sacred is fundamental to the organisation of 
the profane. To illustrate this Bataille calls attention to the layout of the 
traditional French village with the sacred space of the church and graveyard 
at its centre. Meaning is provided to life through sacred communion, the 
effervescence of religious festival and the otherness of self-loss through 
death. The expenditure of excess gives meaning to the profane yet the 
profane persists. Given this it is difficult to see how the radical otherness of 
the sacred can be maintained, or, to use Bataille’s other concepts, how the 
general economy can escape reduction to a limited economy.
As we have already made clear, Bataille’s engagement with this 
question took place through his struggle with Kojeve’s reading of Hegel. 
Bataille’s solution in this context is to valorise the moment of transgression. 
Bataille attempts to escape the Hegelian dialectic, to refuse the synthesis 
and resolution of the pair profane/sacred, through a valorisation of the 
negative moment. This would involve pushing the negative moment beyond 
any hope of positive resolution, the creation of an unemployable negativity. 
We might ask, however, whether this use of transgression can really escape 
the Hegelian dialectic. Doesn’t transgression keep what is transgressed as
-  106 -
the central point of reference?107 Indeed isn’t this what is at stake in the 
centrality of the sacred to the profane? When expenditure gives meaning to 
production it finds itself back in thrall to utility. As Hardt (2002: 80) explains:
Transgression always functions in relation to (or in complicity with) a norm or 
taboo, neglecting the dictates of the norm and yet paradoxically re-enforcing 
the norm's effects. The transgressive act does not simply refuse the norm, but 
rather negates it, transcends it, and completes it. It exceeds a limit, but in its 
excess verifies the limit itself. Transgression always operates through a 
dialectic of negations. If the norm were destroyed, the transgression itself 
would lose all value.
This is certainly the problematic with which Bataille is grappling and we 
can agree with Hardt on the strategic dangers of the valorisation of 
transgression. But doesn’t Hardt also inadvertently reveal the point that 
Bataille is reaching for? Isn’t a transgression that loses all value precisely 
what Bataille means by unemployed negativity? This is the radically of 
Bataille’s position, pushing the negative beyond any notion of utility. This 
once again, however, seems to leave a radical, uncrossable gap between 
the sacred and the profane. We seem stuck in an impasse between, on the 
one hand, a new utilitarianism with its attendant teleology and, on the other 
hand, a resigned acceptance of the impossibility of radical change and 
transformation; in effect another end of history.
Indeed at certain points in Bataille’s work the expenditure of excess 
does seem to be no more than a homeostatic mechanism, the release of 
excess pressure through the safety valve of ritual. There are moments, 
particularly in The Accursed Share, where Bataille’s project appears to be
For an expansion of this point we could refer to Nietzsche’s (2008) argument, in On the 
Genealogy o f Morals, on atheism’s relation to Christianity. Belief in God is central to the 
Christian identity and disbelief in God is central to the atheist identity, God, however, 
remains the central problematic of both belief systems. Atheism, far from breaking with 
Christianity, is reduced to a mere evolutionary stage in the development of the Christian 
problematic.
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simply the avoidance of the kinds of catastrophic and uncontrolled 
expenditure of excess that he had witnessed in the great depression and the 
two world wars.108 At other times, however, Bataille’s project seems much 
more radical. In his essay The Notion of Expenditure Bataille (1985:121) 
links the expenditure of excess to proletarian revolution:
Since power is exercised by the classes that expend, poverty was excluded 
from all social activity. And the poor have no other way of re-entering the 
circle of power than through the revolutionary destruction of the classes 
occupying that circle -  in other words, through a bloody and in no way limited 
social expenditure.
We could, of course, relate this divergence to the different historical 
circumstances in which these texts were written. The former is a product of 
the post-war period, while the latter was written during the period of political 
ferment that culminated in the wave of factory occupations that swept France 
after the 1936 election of the Popular Front. It might be more accurate, 
however, to say that the differing historical situations brought out different 
aspects of a more general and unresolved tension in Bataille’s work.
While it is true that in The Accursed Share Bataille is sometimes drawn 
into an overly sociological problematic we can also find what we could think 
of as a proto-post-structuralist problematic that might rescue the sacred from 
its position trapped between utilitarianism and mysticism. As Noys (2000:
115) puts it:
In his desire to p ro v e  the existence of the accursed share Bataille has 
reduced the accursed share to a perception from a restricted economy. But 
his writing also offers a different account of general economy as emerging 
through difference, the difference that the restricted economies cannot 
control.
His examination of the post-war Marshall plan as an expenditure without expectation of 
return seems a particularly naïve analysis of geopolitics.
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Pursuing this argument Noys identifies what for him is the key passage 
in The Accursed Share, in which Bataille (1989: 25) declares that: “Changing 
from the perspectives of restrictive economy to those of general economy 
actually accomplishes a Copernican transformation: a reversal of thinking — 
and of ethics.” This could be interpreted as a desire to move from one form 
of economy to another but as Bataille (1989:12) makes clear, “[r]eal life, 
composed of all sorts of expenditure, knows nothing of pure productive 
expenditure; in actuality, it knows nothing of purely nonproductive 
expenditure either.” On this reading then “[g]eneral economy would no longer 
be a place outside of restricted economy but a fleeting and effervescent 
effect of this swirling turbulence of energy flows that constantly puncture 
limits, create openings and new limits" (Noys 2000; 115).
If we return to the image of sun as the symbol of the general economy, 
we can see that this is not a place that we can occupy; indeed we cannot 
gaze directly upon it without risking damage to our vision. We can, however, 
still incorporate, and indeed valorise, the perspective of the general economy 
in our forms of analysis. This would involve the creation of forms of thought, 
or indeed what Deleuze would call an ‘image of thought’, that presupposes 
an excess to each restricted economy within which we find ourselves. What 
this would give us is an open, contingent form of analysis that we could, 
perhaps, name the perspective of excess. A form of organisation based on 
this perspective would have to allow for moments of nonproductive 
expenditure from which new problematics could emerge. This, in turn would 
require a certain amount of humility in the face of activities that seem un­
productive when viewed from within standing conceptions of what it is most 
useful to do. It is only nonproductive expenditure that can generate radical 
difference, while purely productive expenditure must tend to generate self­
similarity. Nonproductive expenditure can bring about transformations in the 
conception and measure of utility; this would in turn bring about 
transformations in what is reasonable. This stands in real contrast to 
conceptions of communism, socialism or indeed social democracy, which 
seek the simple transformation of our economy into a more rational one, 
especially if this transformation would be accomplished through the
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elimination of instances of waste. The elimination of all nonproductive 
expenditure really would constitute a Kojevian end of history.109
To think this through we can return to our discussion of subterranean 
historicism. Hegel’s (2010: 547) use of the phrase ‘old mole’ is actually a 
Shakespearian reference. We should read Marx’s old mole, then, in 
reference to both Hegel and Shakespeare (Stallybrass 1998). In Act 1,
Scene v, Hamlet speaks the phrase “well said old mole” (Shakespeare 2007: 
1941) to his father’s ghost, who has returned beneath the earth after a brief 
spell above ground but who continues to speak and guide Hamlet from his 
now obscured position.110 We can see why Hegel would find this suggestive 
of the obscured inheritance of past generations of philosophy guiding the 
present towards its own ends; the end of history. The Marx of The 
Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte also discusses the role that 
historical antecedents play within the present. There comes a point, 
however, when Marx (1968a: 99) wants to “let the dead bury the dead.” 
While each new generation will use the figures and traditions of past events 
to orient themselves, they must do so in a way that will allow them to break 
with “the tradition of past generations” which “weigh like a nightmare upon 
the brains of the living” (Marx 1968a: 97); only this will allow the new 
generation to face up to the challenge of the present and pose their own
1 This is not to say that we shouldn’t seek to eliminate the forms of waste and 
nonproductive expenditure associated with capital. Environmental considerations assure us 
that this is an essential task. But as Stoekl (2007:274) makes clear:
If... we dissociate the "tendency to expend" characterizing humanity from the selfish 
consumption of huge amounts of fossil-fuel based energy... we can then continue to 
affirm excess, but excess, the destruction of the thing, as a movement of intimacy. 
Energy now will be wasted on an intimate level, that of the human body, against the 
imperious demands of the self. The expenditure analyzed by Bataille is always on the 
level of corporeality: the arousal of sexual organs, the movement of muscles, the 
distortions of words spewing from mouths.
1 The Eighteenth Brum aire o f  Louis Bonaparte, which contains Marx’s (1968a: 170) most 
famous use of the phrase “old mole” is read by Stallybrass (1998) as, in part, a re-writing of 
Hamlet. Both texts are, after all, treaties on the problematic inheritance of past generations. 
Stallybrass (1998) reveals that Marx was reading Shakespeare intensively during the period 
of his study of French politics.
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questions on their own terms. Marx, as Derrida (2004) has indicated, has a 
specific role for ghosts and spectres in his philosophy; they symbolise 
unrealised potentials that haunt and problematise the present and which 
may have, in fact, been revealed in past events.111 We should also note that 
while both Shakespeare’s and Hegel’s moles speak, Marx’s mole grubs. It’s 
an iconoclastic mole, which burrows beneath the fetishisms of the present 
subverting and toppling them.112 The communism of this mole is not “a state 
of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality will have to 
adjust itself” (Marx 1987:21). It is instead in the real movement of the mole 
that we find its communism.113
The Body Without Organs
At this point we can move our problematic back within the conceptual 
apparatus of Deleuze and Guattari, who make direct use of Bataille’s 
conception of the expenditure of excess, transforming it into the concept of 
antiproduction. On the broadest level we can characterise antiproduction as 
“the conversion of a portion of the superabundant forces of production into a
11 "I The most famous spectre, of course, is the one that opens The C om m unist Manifesto:
“A spectre is haunting Europe — the spectre of Communism” (Marx 1968b: 35). Such a 
hauntology can also help us think through the unstable relation between the general and 
limited economy, each one haunts the other, as nonproductive activity becomes productive 
and productive activity becomes nonproductive through transformations in the measure of 
utility.
112 As Stallybrass (1998:11) explains: “The modern German for subversive activity -  
M aulw urfsarbe it-  means literally the work of the mole.”
112 The full reference reads: “Communism is not for us a state of affairs which is to be 
established, an ideal to which reality will have to adjust itself. We call communism the real
movement which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this movement 
result from the premises now in existence.” (Marx 1987:21). We should make clear that this 
is not the only possible reading of Marx’s communism. It is what Deleuze and Guattari would 
call a minor reading of Marx; orthodox Marxism by contrast has tended towards a major 
reading, in which classically, the industrial working class necessarily embodies universality.
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counter-force” (Holland 1999:64). As we have seen, Bataille’s notion of 
expenditure has both psychological and social dimensions. For Deleuze and 
Guattari, however, it is important to distinguish between how antiproduction 
operates in social production and how it operates in desiring production.114 
The relations between the two take different forms in different regimes of 
production and, as we shall see, the resonance or dissonance of the function 
of antiproduction between the spheres of social production and the spheres 
of desiring production plays an important role in their construction of a non- 
teleological universal history.
In Anti-Oedipus Deleuze and Guattari posit three social forms -  the 
Primitive or Savage socius, the Despotic or Barbarian socius and the 
Civilised or Capitalist socius — each of which have their own regime of 
production and antiproduction. We can distinguish this from a teleological 
universal history in a number of ways. Firstly, the three socius that they 
describe should not be thought of as evolutionary stages, or indeed as 
distinct historical epochs, but rather as poles of potential social forms that 
intermingle in actual social assemblages.115 Secondly, it must be understood 
that history is contingent and not the unfolding of a preordained destiny:
[U]niversal history is the history of contingencies, and not the history of 
necessity. Ruptures and limits, and not continuity. For great accidents were 
necessary, and amazing encounters that could have happened elsewhere, or 
before, or might never have happened (Deleuze Guattari 1984:140).
Thirdly, and consequently this universal history can only be constructed 
in retrospect. Indeed Deleuze and Guattari are quite clear that it is the formal 
qualities of the capitalist socius that allow a universal history to be
114 Deleuze and Guattari talk of the unconscious in terms of desiring production in order to 
emphasise its relation to social production. The intention is to escape a naturalisation of the 
contemporary structuring of desire. Desire is produced, machined, as an element in the 
production of subjectivity.
115 n ¡3 also important to note that these three socius don’t exhaust the range of social 
forms that could be described.
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constructed. We shall examine this in more detail but for the time being we 
can say that “capitalism is indeed the limit of all societies, insofar as it brings 
about the decoding of the flows that all other social formations coded and 
overcoded” (Deleuze Guattari 1984: 246). This allows Deleuze and Guattari 
(1984:140) to say: “Hence it is correct to retrospectively understand all 
history in the light of capitalism, provided that the rules formulated by Marx 
are followed exactly.”
Deleuze and Guattari’s use of Marx here is guided by two problematics: 
the first is the genesis of social forms, in particular the genesis of capitalism, 
which leads to the second problematic which is unusual in the history of 
Marxism -  the production of subjectivity. By tracing the role of antiproduction 
in the genesis of different regimes of the structuring of experience we 
approach Deleuze and Guattari in this section through positioning Bataille’s 
conception of the expenditure of excess within their non-teleological 
universal history. The focus on the genesis of social form will allow us to 
escape the functionalist trap that Bataille occasionally falls into and bypass 
the absolute distinction between productive and nonproductive expenditure 
that gets Bataille into so much difficulty. This will allow us not only a better 
understanding of the specificities of capital’s structuring of experience but 
also suggest the role that irruptions of excess could play in helping us to 
break with the capitalist socius.
Deleuze shares with Bataille the perceived need to escape the 
overwhelming influence of Kojeve’s Hegelianism, as well as the teleological 
determinism of more orthodox Marxism. Rather than a philosophy of radical 
negativity, however, Deleuze is a philosopher of radical immanence. Setting 
up an ontology of immanence, reverses the question of how to escape from 
a totality into the question of how it is that we come to fall into transcendental 
illusions at all. As Foucault (1979:1) says: “in political thought and analysis, 
we still have not cut the head off the king.” But in fact perhaps the most 
fundamental political question is: “How is it possible that his headless body
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often behaves as if it indeed had a head?” (Dean 1994:156).116 Approaching 
the problem of totality from the perspective of an immanent ontology allows 
us to ask questions such as: How does a body act like a totality by 
preventing change?117 How does it develop its totalisation effect? How is the 
potential for difference incorporated within the body as excess? From these 
analytical problems we can move to the political problem of how this 
irreducible excess is made visible and then incorporated into the body in a 
manner that expands the field of potential.
Whereas Bataille tries to push through Hegel to escape him, Deleuze 
draws up an alternative intellectual lineage to what he calls the dogmatic 
image of thought. Fundamental to this is the influence of Spinoza and his 
univocular conception of being as a plane of immanence, which excludes the 
notion of a transcendent realm that organises being, whether a divine, 
supernatural realm or the realm of platonic forms. Reality, for Deleuze, 
consists of the self-organising flows of matter/energy. This ontology has at 
least two consequences for politics. Firstly, compared to a hylomorphic world 
of essences, there is a greatly increased potential for transformation. 
Secondly, because there can be no recourse to a transcendent realm, we 
must reject pretensions to an eagle-eyed view of this potential for 
transformation. Unlike Hegel’s mole, we can’t breach the surface of full 
consciousness and we have no access to the realm of total freedom. We are 
buried within actual bodies, organic and inorganic, corporeal and social. As 
such our immediate realm of freedom is restricted to the range of affects of 
which those bodies are capable; what a body can do and what can be done 
to it. From this perspective a body is defined not by its essence -  as, for
f f ® In fact this is a philosophical rendering of what Deleuze and Guattari (1984: 29), 
channelling Spinoza and Wilhelm Reich, believe is the essential political problematic: “Why 
do men fight fo r their own servitude as stubbornly as though it were their Salvation?"
Once again it’s important to bear in mind the idea of a body of people as well as an 
individual body. Indeed a body on one level of scale can be a component or organ of a body 
at another level of scale.
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instance, determined by its extensive properties such as length and width -  
but by its capacities, its degrees of freedom, its realms of potential.118 
Bodies, then, should be understood as multiplicities rather than discrete 
entities.119 The Body without Organs (BwO) is one of the conceptual tools 
that Deleuze and Guattari develop to help determine the limits of what a 
body can do, its phase space of possibilities, and therefore the point at which 
a body transforms into a different body, with a new phase space of 
potential.120
Deleuze and Guattari take the Phrase “Body without Organs" from 
Antonin Artaud’s radio play: To be Done with the Judgement of God. Artaud 
was concerned with the schizophrenic experience, in which meanings and 
functions are in continual transformation, where one thing slips continuously 
into another. Deleuze and Guattari use this symptomology of schizophrenia 
to help conceptualise the unconscious while also associating the symptoms 
with the experiences produced by capitalism: “All that is solid melts into air” 
(Marx 1968b: 38).121 In the context of our corporeal bodies, Artaud wonders 
how the functions of our organs might be made to differ from our habitual
We will examine the ethical consequences that follow from this in the next chapter.
Analysis of a body from within the orthodox image of thought involves the fiction of 
stopping time in order to isolate the body from its becomings. Deleuze, influenced by 
Bergson, rejects a discontinuous conception of time that would allow its slicing into 
segments. Instead his philosophy involves a rigorous thinking through of the consequences 
of time as continuous duration. A multiplicity is a designation of a phase space “the space of 
possible states which a physical system can have” (Delanda 2002:13).
120 As Manuel Delanda (1997:263) puts it: “The concept of the BwO was created in an 
effort to conceive the genesis of form (in geological, biological, and cultural structures) as 
related exclusively to im m anent capabilities of the flows of matter-energy information and 
not to any transcendent factors, whether platonic or divine."
^  As we shall see later in Deleuze and Guattari’s non-teleological universal history the 
recognition of the underlying schizophrenic nature of the unconscious only becomes visible 
under capitalism.
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conception of them.122 As a step towards this he conjures up the image of 
the Body without Organs. This phrase, however, can be misleading as “[t]he 
BwO is not at all the opposite of the organs. The organs are not its enemies. 
The enemy is the organism. The BwO is opposed not to the organs but to 
that organization of the organs called the organism” (Deleuze, Guattari 1988: 
158).
When a body approaches its BwO it has broken from its habitual 
patterns of organisation, entering a far from equilibrium crisis state. “The 
BwO is what remains when you take everything away” (Deleuze, Guattari 
1988:151). The BwO then is better thought of as the limit point of 
disorganisation of a body. It is the limit to which a body can be disorganised, 
or deterritorialised, before it transforms into either a different body or entropic 
disorganisation. As such it’s a threshold that defines a body and sets the 
boundaries to its potential. A BwO however doesn’t just function as a 
borderline; it exerts forces onto the body, the forces of antiproduction. The 
BwO, then, is a way to conceptualise the relationship between a body and 
what exceeds it. Antiproduction manages excess by tying it to the BwO; in 
doing so it creates what Deleuze and Guattari call the full body or socius. A 
socius is a folding back over of excess forces, an incorporation of the forces 
of the outside, which then appear to emanate from within the body and 
creates the effect of a totality. It is the operation of an inclusive exclusion of 
the outside or what Deleuze and Guattari would call an inclusive 
disjunction.123
122 William Burroughs (1966: 8,133) imagines just such a corporeal deterritorialisation in a 
passage from his novel Naked Lunch :
No organ is constant as regards either function or position... sex organs sprout 
everywhere... rectums open, defecate, and close... the entire organism changes 
color and consistency in split-second adjustments... The human body is scandalously 
inefficient. Instead of a mouth and an anus to get out of order why not have one all­
purpose hole to eat and eliminate? We could seal up nose and mouth, fill in the 
stomach, make an air hole direct into the lungs where it should have been in the first 
place (Cited in Smith 1997: xxxviii).
123 It is through these mechanisms that Deleuze can account for the appearance of distinct 
and discrete bodies within an immanent ontology of flows. We can understand a socius as
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The BwO is one of Deleuze and Guattari’s most notoriously difficult 
concepts; this is partly because it is drawn at an abstract enough level to 
apply to both organic and inorganic systems, including human psychological 
and social systems.124 Deleuze and Guattari add to the difficulty, however, 
by changing the concept through the course of their work as their 
problematics develop. In Anti-Oedipus their focus is diagnostic, while in A 
Thousand Plateaus the BwO is more of a technique or a practice. In this 
chapter we focus more on diagnostic, turning in later chapters to the BwO as 
one element in a practice of freedom.125 As such we begin by unpacking 
Deleuze and Guattari’s (1984:10) initial description of the BwO in Anti- 
Oedipus:
If we wish to have some idea of the forces that the body without organs exerts 
later on in the uninterrupted process, we must first establish a parallel 
between desiring-production and social production... (both) involve an 
unengendered nonproductive attitude, an element of antiproduction coupled 
with the process, a full body that functions as a socius. This socius may be 
the body of the earth, that of the tyrant, or capital. This is the body that Marx 
is referring to when he says that it is not the product of labor, but rather
an organism on the level of the social, which is created through the mechanisms of 
antiproduction. An organism is “that which life sets against itself in order to limit itself” 
(Deleuze, Guattari 1988:503).
124 Deleuze and Guattari talk about organic, inorganic and alloplastic strata. The latter 
referring to: “That register where the creative production of signs constructs territories. It is 
not limited to the human or the social, but extends to territorial animals" (Bonta, Protevi 
2004:51). However the alloplastic can also be split into related psychological and social 
levels, or, as Deleuze and Guattari put it desiring production and social production.
12£5 Deleuze and Guattari cause more confusion by using the phrase ‘the full BwO’ 
differently in Anti-O edipus  to the way it is used in A Thousand Plateaus, and annoyingly 
they do so without commenting on the change. In the former the full body is used to refer to 
the socius, as the obscuring of social genesis. In the latter the full BwO is used in 
counterpoint to with the empty BwO by which they mean a black hole of subjectivity 
containing little intensity and therefore little capacity for change. William Burroughs’ 
descriptions of the junkie are the model for the empty BwO.
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appears as its natural or divine presupposition. In fact, it does not restrict itself 
merely to opposing productive forces in and of themselves. It falls back on all 
production, constituting a surface over which the forces and agents of 
production are distributed, thereby appropriating for itself all surplus and 
arrogating to itself the whole and the parts of the process, now seem to 
emanate from it as a quasi cause. Forces and agents come to represent a 
miraculous form of its own power: they appear to be ‘miraculated’ by it.
The opening of this passage, establishes a parallel between desiring 
production and social production.126 However, we are more immediately 
concerned with the notion of the full body or socius as presupposition. This 
passage allows us to trace the emergence of the full body out of the different 
functions of the BwO. Firstly the BwO comes into being by breaking and 
channelling productive flows through the forces of antiproduction. The body 
incorporates as presupposition that which is in excess of it. But then it ‘falls 
back on’ its presuppositions, obscuring its origins. There is an inversion of 
cause and effect, where the effect of an activity appears as its cause and 
acts as a quasi-cause.
This might become clearer when we think of capital as “the body 
without organs of the capitalist or rather of capitalist being” (Deleuze, 
Guattari 1984:10).127 Firstly the BwO acts as a recording surface upon 
which all production must be realised. Anti-production stops production and 
brings it back to the BwO. The accumulation and realisation of capital is the 
basis of all production, it is the bottom line; if a productive effort doesn’t
yye can think of the BwO as, in part, an intervention into Marxist debates over ideology 
and the relation of base and superstructure. The Spinoza-inspired parallelism indicated here 
accepts the entanglement of material and intellectual but rejects notions of crude 
determination. We examine Spinoza’s parallelism in Chapter Five.
127 We should remember here that we are talking about capital as a social relation rather 
than a specific embodiment in plant or stock. “Capital is not a thing, anymore than money is 
a thing. In capital, as in money, certain specific  socia l relations o f  production between  
people  appear as relations o f things to people, or else certain social relations appear as the 
natural properties o f things in s o c ie ty  (Marx 1982:1005).
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realise capital, then no matter how ‘useful’ that activity it cannot continue. As 
such the BwO acts as “a surface over which the forces and agents of 
production are distributed” (Deleuze, Guattari 1984:10). This inevitably has 
a mystifying effect as "(p)roduction is not recorded in the same way it is 
produced" (Deleuze, Guattari 1984:12). So secondly the BwO acts as a 
miraculating machine as capital takes upon itself the productive power of 
cooperative labour and so appears to miraculate both value and therefore 
itself out of thin air as though possessed of divine powers. As Marx (1982: 
757) puts it: “All the powers of labour project themselves as the power of 
capital.”
The reference to Marx in the long passage form Anti-Oedipus above is 
drawn from a section of the Grundrisse entitled Pre-Capitalist Economic 
Formations which states: ‘The real appropriation through the labor process 
happens under these presuppositions, which are not themselves the product 
of labor, but appear as its natural or divine presuppositions” (Marx 1977:
472). In this piece of writing Marx takes the unusual approach of defining 
modes of production from the basis of their historical preconditions. In this 
way, as Read (2003:39) makes clear, Marx is presented with the:
theoretical problem of thinking the mode of production from its 
presuppositions that is, thinking it from that paradoxical instance of formation 
that is exterior to a particular mode of production, since it is constituted by 
other forces and relations and the dissolution of another mode of production, 
and, at the same time, interior to a particular mode of production, since it is 
the reproduction of these presuppositions that sets the terms and relations for 
the continuity and survival of the mode of production.
If we approach capitalism from its preconditions we can see how a 
socius forms. Capital, as a mode of production, is triggered by the contingent 
encounter of two flows: “On the one side, the deterritorialized worker who 
has become free and naked, having to sell his labour capacity; and on the 
other, decoded money, that has become capital and is capable of buying this 
labour capacity” (Deleuze and Guattari 1984:225). Both of these flows had 
to be produced but their production can’t be seen from within the socius of
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capital. As a result they appear as divine or natural presuppositions. As 
Read (2003: 40) explains:
The presuppositions of any mode of production are the conditions that 
constitute a mode of production but are not produced from it. Their original 
appearances are unimaginable or unexplainable according to the particular 
protocols and practices of that mode of production.
For instance the primitive accumulation that produced these flows 
involved great violence. The worker is freed from the indentured nature of 
serfdom and the beliefs that upheld it but also freed from (as in, separated 
from), the means of production.128 As Marx says:
(T)he historical movement which changes the producers into wage-labourers 
appears, on the one hand, as their emancipation from serfdom and from the 
fetters of the guilds, and it is this aspect of the movement which alone exists 
for our bourgeois historians. But, on the other hand, these newly freed men 
became sellers of themselves only after they had been robbed of all their own 
means of production, and all the guarantees of existence afforded by the old 
feudal arrangements. And this history, the history of their expropriation, is 
written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire (Marx 1982: 875).
Indeed the other precondition, the store of liquid, deterritorialised 
capital, also “comes dripping from head to toe, with blood and dirt” (Marx 
1982:926) -  not least from the exploits of colonialism as “(t)he treasures 
captured outside Europe by undisguised looting, enslavement and murder 
flowed back to the mother-country and were turned into capital there” (Marx 
1982: 918).129 However, the violence of this process becomes disassociated
128 Marx (1982:897) calls this condition “vogelfrei” -  bird-free, free from indenture but also 
free of any legal rights or protection or inclusion in the political community. As such the 
vogelfrei could be thought of as an example of what Agamben (1997) would call ‘bare life’.
129 “Thus were the agricultural folk first forcibly expropriated from the soil, driven from their 
homes, turned into vagabonds, and then whipped, branded and tortured by grotesquely 
terroristic laws into accepting the discipline necessary for the system of wage-labour.” (Marx 
1982:899). Indeed the “grotesquely terroristic” anti-vagabondage laws detailed by Marx are
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from capital because, despite its role in constituting capital, it appears as a 
precondition and not a product. Capital’s socius buries this violence making 
it appear a pre-accomplished or naturally occurring phenomenon.130 We can 
see the persistence of this mechanism in the way capital absolves itself of 
responsibility for the horrific violence that accompanies primitive 
accumulation around the world today131. As De Angelis (2007) has shown, 
primitive accumulation is not a historical period but an ongoing process of 
enclosure of the commons. Indeed Harvey (2003) has gone so far as to 
suggest that primitive accumulation, which he renames accumulation by 
dispossession, is the predominant contemporary form of accumulation.
The presuppositions of capital, rather than being natural or divine, are 
the result of great violence and effort. Indeed the disciplinary mechanisms 
outlined by Foucault (1977) show the immense effort needed to force 
humanity to accord with the presuppositions of capital. However capital not 
only incorporates its presuppositions but also falls back on them, or folds 
them, to become the surface upon which production is distributed. Capital 
itself is the product of past labour. “Capital is dead labour which, vampire­
like, lives only by sucking living labour, and lives more, the more labour it 
sucks” (Marx 1982:342). This fact quickly becomes obscured as capital 
appears to miraculate itself out of thin air.
reminiscent of the horrific branding and amputation that accompanied the colonial project in, 
for instance, the Belgian Congo. As Conrad might have said: ‘capital; the horror, the horror’.
130 “Hence the very particular character of state violence: it is very difficult to pinpoint this 
violence because it always presents itself as pre-accomplished... From a standpoint within 
the capitalist mode of production it is very difficult to say who is the thief and who is the 
victim, or even where the violence resides." (Deleuze and Guattari 1988:447)
Using the example of the massive increase in African poverty over the last thirty years 
we might think of the discussion that surrounded the ‘Make Poverty History’ campaign at the 
2005 Gleneagles G8 meeting. In this discourse the poverty appeared as either the result of 
natural processes or the product of other modes of production. Africans are either unlucky to 
suffer from continuous ‘natural’ disasters, are endemically corrupt, or retain the rigidities of 
tribalism or perhaps state socialism (Hewson 2005).
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As Marx observes, in the beginning capitalists are necessarily conscious of 
the opposition between capital and labor, and of the use of capital as a means 
of extorting surplus labor. But a perverted, bewitched world quickly comes into 
being, as capital increasingly plays the role of a recording surface that falls 
back on all of production. (Furnishing or realizing surplus value is the right of 
recording) (Deleuze, Guattari 1984:11).
We have already noted how living labour contains an excess of 
creativity and cooperation that is irreducible to capital. Now, however, we 
can see how this excess is subsumed within capital’s full body. Marx 
provides an example of this mechanism in the chapter on cooperation in 
Capital: Volume One. Cooperative production is an emergent property; it is 
more than the sum of its parts. A number of people working cooperatively 
will produce more than the same number of people working individually. 
However, in capitalism, predicated as it is on the presupposition of the 
separation of labour from the means of production:
[workers’] co-operation only begins with the labour process, but by then they 
have ceased to belong to themselves. On entering the labour process they 
are incorporated into capital. As co-operators, as members of a working 
organism, they merely form a particular mode of existence of capital. Hence 
the productive power developed by the worker socially is the productive power 
of capital. The socially productive power of labour develops as a free gift to 
capital whenever the workers are placed under certain conditions, and it is 
capital which places them under these conditions. Because this power costs 
capital nothing, while on the other hand it is not developed by the worker until 
his labour itself belongs to capital, it appears as a power which capital 
possesses by its nature -  a productive power inherent in capital (Marx 1982: 
451).
With these miraculating powers of capital in mind we might now revisit 
the Bataillian idea that productive activity derives its meaning from 
expenditure. Antiproduction, as a force of the BwO, acts on excess forces, 
bringing them within the body and hence expending them in that body’s 
animation. When we think of regimes of rationality and utility we can see that 
it is antiproduction that polices the borders of those regimes. The BwO
-  122 -
functions as the limit of sense of a body, it is the presuppositions that 
determine what makes sense. What is in excess of a body must be brought 
within the sense of the body. Deleuze and Guattari (1984:236) also talk 
about antiproduction as a “flow of stupidity”. We might then characterise the 
BwO as the point of stupidity of an organised body. Capitalism, for instance, 
is organised in an entirely rational way. The only irrational thing about it is 
the whole thing: capital itself, which exists only to increase its own value.
The bottom line for the whole system is the realisation of capital, the 
expansion of zeros on an accounting sheet. It is from that point of madness 
that a delirium sweeps through the whole of society and throws our lives out 
of control.
Capital, however, has a specific relationship to the production of 
meaning. It does not rely on any particular belief, so even the revelation of its 
moment of stupidity does not prove fatal for it. In pre-capitalist forms 
antiproduction is a means of turning what is in excess of those societies into 
meaning; it codes, or overcodes the flows, giving meaning to production. 
Within capitalism production is essentially meaningless. “(M)oney, as a 
general equivalent, represents an abstract quantity that is indifferent to the 
qualified nature of the flows” (Deleuze, Guattari 1984:248). Rather than 
coding Deleuze and Guattari call this ‘axiomatisation’; we might think of this 
as “a kind of accounting” (Deleuze 2004a: 270).
[W]hat sets it apart from other social forms is that capitalist axioms conjoin 
completely undetermined flows of matter/energy, flows which become 
determinate -  take on content, quality, even meaning -  only after they have 
been conjoined... Capitalist axiomatization is essentially a meaningless 
calculus (Holland: 1998: 70).
Capital takes the position of the sovereign but it doesn’t overcode productive 
flows. As Holland (1998: 66) puts it, capital “sits mute on the deposed 
sovereign’s throne”.
Anti-production involves separation from other potential modes of 
production, just as primitive accumulation, and acceptance of capital as right, 
frees labour from the means of production. It is this separation from potential
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that inculcates lack into desire and it is lack that ties productive organs to the 
BwO.132 Anti-production in the primitive socius creates mobile blocks of, in 
principle, acquittable debts. Indeed the destruction of excess and its removal 
from utility -  in for instance, sacrifice or potlatch -  represents the acquittal of 
that debt. The barbarian or despotic socius, on the other hand, owes an 
infinite debt to the body of the sovereign. “The infinite creditor and infinite 
credit have replaced the blocks of mobile and finite debts. There is always a 
monotheism on the horizon of despotism: the debt becomes a debt of 
existence, a debt of the existence of the subjects themselves" (Deleuze, 
Guattari 1984:197). Here antiproduction takes the form of glorious 
expenditure such as the Palais d’Versailles, the Pyramids or the Great Wall 
of China. These are symbols of a paranoid relationship that channels all 
meaning through the body of the despot.133
Capital as it takes over from despotism is also owed an infinite debt. 
This debt, however, takes a different form as it arises from the specificities of 
capital’s full body. As capital appears to miraculate itself -  as Read (2003: 
43) puts it, “capital seems prior to and independent of labour” — then capital 
appears to provide labour with the means of life. From this we appear to owe 
an infinite debt to capital but what is owed is not our life but our work. No 
matter how long or hard we work, the debt is never paid off and we never 
regain access to the means of production.134 Capital is the boundless 
imposition of work.
132 Antiproduction “alone is capable of realizing capitalism's supreme goal, which is to 
produce lack in the large aggregates, to introduce lack where there is always too much, by 
effecting the absorption of overabundant resources" (Deleuze, Guattari 1984:235-6).
133 “ah the coded flows of the primitive machine are now forced into a bottleneck where the 
despotic machine overcodes them” (Deleuze, Guattari 1984:199). As such desire is 
displaced onto the full body, the socius, which In this case is the body of the despot. As 
Holland (1999:77) explains: “Desire no longer desires objects, but desires another’s desire: 
desire has become the desire of the despot’s desire.”
134 This position is only strengthened as we move from disciplinary to control societies. 
“Man is no longer a man confined but a man in debt" (Deleuze 1995:181). Debt is a
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Antiproduction under capital does not function to produce stable 
meaning as it is not a static socius. Instead antiproduction imposes lack as a 
stimulus to ever-increasing production for its own sake. Capital does away 
with distinct festivals of antiproduction, spreading it instead across the whole 
of life. “Capital becomes, as it were, its own instance of antiproduction” 
(Holland 1999: 68). As such:
The apparatuses of anti production is no longer a transcendent instance that 
opposes production, limits it, or checks it; on the contrary, it insinuates itself 
everywhere in the productive machine and becomes firmly wedded in order to 
regulate its productivity and realize surplus value (Deleuze, Guattari 1984: 
235).
If antiproduction in static societies constitutes negative feedback 
mechanisms then in capital, with antiproduction subsumed by production, it 
acts as a positive feedback mechanism and one that runs out of control. 
When capital encounters limits to its expansion it displaces them, pushing 
the consequences of its moment of stupidity onto an ever-greater scale. As 
Marx (1981:358) puts it: “Capitalist production seeks continually to 
overcome these immanent barriers, but overcomes them only by means 
which again place these barriers in its way and on a more formidable scale. 
The true barrier of capitalist production is capital itself."
Capital deals in abstract quantities, just as its foundational encounter is 
the conjunction of two deterritorialised flows. It is not interested in specific 
labour but abstract labour.135 The development of capital’s BwO out of its 
foundational encounter means capital gives primacy to deterritorialisation. 
When capital reterritorialises it does so not on codes or beliefs but on an 
axiomatic of undetermined quantities. As Holland (1998:70) explains:
privileged mechanism of control with credit ratings and profiles functioning as checkpoints 
that we have to pass if we wish to circulate freely in society.
If, for instance, unionisation increases the cost of labour in the UK capital can quite 
happily employ Indian labour.
1
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[T]he belief in any general meaning under these conditions is ‘paranoid’. If it 
weren't for the inconvenience of workers and consumers, capitalism would do 
very nicely without meaning altogether. What temporary, local meanings 
capitalism does provide are derivatives of whatever axioms happen to be in 
place.
Capital is a deterritorialising mode of production; everything changes 
yet everything stays the same. The limit that capital can’t overcome is its 
own BwO, its need to increase. The potential differentiation of immanent 
production is trapped into a runaway monomania. “Accumulate, accumulate! 
That is Moses and the prophets!” (Marx, 1982: 742).
From this conception of capital we can understand the critical and 
ironic nature of Deleuze and Guattari’s universal history. All previous 
societies have a dread of uncoded flows, flows that aren’t given social 
meaning; as such they have attempted to ward them off. “In a sense 
capitalism has haunted all forms of society, but it haunts them as their 
terrifying nightmare, it is the dread they feel of a flow that would elude their 
flows” (Deleuze and Guattari 1984:140). This leads Deleuze and Guattari 
(1984:153) to argue: “If capitalism is the universal truth, it is so in the sense 
that makes capitalism the negative of all social formations.”136 Capitalism, 
however, is not an absolute limit, it is a relative limit whose universality 
comes from its proximity to the absolute limit of schizophrenia. As Deleuze 
and Guattari (1984:246) explain:
Capitalism... is the re la tive  lim it  of every society; it effects re la tive  breaks, 
because it substitutes for the codes an extremely rigorous axiomatic that 
maintains the energy of the flows in a bound state on the body of capital as a 
socius that is deterritorialized, but also a socius that is even more pitiless that 
any other. Schizophrenia, on the contrary, is indeed the a b s o lu te  limit that
1OD It is in this light that we can understand Clastres’s (1990) argument that primitive 
societies had revolved around warding off the state and capital. Not that these societies had 
an understanding of the state and capital before their emergence but that they had a fear of 
decoded flows and paranoid investments of desire.
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causes the flows to travel in a free state on a desocialized body without 
organs. Hence one can say that schizophrenia is the e x te r io r  limit of 
capitalism itself or the conclusion of its deepest tendency, but that capitalism 
functions on the condition that it inhibit this tendency, or that it push it back or 
displace this limit, by substituting for its own im m a n e n t relative limits, which it 
continually reproduces on a widened scale. It axiomatises with one hand what 
it decodes with the other.
If there is a universality attached to capitalism then, it is due the 
proximity of its mode of operation to the schizophrenic absolute limit of all 
societies. This is a strangely nuanced universality that can only be grasped 
in retrospect. It is capital’s schizophrenic tendency that provides it with its 
universality, yet capital’s perseverance, its mechanisms of antiproduction, 
rely on counteracting this tendency. From this diagram we can raise the 
prospect of overcoming capital’s fetishisms and constructing a diagram of an 
auto-critical organisational form.137
The Moment of Excess
So what is the solution? Which is the revolutionary path?... To withdraw from 
the world market?... Or might it be to go in the opposite direction? To go still 
further, that is, in the movement of the market, of decoding, and 
deterritorialisation? For perhaps the flows are not deterritorialised enough, 
form the viewpoint of a theory and a practice of a highly schizophrenic 
character. Not to withdraw from the process, but to go further, to ‘accelerate 
the process,’ as Nietzsche put it: in this matter, the truth is that we haven’t 
seen anything yet (Deleuze, Guattari 1984: 239-40).
Capital’s regime of antiproduction, the mechanisms with which it 
incorporates excess, constitutes a positive feedback loop that is trapped in 
the monomania of its self-expansion. Capital, for all its self-revolutionising,
1 ^7
To follow though on this idea we could reverse the notion that communism is a potential 
that is haunting capitalism and declare capitalism as a diagram of mechanisms of 
expenditure that wards off communism.
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cannot produce real difference. Its positive feedback loop cannot change 
direction and it is this that makes it so destructive. But as Deleuze and 
Guattari ask above: “What is the solution?” Is it to bring capital under control 
by using antiproduction as a mechanism of negative feedback? Isn’t 
Keynesianism an attempt to do just that? The post-war boom, however, is an 
example of capital displacing its limits and its antagonisms and indeed using 
this displacement as the grounds for new rounds of accumulation.138 In the 
section of Anti-Oedipus quoted above Deleuze and Guattari suggest a 
different strategy to escape this fate, one that would accelerate capital’s 
deterritorialising tendencies until capital’s monomania is broken with. To do 
so would involve pushing through the relative limit of capital to the absolute 
limit of schizophrenia.
138 Deleuze and Guattari (1988:462) conceptualise Keynesianism as the introduction of 
new axioms into capital’s axiomatic calculations, “Keynesian economics and the New Deal 
were axiom laboratories”. This, however, doesn’t alter capital’s overall orientation to the self­
expansion of value. Nor does it prevent the stripping away of axioms during periods such as 
neoliberalism. It is perhaps Negri (1988,1991) who produces the most thorough analysis of 
Keynesianism as a strategy that recomposes capital to harness its own inherent 
antagonisms, which it then uses as the grounds for a new round of accumulation. Following 
the post-war settlement, the struggles of labour became channelled into demands for 
increased wages; these in turn became tied to agreements on rising productivity. In this way 
capital could place limits on the inter-war revolutionary wave while also apparently solving 
the problem of effective demand. Such a settlement relied on an organised working class 
with stable institutions, in the form of trade unions and social democratic parties, which 
could act as mediators between labour and capital. In this analysis the post-war settlement 
was broken during the 1960s and 1970s by the struggles of sectors excluded from that 
settlement, women, blacks, the colonial countries, etc, which began to resonate with the 
struggles of the included sectors who raised demands that began to push beyond capital’s 
ability to deliver, struggles that became increasingly autonomous from the mediating 
institutions. The combination of these struggles caused a profitability crisis for capital during 
the 1970s, which in turn provoked the neoliberal backlash. Negri was involved in an 
important moment in this trajectory through the Italian Autonomía movement of the 1970s. 
The excessive demands of the time were  epitomised by the striking workers of the Mirafiorl 
Fiat plant who raised the slogan: Vogliamo Tutto! (W e W ant Everything!).
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Noys (2010) calls this strategy, in which the tendencies of capitalism 
are pushed to an apocalyptic conclusion, accelerationism.139 The problem 
with this strategy, according to Noys, is that it fails to break with capital’s 
formal qualities; as a consequence that which is proposed as resistance 
ends up a “mirror of capital”. Zizek (2003:184) takes this argument further, 
arguing that, as capital has itself undergone a process of acceleration, 
Deleuze has become “the ideologist of late capitalism”. While Zizek’s 
position is a deliberately provocative overstatement, we should concede that 
there is a strain of accelerationism running through Anti-Oedipus, and that 
some of the Anglo-American (and Antipodean) reception of Deleuze has 
veered towards a de-politicised reading that has side-stepped the 
problematic of anti-capitalism and so has indeed risked a complicity with 
neoliberalism. Our thesis, however, suggests that by paying attention to 
Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of universal history we can find in their 
work not only resources for alternative strategies but also a political 
problematic in which a certain form of accelerationism can fit into a coherent 
anti-capitalist project.
The creation of an apparent totality relies on the channelling of excess 
and the siphoning of the surplus into the self-reproduction of a system. If 
such an expenditure is successfully warded off, then this excess can be 
maintained immanently causing intensity to rise. This can, in turn, cause a 
positive feedback loop of increasing excess and increasing intensity. Such a 
moment of sustained excess can lead to a change in habitual behaviour, “an 
excess of self-catalyzing desire” (Holmes 2009). Such a strategy raises the 
prospect of a positive feedback loop that escapes monomania and produces 
difference. Expenditure can then function as an interruption of the expected,
139 Noys (2010) sees this as a persistent theme in post-structuralism, although it is taken to 
its extreme conclusions by moments in both Lyotard and Baudrillard.
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as the dispersal of fate. The excess is expended in the creation of a moment 
of transvaluation.140
We can think of this as a move from a model of a closed, equilibrium 
seeking, dynamical system to a model of an open, nonlinear, dynamical 
system. A closed dynamical system -  a steam engine for example -  needs a 
negative feedback mechanism, such as a governor or a safety valve, to let 
off excess pressure and maintain homeostasis.141 In nonlinear dynamical 
systems the pushing of a body into a far from equilibrium, intensive crisis 
state opens it to the possibility of a break with the patterns and thresholds of 
that particular body, the reaching of a bifurcation point and the entry into a 
new semi-stable system of patterns and thresholds, based around new 
attractors (Bonta, Protevi 2004). Capital is an unstable combination of a 
closed equilibrium model conjoined with a positive feedback loop; this results 
in the self-expansion of the system beyond any apparent limits.
If we return to Bataille’s problematic we can see that the concept of the 
BwO provides a new perspective on utility. Put simply, a notion of utility is 
always tied to a body’s presuppositions, its point of stupidity. The bottom line 
for capital’s conception of utility is simply its own self-expansion. It is 
exchange value that counts, not use value. However, as Derrida (1994) 
warns us, we cannot look to use value as though it contains an a-historical 
purity from which we could rescue an un-alienated form.142 We can’t look to
^40 |n the next chapter we examine Deleuze’s Nietzschian inspired critique of Kant on the 
basis of his inability to account for the genesis of values. We might see this critique as a 
conceptualisation that overlaps with the concept of the BwO as the genesis of a socius, with 
its own conceptions of utility and value.
141 Many nineteenth century social and psychological theories follow this model -  Freud's 
libidinal energetic system, for example but also classical liberal economics (Nadeau 2008).
142 “But whence came this certainty concerning the previous phase, that of this supposed 
use-value purified of everything that makes for exchange value and the commodity form?” 
(Derrida 1994:159). Derrida actually looks at use value as an example of Marx’s misplaced 
reliance on ontology. He compares it to the ‘hauntology’ of exchange value, arguing that the 
concept of use value contains a harking back to some prelapsarian idyll. While certain
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the elimination of exchange value to find a universal utilitarianism in use 
value and we can’t seek to eliminate antiproduction to be left with a pure 
production. Both use value and exchange value, both production and 
antiproduction are arranged on the surface of capital’s BwO. This suggests 
that what we experience in the de-mystificatory affects of a moment of 
excess isn’t the revelation of some essential nature that lurks behind the 
world of appearances. It is instead the revelation of capital’s BwO; but 
gaining this perspective, that is stepping beyond capital’s presuppositions, 
involves the creation of a new body or else the risk of catatonic 
schizophrenia. In turn this new body would have its own BwO with its own 
point of stupidity upon which is built its own regime of rationality.
If Deleuze and Guattari talk about singular BwOs they do also 
conceptualise a virtual realm that contains all possible BwOs, the abstract 
diagrams of all possible bodies. This is THE BwO of all individual BwOs, 
which they also called the plane of consistency. It is, however, a virtual limit 
that can only ever be approached and not reached. When we reach the BwO 
of a body, through disrupting the habitual organisation of its organs and 
leading it into a far from equilibrium crisis state, then we approach THE 
BwO, the plane of consistency. It is this that provides the affect of rupture but 
also what Deleuze and Guattari call a moment of schiz that “produces this 
strangely polyvocal moment when everything is possible” (Deleuze, Guattari, 
1984:378). If we think then of a moment of schiz as a component of a 
moment of excess we can begin to make sense of our symptomology of 
excess, which contained the seemingly contradictory affects of both rupture 
and intense productivity. Isn’t it this sense of possibility that breaks with the 
cramped subjectivities produced by capital?
Marxist conceptions of use value could benefit from the warning -  nationalising the factories 
and planning production certainly didn’t eliminate fetishism and alienation -  I don't, however, 
think that this exhausts the concept. We can also construct a minor Marx, whose use of use 
value recognises its social determined nature.
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THE BwO, the plane of consistency, is however, a limit state; it can be 
approached but not reached. It is in this way similar to Batailles’s concept of 
the general economy symbolised by the sun. It is not a position upon which 
we can exist and even to gaze upon it carries its own risks. As capital’s 
exterior limit is schizophrenia there is always a danger of a fall into catatonia, 
the inability to act, but such a risk is multiplied as we approach the plane of 
consistency.143 Of course we can only exist in actual bodies of some kind 
and this inevitably involves the closing-off of certain possibilities, indeed the 
creation of impossibilities, under a BwO’s presuppositions. Not all bodies are 
alike, however, as Bonta and Protevi (2004; 65) make clear:
Since all actual bodies must make choices, the key ethical choice is to 
construct a body in which patterning is flexible, that is to stay in sustainable 
intensive 'crisis' situations, where the BwO or the virtual can more easily be 
reached, so that any one exclusive disjunction can be undone and alternate 
patterning accessed.
Deleuze and Guattari call these kinds of flexible bodies consistencies 
or war machines, which they contrast to more rigid strata.144
If there is an accelerationism at play here, it is a quite precise one in 
which struggles push beyond capital into a moment of schiz. But importantly 
this is not the end of the story. The moment of schiz must be incorporated 
into a new body; it must be the basis from which some consistency is found. 
To fail to do so is to risk catatonic schizophrenia, or alternatively a rebound 
into a hard reterritorialisation from which it is even more difficult to escape.145
143 We can of course interpret this as a political catatonia -  the inability to cohere around a 
common project -  but we could also think of both Artaud and Nietzsche as examples of the 
heavy psychological price to be paid for staring too long into the abyss.
144 This distinction shouldn’t be thought of as an exclusive binary. In fact these possiblities 
would be better thought of as poles on a continuum of degrees of rigidity or stratification. We 
examine this distinction in more detail below.
^4^ An example of what Deleuze and Guattari have in mind here, following the warnings of 
William Burroughs, is the junkie as a black hole of the subjectivity, a desire for
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This accelerationism aims to push capital’s deterritorialising tendencies to 
breaking point, to the moment of schiz, when all seems possible. But, as we 
have seen, capital can only continue to exist because its regime of 
antiproduction acts as a counter tendency to its schizophrenic drive. To push 
through capital means to break with its regime of antiproduction. To push 
through capitalism involves the constitution of a new regime of 
antiproduction, the creation of a consistency that is not trapped in 
monomania.
In such bodies antiproduction operates in social production much as it 
does in desiring production. War machines then operate by:
Enabling social connections and investments to be made, un-made, and re­
made in accordance with the movements of molecular desiring-production 
itself. And this would require cancelling the debt to capital, and hence making 
molar reterritorialization and recoding subordinate to molecular 
deterritorialization and decoding, rather than the other way round (Holland 
1999: 97).146
Antiproduction becomes not the mechanism of limitation but the means 
of widening the sphere of freedom. In this regime, antiproduction functions 
by breaking the repetition of connections that constitute production. This 
inclusive disjunction allows new connections to develop. It is the breaking of 
monomania and the production of differentiation. If we consider the alter-
deterritorialisation producing the fall into a subjectivity containing just one parameter -  get 
junk. It is, in part, these considerations that make Deleuze and Guattari change the concept 
of the BwO when they come to write A Thousand Plateaus so that the empty BwO becomes 
unproductive stasis.
Here we can see the consequences of Deleuze and Guattari's universal history. It is 
only from the socius of capital, with its proximity to the absolute limit of schizophrenia, that 
we can easily recognise the schizophrenic nature of the unconscious. This recognition 
allows us to use the resonance, or dissonance, between regimes of antiproduction in 
desiring production and regimes of antiproduction in social production as ethical criteria from 
which to judge a socius. Capital’s schizophrenic socius raises the prospect of an auto- 
critical socius.
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globalisation movement as a consistency or war machine, then moments of 
excess could operate as distinct moments of antiproduction, breaking a 
movement from the repetitions, repertoires and frames of sense that sustain 
it, rendering new areas problematic and thus providing the opportunity for 
new sense, new subjectivities and in turn new repetitions. At the end of A 
Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari (1988:500) remind us that:
Of course, smooth spaces are not themselves liberatory. But the struggle is 
changed or displaced in them, and life reconstitutes its stakes, confronts new 
obstacles, invents new paces, switches adversaries. Never believe that a 
smooth space will suffice to save us.
What is to be Done With Moments of Excess?
During a discussion with Foucault in 1972 the Maoist leader Pierre Victor 
outlined his view of a revolution carried out in stages:147
At the first stage of the ideological revolution I'm in favour of looting, I'm in 
favour of 'excesses'. The stick must be bent in the other direction, and the 
world cannot be turned upside down without breaking eggs... At the first stage 
there can be an act of retribution against a boss which is an act of popular 
justice... Even if things go too far, if he gets three months in hospital when he 
really only deserved two, it is still an act of popular justice. But when all these 
actions take the form of a movement... then you have the setting up of 
regulations, of a revolutionary state apparatus (Foucault 1980: 32).
Isn’t this a moment of excess seen from the perspective of 
sovereignty? A period in which there might be some excesses, when 
participants might get a little carried away and go too far? In Victor’s schema 
such excesses can be excused as the consequence of the rigidities and 
injustices of the previous system, which has acted as a limit to the realisation
Pierre Victor was actually the pseudonym for Benny Levy, editor of the influential Maoist 
newspaper L a  C a u s e  d u  P e u p le . He became Sartre’s personal secretary in 1974 (Lecourt 
2001).
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of people’s desires. Frustrations build up and then burst forth, sweeping 
people along into actions they might not otherwise commit. Beyond the 
sense of atavism, however, we can find a notion of an irruption of irreducible 
excess, which, at least potentially exceeds all juridical forms.148 This excess 
is given a moment in the sun during the period of rupture, but for Victor the 
task of the revolutionary in the second stage of revolution, or indeed the 
development of a movement, is to capture this excess with a new state 
apparatus.149 This of course mirrors the previously discussed conception of
148 Negrj (iggg) draws a similar ontological distinction when he differentiates between 
constituent power and constituted power, with the former animating the later. Once again 
the exceeding of juridical forms and the subjectivities of habitual life is the foundation for 
innovation in the sphere of representation. Yet both this conceptualisation and the concept 
of sovereignty attempt to recognise the animating force through the movements of the 
apparatus of capture. They are ways of conceptualising moments of excess through its 
effects on constituted power. Underlying both concepts is the idea that “the source of the 
political is always outside conceptualisation and codification... the foundation is always 
open and indeterminable” (Jameson 2005:161).
149 Ross (2002:148) discusses a 1988 French TV programme set up as a mock trial of 
May ‘68. One section of the programme, called The Excesses o f May, contained repentant 
ex-militants attacking the ‘excesses’ of the events of 68, to which they attributed the 
disorganisation of the universities, ultrafeminism and ‘violence’. Isn’t there a line of continuity 
here between Victor the Maoist, who would allow a period that contains some excesses, 
and the repentant ex-Maoists who recant their past precisely on the basis of those 
excesses? The failure to subsequently impose a new state apparatus removes the 
anticipated, retrospective justification for the moment of excess. Indeed if a militant converts 
to a liberalism in which fundamental transformation is no longer possible or desirable then 
any disruption must become tendentially excessive, or even extremist. Of course, this is a 
reactionary trope with a long history, leading back at least to conservative interpretations of 
the French Revolution. Indeed for the ‘ex-Maoist’, ‘anti-totalitarian’ New Philosophers of the 
1970s, it is the French Revolution itself that leads inevitably to the gulag. This penitent 
recanting by former contemporaries provides the context for Badiou’s problematic. How can 
he adapt to the contemporary situation while distinguishing himself from those of his former 
comrades who have fallen into liberalism? It is from within this problematic that Badiou 
seeks criteria with which to remain faithful to the excess of the event of ’68. We might ask, 
though, whether there are other ways to incorporate this excess that could mediate the risk 
of rebounding into reaction. As Deleuze and Guattari might conceptualise the problem, too
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social movements as providing the initial energy for political change, which 
must then be captured and moved into the sphere of representation if it is to 
be effective. What is additionally interesting about Victor’s comments is that 
they reveal a conception of the initial stages of a movement, of the moment 
of excesses, as a period of exception.
In recent years Giorgio Agamben has extracted a model of sovereignty 
based on the state of exception from the right wing German legal theorist 
Carl Schmitt.150 For Agamben (1995:15) “the paradox of sovereignty 
consists in the fact the sovereign is, at the same time, outside and inside the 
juridical order.” Sovereignty rests with whoever can make the decision to 
suspend the constitution or the operation of law and right. “[T]he sovereign, 
having the legal power to suspend the validity of the law, legally places 
himself outside the law” (Agamben 1998:15). The state of exception is the 
means by which sovereignty captures what is outside it via an “inclusive 
exclusion” (Agamben 1998:21 ).151 This is, of course, a critique of the notion
fast a deterritorialisation risks a retreat into a hard reterritorialisation from which it is 
subsequently impossible to escape.
^50 Schmitt was a member of the Nazi party and we should bear in mind the context of 
Hitler’s rule by the emergency powers of the Enabling Act passed in the light of the 
Reichstag fire.
151 If we apply this schema to Victor’s comments above, then some confusion arises as to 
the exact location of the period of exception. While the moment of excess is a period 
seemingly exempted from a juridical apparatus, which is subsequently re-imposed in the 
second stage of revolution, we could also see the juridical apparatus itself as a state of 
exception, a necessary transitional period which will lead back to a stateless society. Indeed 
we could understand Agamben’s (1998:12) conception of sovereignty as, in part, a warning 
against a transitional recourse to sovereignty.
The weaknesses of anarchist and Marxian critiques of the State was precisely to have 
not caught sight of this structure... as if it had no substance outside the simulacra and 
the ideologies invoked to justify it. But one ends up identifying with an enemy whose 
structure one does not understand, and the theory of the state (and in particular of the 
state of exception, which is to say, of the dictatorship of the proletariat as the 
transitional phase leading to the stateless society) is the reef on which the revolutions 
of our century have been shipwrecked.
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of sovereignty that underlies the various social contract theories of 
liberalism. In the social contract tradition sovereignty ultimately lies with the 
rational, autonomous individuals that are presupposed by liberal theory. The 
contract is the mechanism by which this sovereignty is handed over to a 
sovereign. Schmitt critiques such theories by showing that, far from arising 
from contractual agreement, sovereign power resides outside that contract 
and is indeed based on the ability to suspend the contract, to suspend the 
operation of law. Indeed Agamben, following Benjamin, argues that in 
contemporary society the state of exception, far from being a temporary 
occurrence, has become the predominant form of the operation of power.
The prominence gained by Agamben’s model of sovereignty over the 
last decade can be attributed to its explanatory power in the face of the 
seemingly paradoxical structure of neoconservative thought. The Bush 
Presidency’s post-9/11 War on Terror ostensibly sought the universal 
application of liberal democracy and its associated regime of rights. The 
means by which this end was pursued, however, involved the suspension of 
those rights. Indeed in later texts Agamben explicitly linked the state of 
exception to the War on Terror.152 However the application of sovereign 
violence and the suspension of the normal operation of law around summit 
protests, for instance, also seemed to give this model of sovereignty 
explanatory power in the context of the increased militarisation of the
Agamben might argue that the confusion as to the precise location of the period of exception 
arises because the sovereign decision is located precisely at the point of indistinction 
between constituent and constituted power.
152 Talking about the 2001 US patriot act Agamben (2005:3) says:
What is new about President Bush’s order is that it radically erases any legal status of 
the individual, thus producing a legally unnamable and unclassifiable being. Not only 
do the Taliban captured in Afghanistan not enjoy the status of POWs as defined by 
the Geneva Convention, they do not even have the status of persons charged with a 
crime according to American laws. Neither prisoners nor persons accused, but simply 
‘detainees,’ they are the object of a pure de facto rule, of a detention not only in the 
temporal sense but in its very nature as well, since it is entirely removed from the law 
and from judicial oversight... at Guantanamo, bare life reaches its maximum 
indeterminancy.
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policing of protests.153 With the collapse of the neoconservative project and 
the economic crisis of 2007 we might ask whether sovereignty is really 
primary in the contemporary operation of power. In our discussion of the 
BwO we argued that it was not the direct application of violence that was 
primary under capital but the displaced force and violence obscured by the 
socius. Sovereign violence is, at best, a supplement to the transcendental 
operation of power. We therefore need to conceptualise moments of excess 
in their relation to both sovereign violence and capital’s transcendental 
conditioning of experience.
In his discussion with the Maoists mentioned above, Foucault (1980:
34) responds to Victor by arguing against “taking the place of the juridical 
system”, against the re-imposition of a state apparatus. But is the alternative 
to merely trust in the spontaneous development of liberated desire? In a later 
interview Guattari comments on Foucault and Victor’s discussion, saying that 
he believes: “Not in a definitive end to history, and not in provisional excess” 
(Deleuze 2004b: 266). This appears to present the same impasse in which 
Bataille was caught, but as we have seen, Deleuze and Guattari address this 
problem by constructing a non-teleological universal history. However if 
Guattari wants to escape teleology he goes on to say that “[t]he moments of 
excess, the celebrations are hardly more reassuring” (Deleuze 2004b:
266).154 We can take this statement as recognition that isolated moments of 
excess are not enough to save us; that transformation must be generalised. 
In part this is an argument against a faith in spontaneity that would see no 
need for ongoing organisation, no need for an inheritance from historical 
experience. However it is also an argument against an acceptance of
153 por an ana|ySiS ¡n this mode see Scrimshire (2005).
15^ This seems to be the only place that either Deleuze or Guattari use the phrase “moment 
of excess”, however, the concept seems latent in many of their conceptualisations of this 
time. It is for this reason that we pick it up and try to develop it as a conception of a certain 
type of political event.
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seriality, in which succesive revolts, movements and lines of flight would 
remain separate from each other.155 As Guattari goes on to say:
The revolution clearly needs a war-machine, but that's not a State apparatus.
It also needs an analytic force, an analyzer of the desires of the masses, 
absolutely -  but not an external mechanism of synthesis... as long as we 
stick to the alternative between the impotent spontaneity of anarchy and the 
hierarchical and bureaucratic encoding of a party-organisation, there can be 
no liberation of desire. (Deleuze 2004b: 267).
When Guattari considers moments of excess he finds an organisational 
problematic, which we could summarise thus: how do we build lasting forms 
of political organisation where the lessons of previous events and 
generations provide the grounds for continuing innovation?
We will take this problematic as marking a juncture in the structure of 
our thesis. From this point we move from a symptomological and analytical 
register to the problem of composition. So far, as we have examined the 
political problematic of the alter-globalisation movement, we have 
concentrated on the analysis of the moment of excess in its relation to more 
quotidian periods of struggle. For the rest of the thesis, however, we will 
follow Guattari’s schema and attempt to construct a diagram of an analytical 
war machine adequate to the problem of the moment of excess. We will 
suggest that this is the rhythm of a Deleuze/Guattarian politics, with a relay 
between the high intensity of moments of excess and lower intensity periods 
of analysis. In the next chapter we will examine the form of analysis, and 
ultimately ethics, that can apply in the face of moments when the very
155 As Deleuze (2004b: 278) says:
A system like capitalism escapes in every direction; it escapes, and then capitalism 
fills in the gaps, it ties knots, it establishes links to prevent the escapes from 
becoming too numerous... what can we do so that these escapes may no longer be 
individual attempts or small communities, but may instead constitute a revolutionary 
machine?
We will return to the concept of seriality in Chapter Six when we consider Deleuze and 
Guattari’s theory of groups in its inheritance from Sartre.
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assumptions and presuppositions of the analysis are themselves subject to 
transformation. Before that, however, we will attempt to unpack the 
distinction, contained in Guattari’s prescription, between a war-machine and 
a State apparatus. As with many of Deleuze and Guattari’s neologisms it can 
be the cause of some confusion.
Firstly we should distinguish their concept of a war machine from more 
everyday usage of the term. It does not, for instance, refer to the idea of a 
military/industrial complex, neither is it necessarily a machine that produces 
war -  indeed Deleuze and Guattari (1988:417) explicitly state that “the war 
machine does not necessarily have war as its object.” They use the term 
rather to describe a form of organisation whose aim is to produce “a 
particular way of occupying, taking up, space-time, or inventing new space- 
times” (Deleuze 1995:172). As we have seen through reference to regimes 
of antiproduction, it is a mode of organisation and an accompanying image 
of thought that is distinguished from the State by its orientation to the 
outside.
The State-form, as a form of interiority, has a tendency to reproduce itself, 
remaining identical to itself across its variations and easily recognizable within 
the limits of its poles... But the war machine's form of exteriority is such that it 
exists only in its own metamorphoses. (Deleuze, Guattari, 1988: 360).156
In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari (1988) attribute the 
invention of the war machine to the nomads of the steppes and desert. We 
might think of the primary aim of the war machine, what they call “its sole 
and veritable positive object", as producing or extending the forms of 
occupying space-time that you find in the smooth spaces of the desert or the 
steppe, “and the corresponding composition of people” (Deleuze, Guattari
156 when Deleuze and Guattari (1988:360) say “sovereignty only rules over what it is 
capable of internalizing” they come close to Agamben's (1998:21) conception of 
sovereignty as an “inclusive exclusion". The State and the war machine then can be thought 
of as different modes of relating to excess, one through mechanisms of internalisation and 
the other through machines of externalisation.
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1988:417). It is this that they see as the aim of the great Mongol war 
machines of the 13th century. War then is not the primary object of the war 
machine but only a potential supplement that arises “because the war 
machine collides with States and cities, as forces (of striation) opposing its 
primary object... it is at this point that the war machine becomes war” 
(Deleuze, Guattari 1988:417). The real danger for the war machine is 
appropriation by the State apparatus. “It is precisely after the war machine 
has been appropriated by the State in this way that it tends to take war for its 
direct and primary object, for its ’analytic’ object (and that war tends to take 
battle for its object)” (Deleuze, Guattari 1988:418).157
To unpack this conception in relation to social movements, let’s 
examine the tension between the war machine and its appropriation by the 
state apparatus, between mutation and war, through a discussion of the 
development of the Black Bloc. The tactic has its roots in the experience of 
the German Autonomen movement of the 1980s. The movement was a 
relatively large, although marginal movement with a fairly cohesive culture, 
including spaces for internal debate and analysis. In 1980 a police 
crackdown on the squatting and anti-nuclear movements, in particular the 
violent police attack on thousands of non-violent, sit down protestors at the 
Gorleben nuclear waste plant, sparked a classic cycle of militancy which 
transformed the culture of the movement. As participants were radicalised by 
the experience of police violence, more militant and confrontational tactics 
began to be adopted. Protesters took to wearing similar black clothing and 
sometimes masks and crash helmets on protests in order to make police 
surveillance more difficult (Katsiaficas 1997).158 We might interpret this initial
157 It should be clear from this that for Deleuze and Guattari (1988:417-18) war does not 
arise directly from the State. The State’s domination is initially “based on other agencies 
(comprising, rather, the police and prisons).”
158 This rendering of the story makes the adoption of black dress appear more intentional 
than it might well have been. The similarity of dress also arose from the clothes that the 
Autonom en  wore, for practical and stylistic reasons, when not on demonstrations.
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tactic as an attempt to present a smooth surface that would thwart 
surveillance and prevent the subsequent striatiation of the movement into 
individual subjects with individualised responsibility. In response to this 
phenomena the German media invented the name der Schwarze Bloc (the 
Black Bloc), a term which gradually became adopted, although at first 
ironically, as a term of self-description by sections of the Autonomen scene. 
This form of entanglement with media representation, however, has a 
flattening and reductive effect on a movement’s institutionalisation. New 
participants are attracted to the movement on the basis of the flattened and 
un-nuanced conception that they gain from the media. This can be followed 
by a subsequent tendency to behave in accordance with these 
expectations.159
Raunig (2010) suggests the Black Bloc as an example of a war 
machine appropriated by a State apparatus, which in this case takes the 
form of the police and the media. He also suggests that this process has 
been repeated in an intensified manner since the Seattle protests, when a 
small Black Bloc gained much attention and came to represent, for some, 
the model of militancy. A reductive Black Bloc can lose its focus on 
metamorphosis and instead take war as its primary object. The result can be 
a tactical inflexibility that seeks to impose battle in any circumstances and on 
any terrain. We can think of the automatic resort to ‘militant tactics’ as a 
consequence of the Black Bloc repertoire losing the space for analysis and 
mutation that existed in its German origins. The reductive Black Bloc 
operates as a failed war machine. As Deleuze and Guattari (1988:230) 
explain, “war is like the fall or failure of the war machine, the only object left
159 Thoburn (2008) outlines the important role that the militant image or icon plays in 
constructing a self-referential militant subjectivity, which closes itself off from its outside. As 
an illustration of a movement attempting to reverse this tendency he cites the anecdote that 
an important moment of transformation in the 1970s Italian Autonom ia  movement was 
marked by the replacement of pictures of Mao and Che Guevara on the bedroom walls of 
activists by diagrams of the Mirafiori FIAT factory, which was a centre of struggle at the 
time.
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for the war machine after it has lost its power to change.” At its worst the 
wearing of black clothes on demonstrations can become a statement of 
militancy, accompanied by a sneering dismissal of any other tactic or 
approach. In an ironic reversal the Black Bloc, which began as an anti- 
identitarian tactic, becomes an overt identity that its participants adopt but 
are unable to transform.160
Yet doesn’t this analysis place too much blame on the Black Bloc, or 
other confrontational tactics, for turning protest into war? It is an all too 
common reaction for ‘peaceful protesters’ beaten by the police to condemn 
more militant protesters for the provocation of the violence. This reaction, 
however, remains trapped in the logic of sovereignty, which sees the 
excesses of the movement as the provocation of the state of exception. 
Rather than blaming the excessive behaviour of the Black Bloc for provoking 
reaction, couldn’t we rather say that it is the mutational and compositional 
affects of the moment of excess, a creation in excess of contemporary 
sense, which provokes a sovereign crisis and hence sovereign violence? We 
could even say that moments of excess provoke sovereign violence because 
of the existential crises they create for all concerned. Isn’t this what William 
Burroughs (2003:246) grasped as he witnessed the Chicago police beating 
protesters at the 1968 Democratic convention?161 During moments of excess 
social movements engage in the process of worlding, they create new 
worlds. Such moments are necessarily worlds in conflict; if the moment of 
excess stands then the world that produced the policemen falls. It is this 
intuition, “that reality is slipping away from them”, that provokes the cry, “We 
are REAL REAL REAL!!! as this NIGHTSTICK!”162
1®° I should make clear that while what I am describing is a tendency within certain 
movement scenes, there still remain examples of the use of the Black Bloc repertoire in a 
tactically astute, controlled and flexible manner.
^  I refer to the quotation that begins this chapter.
Again this is not to say that there aren’t strategic decisions made to repress movements 
but it seems that shifts in the level of repression, the hardening of attitudes, involve more
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Liberalism, with its threat of sovereign violence, presents a double bind 
for social movements.* 163 Protest as much as you like, it says, as long as the 
protests have no effect; the moment they are effective and interrupt the 
homeostatic functioning of the society then they shall be cast as extremist 
and subjected to exceptional violence. The diagram of this double bind is 
captured by the invention of the ‘Designated Protest Zone’. At events in 
which protests are expected there has been a growing tendency for the 
police to delimit a certain area in which the protests can take place. These 
are often a long way from the object of protest, are separated from the 
‘general public’, are often out of bounds for media organisations and are 
surrounded by fencing or other means of control.164 Those that protest 
elsewhere are removed to the zone or subject to arrest and/or assault. As 
Skrimshire (2005: 286) explains: ‘The routine ascription of ‘Designated
than just conscious intention. Like moments of excess, they too must surely involve an 
unthought crystallisation of desire on the part of the State apparatus. Isn’t it this that makes 
it difficult for juridical inquiries into events such as Bloody Sunday, or the Kent State 
Massacre to establish chains of decision-making that could account for the events? As 
Guattari says, “power is much more repressive when it senses that its means of control are 
dissolving -  perhaps first and above all on the level of the social unconscious" (Guattari 
2009: 62).
163 The term double bind, created by Gregory Bateson, is described by Deleuze and 
Guattari (1984:79) as “the simultaneous transmission of two kinds of messages, one of 
which contradicts the other, as for example the father who says to his son: go ahead 
criticize me, but strongly hints that ail effective criticism -  at least a certain type of criticism -  
will be very unwelcome." Bateson suggests this provokes a schizophrenic response.
164 Perhaps the paradigmatic example of a ‘Designated Protest Zone’ occurred at the 2004 
Democratic Convention in Boston where it “resembled an outdoor prison... set up for 
protesters two blocks from the convention. The area was demarcated by concrete 
barricades, two walls of fencing topped with razor wire, and overhead netting." The 
protestors responded with a strategy of ironic over-identification, which linked the zone to 
other symbols of the state of exception. “The morning the convention began, one hundred 
people suited up to resemble the detainees at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay— black 
hoods and orange jumpsuits— and knelt in front of the zone with their hands tied behind 
their backs for almost an hour" (Maguire 2006).
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Protest Zones’ is now assimilated within a logic of pre-emptive strike, since 
the threat alone of protest outside the space designated to it has become, in 
the eyes of the state, intolerable.”
What is required in these circumstances is a war machine that takes 
neither war, nor the refusal of war, as its positive object but instead 
maintains the problematic of generalised metamorphosis as its analytical 
focus and objective.165 This is of course no easy task but in Chapter Six we 
will examine some of the repertoires of the alter-globalisation movement in 
the light of this problematic.
The task is made even more complicated by transformations that have 
taken place in the relationship between the State and war machines during 
the process of neoliberal globalisation. “We could say that the appropriation
165 Couldn’t we also analyse the neoconservative project as the attempted imposition of 
sovereign violence and war as the primary analytical object of politics? To do so would be to 
cast neoconservatism as a populist supplement to the neoliberal socius, with the War on 
Terror as a Straussian inspired motivational myth in which war is the means by which values 
are injected into the socius, allowing the mobilisation of an otherwise nihilistically cynical 
public. The fatal paradox for neoconservatism, however, is that the values it inculcates are 
undone by the very operation of neoliberal capital that the supplement intended to protect. 
To follow this line of thought we could certainly say that as the alter-globalisation movement 
took war as its analytical object during the build-up to the invasion of Iraq, it lost its original 
analytical focus on the affects of neoliberal globalisation. In retrospect the acceptance of a 
terrain in which the military are the ones who hold the initiative appears as a strategic error. 
With an issue that seems separated from questions of how we live our lives, the most 
obvious stance is an ethical one that, as Zizek (2006) argues, seeks not to intervene in the 
situation but to inoculate oneself against feelings of responsibility. The predominant slogan 
of the time was, after all, N o t in  M y Name. It is no coincidence that those who most fully 
embraced the shift in the movement were the more traditional left organisations that felt 
more comfortable on a territory that fitted with an anti-imperialist analysis and contained a 
familiar repertoire. It should be remembered that the massive marches of 15 Feb were 
proposed by an alter-globalisation movement space, the European Social Forum. The 
decision, however, came with a high price; the ineffectiveness of the marches led not just to 
the quick collapse of the anti-war movement but to a huge loss of faith in political action of 
all kinds.
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has changed direction, or rather that the States tend to unleash, reconstitute, 
an immense war machine of which they are no longer anything more than 
the opposable or apposed parts” (Deleuze and Guattari 1988:421). In this 
transformation States become “not at all the transcendent paradigms of an 
overcoding but immanent models of realisation for an axiomatic of decoded 
flows” (Deleuze, Guattari 1988:455). This “worldwide axiomatic” (Deleuze, 
Guattari 1988:472) operates in the manner of a war machine by smoothing 
the terrain for flows of capital and subordinating national policies beneath the 
need to attract foreign direct investment. Such a process has been 
accompanied by a shift towards societies of control, which as we have 
already seen, appear to smooth the striations of disciplinary institutions.166 
This, along with neoliberal rhetorical attacks on big government, complicates 
any easy opposition between States and war machines and should 
undermine any naive accelerationism in which the solution is to always to 
move in the direction of deterritorialisation. There is I’m afraid no panacea to 
prescribe -  our therapy consists in interminable analysis,167 the form of 
which we examine in the next chapter. Yet as we shall see, this process 
need not be a miserable one, it should be guided rather by an ethics of joy.
166 Y je should be careful not to overstate this analysis and fall into neoliberal hyperbole 
about a flat and frictionless world. The huge and rising death toll from illegal border 
crossings should stand as a marker of the very real striations that accompany neoliberalism. 
And as Hardt and Negri (2000:190) remind us, a control society may “appear to be free of 
the binary divisions or striation of modern boundaries, but really it is crisscrossed by so 
many fault lines that it only appears as a continuous, uniform space."
167 This quote from Guattari (1984:202) explains the role that analysis can play in keeping 
a politics processual:
From this point of view, the analysis is never-ending, which is what makes it different 
from any self-enclosed programme. Not ‘permanent revolution’, perhaps, but 
‘permanent analysis’! The political concept is continually being re-examined by the 
analytical operation, and continually having to be worked out again from scratch; the 
work of analysis takes it back again to its beginnings, while always withholding total 
agreement.
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Chapter Five 
A Processual Passion.
“What is it that separates the left from the right? Upon what does this 
essential ethico-political polarity rest? Fundamentally, it is nothing but a 
processual calling, a processual passion” (Guattari 1996: 260).
“[T]his movement is PRECISELY and primarily about process” (Alex cited in 
Maeckelbergh 2009: 75)
Introduction
In the previous chapter we sought to conceptualise moments of excess and 
their relation to more everyday experience and struggles. We also raise the 
problem of the forms of ongoing political organisation that could incorporate 
such moments. Any such politics would be marked by breaks and ruptures, 
in which the existing sense of the movement or organisation would be 
disrupted by, for example, the introduction of new problematics. The present 
chapter consists of five sections, each of which is marked by this problem. In 
the first section we discuss the alter-globalisation movement’s focus on 
organisational process and the importance attached to the concept of 
préfiguration, the accordance of ends and means. This raises the question of 
how such a focus can be reconciled with a movement form that includes 
ruptures and discontinuities that alter both practice and expected ends. In 
doing so we seek to resolve the two concepts of process contained in the 
epigraphs above -  the concept of movement process and Guattari’s concept 
of the processual. When we return to this problem in the chapter conclusion 
we will ask what role, for instance, concepts like equality and justice can play 
in such a politics. In the second section we reconceptualise this problem of 
process and the relation of ends and means, through reference to another 
literature that deals with periods of rupture, the literature on revolutionary
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transition. It is our approach of constructing a symptomology of excess in 
Chapter Three that allows us to apply this literature to the problem of the 
relation between moments of excess and ongoing political organisation. In 
the previous chapter we also made clear that the problems facing social 
movements in relation to moments of excess weren’t limited to the need to 
avoid appropriation by the state apparatus but also the need to escape from 
transcendental forms of power, in particular the full body of capital, which in 
some aspects functions more like a war machine than a state. We 
approached this problem with a conceptualisation focused on revealing the 
unthought element of the situation, which we conceptualised as the full body 
or socius. Our approach in this chapter is to construct an analytical process 
that involves the critique of established values. Section three, then, begins 
with a recreation of Deleuze’s Niezschean inspired critique of Kant on the 
basis, precisely, of his failure to include established values within the scope 
of his critique. In section four we put this analysis to work in relation to the 
domination of our contemporary socius by economic value and, in particular, 
neoliberalism’s project of extending the competitive, utility-maximising 
reasoning of economic value throughout the whole of society. In the final 
section we will return to a reading of process and the processual in terms of 
an ethical practice that can operate across the creation of new values, 
though periods of transvaluation. We derive such an ethics from Spinoza’s 
conception of affect and immanent evaluation. We don’t, however, want to 
merely draw up an abstract diagram of an analytical war machine; we want 
to think this political form through reference to the practice of the anti­
globalisation movement. And it is this that draws us back to a focus on 
resolving the two concepts of process in the epigraphs above; indeed we 
now turn to task of unpacking these epigraphs.168
1 fift
oo what we are doing here is extracting concepts and problematics from the movement, in 
this case about process and the relationship between ends and means, and then 
intensifying these problematics through philosophy. This is we, suggested at the end of 
Chapter Three, precisely the role of philosophy in relation to practice.
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Procedures or Process
The question of what the alter-globalisation movement is against and what it 
should be for has been much discussed but remains unresolved. When 
participants discuss the distinctive characteristics of the movement they are 
more likely to turn to the more pragmatic question of what they do, or even 
how they do it. Indeed some have answered the question: what are you for? 
by replying, we are for what we are already doing.169 Within the movement 
such discussions are usually couched in the language of process. To 
illustrate this Maeckelbergh (2009:75) cites an illuminating email exchange 
that took place in 2003. Alex Callinicos, a leading member of the Socialist 
Workers’ Party, wrote: “I’ve been reading the debate about the London 
Social Forum with some bemusement. Most of the discussions by focussing 
on process rather than substance, miss the point. The important question is: 
What is the politics of the London Social Forum?” In response a member of 
the London Social Forum replied: “What Alex doesn’t seem to understand is 
that for many people, this movement is PRECISELY and primarily about 
process. The movement towards another world must be democratic, 
transparent and accessible, lest we become what we are fighting against."170
In a similar vein, but in an American context, Graeber (2007:378) says:
169 “Journalists, leftists, politicians frequently ask, ‘Okay, so you’re against the G8 [or the 
World Bank, or the...]. But what are you for?’ What an absurd question! WE ARE FOR 
THIS! This openness, this way of organising, this way of living, of being, of producing life!” 
(Leeds May Day Group 2005).
170 This is not to argue that political parties such as the Socialist Workers Party, have not 
been part of the alter-globalisation movement however during their participation in that 
movement they have been forced to position and interpret their pre-existing modes of acting 
in relation to the conception of process operative in the movement. Indeed different political 
parties, as well as other more institutionally orientated actors, have been contaminated, to 
greater or lesser extent, by movement practice. Maeckelbergh details the results of one of 
the more fractious of these collisions around the 2005 European Social Forum in London.
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When members of the Direct Action Network or similar groups are considering 
whether to work with some other group, the first question that is likely to be 
asked is ‘what sort of process do they use?’ -  that is: Do they practice internal 
democracy? Do they vote or use consensus? Is there a formal leadership? 
Such questions are usually considered of much more importance than 
questions of ideology.171
The movement has, in particular, built up a specific process based 
around consensus decision-making. As Sitrin (2004:271) explains:
Most groups and individuals working together in the global justice movements 
strive toward various forms of consensus. Consensus is usually defined as a 
group attempt to reach a decision by working together towards a synthesis of 
ideas, rather than by virtue of the strongest and most vocal opinion wining an 
argument. For consensus to be effective, all those participating must be 
actively involved in the discussion process.172
This concern with movement practice has, in part, a pragmatic and 
material basis. Changes In material and technological circumstances have 
made more horizontal, network forms of organising increasingly feasible and 
attractive.173 The operation of networks relies on the protocol that governs 
interaction between the nodes of the network and is less concerned with the 
specific content of those nodes (Galloway 2004).174 Similarly within political 
networks the process by which groups interact tends to gain more
171 The Direct Action Network played a key role In organising the direct action at the 1999
Seattle protests.
173 We will examine the genealogy and operation of this consensus decision-making 
process, and other movement processes, in a little more detail in Chapter Six. Before we get 
to that, however, we wish to identify and develop the political problematic to which it is 
responding.
173 See, for example, (Castells 1996) or (Hardt, Negri 2004).
174 The Internet, which is perhaps the dominant organisational metaphor for our times, is 
primarily a set of shared protocols, called HTTP, which remain indifferent to content. The 
Internet has an end-to-end structure (Galloway 2004).
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importance than those groups’ ultimate aims. However this doesn’t mean 
that process, or protocol, is politically neutral. Juris (2008:17), for instance, 
suggests that ideas become hardwired into the architecture of a network, 
which, he says “helps to explain why ideological debates are often coded as 
conflicts over organisational process and form." The political content of 
movement process has been discussed in many different ways, but perhaps 
the most prominent means of conceptualising it from within the movement 
has been through the concept of prefigurative politics.
This is, for example how Maeckelbergh (2009: 67) discusses her 
exploration of movement process: “Préfiguration is a practice through which 
movement actors create a conflation of their ends with their means. It is an 
enactment of the ultimate values of an ideal society within the very means of 
struggle for that society." Franks (2006) distinguishes prefigurative politics 
from what he calls consequentialism, that is, a concern purely with ends or 
consequences. Graeber (2007:378) provides a similar definition when he 
says: “There is a name for all this: ‘prefigurative politics.’ Direct action is a 
form of resistance which in its structure, is meant to prefigure the genuinely 
free society one wishes to create.”
The focus on process certainly contains a concern with the relationship 
between means and ends. The concept of préfiguration, however, doesn’t 
quite capture the potentially radical rethinking of that relationship suggested 
by movement practice. Préfiguration, in a weak sense, might simply gesture 
to the longstanding anarchist trope that means condition ends. When we 
look at Graeber’s and Maeckelbergh’s definitions, however, we see 
préfiguration used in a stronger sense. There is a closer teleological 
identification between means and ends, with the suggestion that desired 
aims should work backwards to determine means. The danger here lies in 
the closing-off of ends, which simultaneously means the idealisation, and 
elevation beyond history, of present means.
Applying movement processes beyond their social and material 
preconditions must be done carefully if we are to avoid the erection of an
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ideal model.175 At its limit this becomes the temptation to abstract a new 
model of democracy based on the universal adoption of these procedures -  
perhaps a new model of deliberative democracy, to replace the Athenian 
model, or the model of workers councils derived from earlier periods of 
struggle. Although some may think of this as an optimistic or utopian move, 
by removing practices from the specificity of their material circumstances 
and idealising them beyond the problems they face, we set ourselves up for 
preordained failure. If the model is placed beyond problématisation then the 
inevitable failure to match the ideal becomes entangled with different 
strategies that tend towards quietism. One reaction is to begin a never- 
ending search for the betrayers of the model.176 Another is to conclude that 
failure to achieve the model makes all horizontal process pointless. More 
immediately the concept of préfiguration risks the solidification of what 
Nunes (2005:314) has called linear accumulation politics, where “the point is 
to expand, bring more people into the cause, until there are enough of them 
to storm the winter palace.” An obvious target here is the project of party 
building but we can also apply it to the kind of activist politics whose aim is 
the creation of more activists, and the universal adoption of their model of 
the world or their organisational process.177
In practice there is often a considerable degree of flexibility in the 
process and level of organisation that is applied in movement spaces
175 It is precisely this that we have tried to avoid in this thesis. Instead we have aimed at 
the abstraction of problematics, which by definition refuse closure but instead produce more 
problems leading us to an open conceptualisation of practice.
176 Perhaps the contemporary version of this is the critique of those who become a 
supernode, the group or individual who has more connections that any others and so in a 
network has more power. Barabasi (2002) shows that most networks follow a power law 
distribution of connections, with a few nodes automatically developing many more 
connections than others. The point, however, is to treat the horizontal network as an open 
problematic rather than as an idealised end.
177 For a movement critique of such conceptions of activism see the seminal article Give  
Up Activ ism  (Andrew X 1999).
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(Maeckelbergh 2009). However this hasn’t stopped many a meeting being 
made interminable by over-zealous application of process. Nor has it led to 
knowledge of process being used as a means of exclusion. In the Dissent! 
Network mobilisation against the 2005 Gleneagles G8 summit there was 
even a grouping of people who self-deprecatingly referred to themselves the 
‘bureaucracy bloc’. This was in part because they handled the bureaucratic 
tasks for which there was a lack of volunteers, but it was also because they 
wanted to ensure that correct process was being followed (Harvie, et al 
2005). In subsequent mobilisations, including the UK Climate Camps there 
have been ‘facilitation working groups’ that have taken on this task.
In the epigraph that starts this chapter Guattari (1996:260) defines the 
left as “a processual passion”. Does he mean by this a passion for certain 
procedures? In Anti-Oedipus Deleuze and Guattari (1984:293) explain the 
idea “that sexuality is everywhere” using the example of “the way a 
bureaucrat fondles his records”. Are we to interpret a processual passion 
with the image of the bureaucracy bloc fondling their facilitation handbooks 
or becoming aroused by the hand-waving that indicates a meeting 
approaching consensus?178 In fact Guattari has a different concept of 
process in mind, which might help us reconceptualise the connection 
between means and ends. In this chapter we intend to run these two ideas of 
process together.
Guattari’s (1996:260) enigmatic definition of the left as “a processual 
calling, a processual passion” does seem on the face of it a very strange 
definition to give. As an everyday rule of thumb we might position someone 
on the left or right through reference to the issues they are concerned with 
and the positions they take; in this sense the left is a contextual term. Yet the 
position of the centre, in relation to issues and attitudes, is subject to change 
over time and Guattari (1996:260) is arguing precisely against those who
178 In movement practice it is normal to show agreement through waving hands in the air 
rather than shouting out. This aim of this is to provide clearer visual indications of the extent 
of agreement.
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“see nothing in the left-right polarity than what may distinguish them 
momentarily under specific circumstances.”179 Writing in the context of 
nominally leftist governments implementing neoliberal policies, he is seeking 
a more trans-historical definition of the left.180 Of course the origins of the 
terms of this division in the political spectrum are historically specific, dating 
to the seating arrangements at the parliament of the French Revolution. Yet 
just as we bring the terms forward into our own contexts we might apply 
them retrospectively much further back into history. Alain Badiou (2008), for 
instance, writing from the same historical conjuncture, invokes a “communist 
invariant”, by which he means the recurrence throughout history of the 
hypothesis of non-domination. Such invariance is exemplified by the proto­
communist slogan raised by Thomas Miintzer during the sixteenth-century 
German peasant revolts: Omnia Sunt Communia -  Let Everything be in 
Common. How can such a substantive historical recurrence be 
encompassed by Guattari’s definition of the left as “a processual calling”?181
179 Indeed he goes further saying: “There is no Manichaeism in this division, because it 
does not involve the niceties of cut and dried sociological distinctions. (There does exist a 
deep-rooted conservatism in the soil of the left, and sometimes a progressivism in that of 
the right.)” (Guattari 1996: 260).
180 Indeed we can be more specific about this context. In 1981 the Mitterrand government 
abandoned its left-wing manifesto just six months after its election. Franco Berardi (2009a: 
10) points to this as a key moment in the realisation that power was moving far more 
resolutely into a transcendental position and as a consequence the old distinctions between 
left and right were losing their purchase. For the wider context of this remark, however, we 
might point to the impact on French thought of neoliberalism and the New Right. Both Ross 
(2002) and Lecourt (2001) chart the rise of the New Philosophers and their movement from 
libertarian to neoliberal, through the medium of anti-totalitarianism.
1A1
We should make clear that Badiou’s positing of a communist invariant is a response to 
a similar context as Guattari’s positing of processual politics. Badiou’s project, however, is to 
use the positing of a communist invariant as a basis from which to look for a concept of 
universal egalitarianism -  a task made more complicated by the trajectory of the New 
Philosophers who followed their renunciation of Maoism with the embrace of a liberal 
version of universalism in the guise of human rights. When we try to resolve a processual
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Rather than interpret Guattari’s definition as an a-historical fetish for 
procedure we can get a very different sense of the processual if we examine 
it through an anti-capitalist problematic. More specifically we can think of it in 
reference to a Marxist politics of de-fetishisation, which, after all, seeks to 
discover the process behind the object. In the famous section on commodity 
fetishism at the end of the opening chapter of Capital, Marx (1982:164) 
explains how “the commodity reflects the social characteristics of men’s own 
labour as objective characteristics of the products themselves, as the socio­
natural properties of these things.” Commodity fetishism, however, is just 
one, historically specific, form of fetish. In the last chapter we saw how 
“every social machine, produces a seemingly a-historical instance, a socius, 
which appears to be the precondition and not the result of production.” (Read 
2003:178). Indeed this is not just true of social forms; key to Deleuze and 
Guattari’s ontology is the tendency, in all bodies, for their extensive forms to 
obscure the intensive processes that produce them.
It would be a mistake, then, to focus solely on commodity fetishism or 
to think of de-fetishisation as a one-time deal, as something that could be 
over and done with. It is not a case of penetrating the smoke and mirrors of 
capitalist ideology to reveal an un-alienated, static, human essence. Instead 
the task of de-fetishisation, of discovering the process behind the object, 
must itself be a continuous and open-ended process.182 Indeed Guattari 
(2006:420) defines process as: “[a cjontinuous series of facts or operations 
that can lead to other series of facts and operations. A process implies the 
idea of a permanent rupture in established equilibria... it echoes what Ilya 
Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers call ‘dissipative processes.’" What Guattari 
is seeking then is a definition of the left that would be distinguished not only
politics with the communist invariant, then, we are also asking the question: What role can 
concepts like equality, or even liberty play in a left defined by a processual passion?
182 As John Holloway (2002) reminds us rather than talking about fetishism we should talk 
about fetishisation. Fetishism itself is never a done deal but must be continually produced 
through processes of fetishisation.
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from any specific, historically contingent programme but also from any 
conception of teleology. A telos would, of course, represent a stopping point 
for process, quite literally an end to process.
The immediate political engagements that follow from such a 
processual calling return us to more familiar ground for a definition of the left. 
As Guattari (1996:260) says: “At issue here is the collective recapturing of 
those dynamics that can destratify the moribund structures and reorganise 
life and society in accordance with other forms of equilibrium, other worlds.” 
Privileging the processual is to assert that, while politics must start from a 
critical engagement with the present, we can’t know in advance exactly 
where we are heading. We can’t determine beforehand what these other 
forms of equilibrium, these other worlds will be. Following this we might ask 
how such uncertainty can be resolved with the phenomenon of communist 
invariance?
The Time of Jefferson’s Liberation
We can reframe this problem through reference to the literature on 
revolutionary transition. Perhaps unusually we will approach this literature 
through Thomas Jefferson and in particular Michael Hardt’s (2007) 
introduction to a collection of Jefferson’s writing.183 Hardt’s project in this 
essay is to reignite the revolutionary event of Jefferson’s ideas; it is, in effect, 
a jail break, a bid to liberate him from his long capture by the state 
apparatus. To do so Hardt extracts Jefferson from the canonical embrace of 
liberalism and reinserts him into an alternative lineage of revolutionary 
theorists. Liberal theory seeks to deny the revolutionary event, segregating 
its problematics from the normal functioning of society by categorising it as a 
foundational exception. Hardt’s approach allows him to find in Jefferson an
183 Our symptomology of excess in Chapter Three allows us to link the problem of 
revolutionary transition to the more common problematic of the relationship between 
collective events and non-evental quotidian political organisation, such as the relation of 
summit protests to the struggles of everyday life.
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original contribution to a problematic common to all theorists of revolutionary 
events, the problem of transition.
Like all great revolutionary thinkers, Jefferson understands well that the 
revolutionary event, the rupture with the past and the destruction of the old 
regime, is not the end of the revolution but really only the beginning. The 
event opens a period of transition that aims at realizing the goals of the 
revolution (Hardt 2007: viii).
As an explanatory counterpoint to Jefferson’s conception of transition 
Hardt uses Lenin’s State and Revolution, which, Hardt (2007: ix) suggests, 
“poses the role of transition with the greatest clarity and realism.” Lenin 
(1987) positions himself between, on the one hand, the Social Democrats 
who deny the need for any form of rupture and, on the other hand, the 
anarchists whom he accuses of being spontaneists, and so denying the 
need for any period of transition. “For the anarchists... the revolutionary 
event is punctual and absolute, assuming everything can change overnight” 
(Hardt 2007: x).184
For Lenin, although the ultimate goal is to do away with the state along 
with its separation of ruler and ruled, this cannot be achieved “with human 
nature as it is now, with human nature that cannot do without subordination, 
control and ‘managers’” (Lenin 1987:307). Lenin’s solution is the concept of 
revolutionary transition as “a period of education and training in which the 
multitude learns how to rule itself, in which democracy becomes an ingrained 
habit” (Hardt 2007: xi). However, this period of transition can only be 
accomplished through the establishment of a transcendent entity, a ruler in 
the form of a party that can guide and educate the masses towards the goal 
of self-rule.
184 We shall leave to one side whether this is a fair characterisation of anarchist theories of 
revolutionary transformation but point out that the notion of prefigurative struggles is, in part, 
drawn from the longstanding anarchist concern with the compatibility of means and ends.
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There are a number of weaknesses with this conceptualisation but all 
revolve around the separation of ends and means. Firstly, rule by a 
transcendent entity "does not teach people anything about self-rule; it only 
reinforces their habits of subservience and passivity” (Hardt 2007: xx). 
Indeed, secondly, we might extend this argument to say that, as the process 
of direct transformation is interrupted, then the potential for future 
transformation becomes hidden. We re-encounter here the problem of 
fetishism. The transformative potential comes to appear to reside in the 
transcendent entity -  the party or leader -  rather than in the wider field of 
relations from which the ruler has become separated.185 Fundamentally, as 
Hardt (2007: xx) summarises: “How could democracy, after all, result from its 
opposite?”
There is a return here to the temporal sequence asserted by the Maoist 
activist Victor in his discussion with Foucault (1980),186 during which 
excesses may be tolerated during the first stage of struggle but must then be 
reined in by the erection of a new state apparatus.187 Or, as Hardt (2007: xii) 
re-casts this conception, “rebellion is necessary to overthrow the old regime, 
but when it falls and the new government is formed, rebellion must cease.” It 
is in the refusal of this temporal sequence that Hardt finds Jefferson’s 
contribution to the problematic of transition.
185 To situate this within the conceptual apparatus developed in the previous chapter we 
could say that the body of the ruler, or the party, falls back on the wider field of relations 
becoming the full body or the socius, and obscuring the intensive processes that have 
produced it. This would locate it in what Deleuze and Guattari (1984) would call the 
barbarian or despotic socius and what Foucault (1977) would describe as the dispositif of 
Sovereignty.
^88 This text is discussed in the previous chapter in the section Excess an d  Power, where 
we identify it with sovereign capture.
187 As teleological commitments condition the present we might see the party form as the 
state form in embryo.
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Jefferson values rebellion as a good In its own right, independent of its 
justness or timing.188 Indeed Jefferson (2007:35) suggests a very different 
revolutionary temporality when he remarks, “God forbid that we should ever 
be 20 years without such a rebellion.” This valorisation of rebellion indicates 
the need for the periodic reopening of the revolutionary event. In fact 
Jefferson goes further saying:
(N)o society can make a perpetual constitution, or even a perpetual law. The 
earth belongs always to the living generation... Every constitution, then, and 
every law, naturally expires at the end of 19 years. If it be enforced longer, it 
is an act of force and not of right. (Jefferson 2007:56-7).189
Although he doesn’t use the term, Jefferson also seems to deal with the 
problem of fetishism when he says: “Some men look at constitutions with 
sanctimonious reverence, and deem them like the arc of the covenant, too 
sacred to be touched. They ascribe to the men of a preceding age a wisdom 
more than human, and suppose what they did to be beyond amendment” 
(Jefferson 2007:73). Just as Marx reached for religious analogies to 
describe commodity fetishism, Jefferson does the same when describing the 
fetishisation of institutional forms. As long as constitutions are acknowledged 
as the work of mere men they can always be remade, but as they come to 
appear to be the work of “a wisdom more than human” so they become
188 “The spirit of resistance to government is so valuable on certain occasions, that I wish it 
to be always kept alive. It will often be exercised when wrong, but better so than not to be 
exercised at all. I like a little rebellion now and then. It is like a storm in the atmosphere” 
(Jefferson 2007: 30).
189 In a letter to Madison, sent from revolutionary France, Jefferson (2007: 53) writes: "The 
question Whether [sic] one generation of men has a right to bind another, seems never to 
have been started either on this or our side of the water. Yet it is a question of such 
consequences as not only to merit decision, but place also, among the fundamental 
principles of every government.” We can see here an extension of the reasoning of the 
American Revolution. Just as one country can’t be bound by the laws of another, neither can 
a new generation be bound by the laws of its antecedents.
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untouchable. Once again the product of social relations comes to appear as 
their precondition.
Jefferson’s solution then is rebellion; he is not, however, advocating 
continuous rebellion but, rather, a periodic one. As Hardt (2007: xxi) puts it: 
“The only way to be faithful to the revolution... is to repeat it. The temporal 
figure of the revolutionary event, therefore, is the eternal return -  not of the 
same, of course, but the return of the different, that is, the difference marked 
by each generation”.190 Transition, then, doesn’t proceed at an even pace or 
in a linear direction. As Hardt (2007: xxii) says “even when a democratic 
process moves forward it reaches thresholds that cannot be crossed without 
the rupture provided by rebellion.” Those moments of rupture can also allow 
the breaking with one problematic and the positing of a new one. As the 
problematics of the revolution develop, and new forms of domination and 
fetishism are discovered, then the event, as rupture, must be revisited. 
Transition is continual but it is not continuous.
Of course there are many criticisms we could make of Jefferson.
Firstly, the critique of constitutional fetishism must be widened to include 
other fetishisms of established values, in particular, the fetishisms tied to 
property rights. Indeed Hardt and Negri (2009:9) point to “the inviolability of 
the rights of private property, which excludes or subordinates those without 
property”, as the point at which the republican revolutionary process 
becomes interrupted. This point is illustrated by the implacable hostility that 
most republicans displayed towards the Haitian revolution of 1791-1804, “the 
only successful slave revolt in history” (James 1989: vi). Hardt and Negri 
(2009:13) argue that this revolution “was unthinkable because it violated the 
rule of property.”191 The slave-owning Jefferson found it impossible to
This is a conception of difference and repetition with which Deleuze (2001:76) accords 
when he says: "Difference inhabits repetition".
By freeing themselves the Haitian slaves violated the rights of property. As Hardt and 
Negri (2009:13) go on to say: “A simple syllogism is at work here: the republic must protect 
private property; slaves are property; therefore republicanism must oppose the freeing of the
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address not only the elevation of the rights of property above the rights of 
man but also the related racial fetishism that underscored slavery in the 
United States, and indeed still haunts it today. Slavery, of course, is just one 
form of property relations; we have already talked about the fetishism tied to 
commodity production.* 192
The second point of critique of Jefferson’s schema is that the 
temporality of the eternal return can’t be set in advance into a twenty-year 
cycle. Indeed it seems that Jefferson’s argument here needs to be reversed. 
In reality births don’t occur in twenty-year bursts, they happen continuously; 
as such, the concept of a generation only makes sense if we say they are 
formed in relation to certain significant shared experiences. From this 
perspective we can say that it is events that form generations and not the 
other way around. It is the temporality of the event that Jefferson is mistaking 
for the cycle of a generation.
To return to our original Guattarian vocabulary, what Hardt finds in 
Jefferson, although he doesn’t use the term, is a processual transition, in 
which new forms of fetishisation can be overcome and new problematics can
slaves.” As Louis Sala-Molins says “European Enlightenment philosophers railed against 
slavery, except where it  lite ra lly  existecf (cited in Zizek 2009:111).
192 We should, however, point to some interesting aspects of Jefferson’s attitude to 
property in its relation to democracy. Jefferson proposed a ward system of democracy, 
which, as Arendt (1963) notes, has some similarities with, for instance, the democratic 
structures of the 1871 Paris Commune. We might think of Jefferson’s proposed system as a 
kind of yeoman’s democracy, based on a bedrock of rural smallholders, the material 
substratum for which was the perception of plentiful land for all. This perception was made 
possible by the dramatic increase in the size of the United States during the period of 
Jefferson’s presidency, principally though the Indian wars and the Louisiana Purchase. We 
could make an interesting parallel between the sudden disappearance of land scarcity 
during that period and the disruptions in the concept of property rights that have occurred in 
the last two decades as the low, in fact approaching zero, cost of digital reproduction have 
made immaterial goods inherently non-rivalrous.
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emerge.193 In this schema means and ends aren’t in contradiction, instead 
they collapse into one another as they are subsumed into transition as 
process. Transition becomes, not a distinct and separable period but a 
periodic repetition, not a movement from one fixed state to another but “a 
process of infinite becoming” (Hardt 2007: xx). From this perspective it 
makes no sense to consider democracy, self-rule or communism as an 
endpoint. Democracy can only be this very process of continued transition. It 
must be an experimental process of learning by doing, a self-training, which 
includes a process of collective self-analysis and self-correction, including, 
when necessary, recurrent events of rupture.194
It might be objected that this collapse of means and ends in a 
processual politics would once again remove it from a more substantive 
definition of left-wing politics. We might ask: how can we now account for the 
recurrence of the communist invariant? However, the problem takes on a 
different sense if we think of this invariance as the periodic recurrence of a 
starting point, rather than a nascent end point. After all, the hypothesis of 
non-domination is sparked by the experience of domination, or perhaps we 
might more accurately say, it is sparked by the experience of moments of 
excess that occur in struggle against domination. We should be careful not
133  It should be made clear that Hardt doesn’t use the concepts of fetishism or the 
processual in this essay. So just as Hardt could be accused of ventriloquising Jefferson we 
could be accused of ventriloquising Hardt. However the question of what a writer really 
means is rarely the most interesting or useful one to ask. We are following here the 
methodology of symptomatic reading set out in Chapter Three, in which we seek 
problematics that are absent yet inherent to the text. In this way rather than being read 
definitively, texts can be revisited as new problematics are raised.
194 It should go without saying that this temporality also problématisés any conception of a 
transcendent guide sitting above the process of transition. Indeed a familiar critique of the 
stageist conception of revolution is that the transitional stage never ends; instead party rule 
solidifies into dictatorship and democracy is indefinitely postponed. In fact our argument is 
that transition doesn’t and shouldn’t end, the point being, however, that under the Leninist 
formula, transition is subsumed under a transcendent script, which, in effect elides the event 
and prevents its re-emergence.
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to mistake the communist invariant for “a state of affairs which is to be 
established, an ideal to which reality will have to adjust itself.”195 We could 
even say that Badiou strikes a Jeffersonian note when he says of the 
communist invariant: “When all is said and done, everything boils down to 
the maxim: we must dare to struggle, we must dare to revolt,” (cited in 
Hallward 2003: 37).196 The recurrence of the communist invariant is a 
conceptualisation of phenomena we have previously described as symptoms 
of excess.197 There are problematics common to all rupturing events, yet 
they are a repetition of difference as each repetition is immersed in a new 
context. When we reopen such problematics we experience a temporality of 
both ruptures and loops. Seen in this light the temporality of the communist 
invariant is also that of eternal return and neither that of telos nor of 
continuous duration.198
This processual temporality undermines any strategy that distinguishes 
political priorities in the period before a revolutionary event from those in the 
period after it. That form of politics usually designates certain struggles as 
hegemonic and others as strategically marginal. The temporality of this 
strategy means that ‘marginal’ struggles must be subsumed beneath the 
hegemonic ones at present so they can be dealt with later.199 This political
195 Of course, we refer, once again, to Marx (1987:21): “Communism is not for us a state 
of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality will have to adjust itself. We call 
communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things"
19® As will be made clear later we can read this as a rejoinder to “Aude Sapere" -  Dare to 
Know, the maxim of Kant’s essay What is  Enlightenm ent?
19? We should make clear the violence we are doing to Badiou’s conceptual framework 
here. Badiou’s platonic notion of communism would be in serious tension with any notion of 
the processual, his political strategy is in reality far more Jacobin than Jeffersonian.
^9®This is, once again, in accord with Deleuze’s (2001:126) interpretation of the eternal 
return when he says: "The subject of the eternal return is not the same but the different, not 
the similar but the dissimilar, not the one but the many, not necessity but chance."
199 Perhaps the classic content for this political form is the subsumption of feminist, gay or 
black struggles beneath those of the industrial working class. However the same temporality
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configuration is always asking us to be patient. However the problems and 
struggles which arise in the here and now can only be dealt with here and 
now because the problems and struggles we face after an event will, by 
definition, be different and can only be faced then. A processual answer 
must be “first the impatience and then the patience (and not the other way 
around, as in traditional revolutionary theory). Revolution can only be now: 
the idea of a future revolution is a contradiction in terms” (Holloway 2009).
Indeed a processual politics of continual transition means that, contra 
liberal theory, the problematics of revolutionary events can no longer be 
confined to ‘exceptional periods’. Revolutionary theory can be abstracted to 
apply to events of a much smaller scale than the major revolutions 
associated with Lenin and Jefferson. In Chapter Three we saw the 
importance of the event in the formation of social movements both in the 
form of a rupture with the prevailing social consensus but also in accounting 
for their creativity. The structure of the alter-globalisation movement is 
punctual and rhythmic, moving from event to event. We thus have a situation 
in which the movement only fully exists during events, and finds it difficult to 
actualise itself in habitual life. This sets up a two-fold problematic. Firstly, 
what is the relation of such events to habitual life? And secondly, what is to 
be done with these events, that is, how can we act in the face of events? To 
answer the first question we have (re)conceptualised these events as 
moments of excess; this (re)conceptualisation was developed in the previous 
chapter. We have now turned our attention towards the second question.
is evident in reformist and social democratic politics, which urges that struggles be 
subsumed beneath the effort to gain power, at which later date the problems that gave rise 
to those struggles will be dealt with. The classic rejoinder to this proposition can be found in 
the words of Frederick Douglass (1985: 204):
Let me give you a word on the philosophy of reform. The whole history of the 
progress of human liberty shows that all concessions yet made to her august claims, 
have been born of earnest struggle... If there is no struggle there is no progress. 
Those who profess to favor freedom and yet depreciate agitation, are men who want 
crops without plowing up the ground, they want rain without thunder and lightening. 
They want the ocean without the awful roar of its many waters.
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As we have seen in previous chapters the problematic of the event isn’t 
limited to any narrowly drawn conception of politics; it runs, rather, right 
through life and thought. We can identify it, in the guise of the bifurcation 
point, as the constitutive focus of the revolution in the sciences that has 
come to be known as complexity theory, or the theory of non-linear dynamics 
(Prigogine, Stengers 1984). We also saw how this question defines a certain 
lineage in twentieth century art. Indeed the art critic Brian Holmes (2008) 
finds a notion of process in this latter context that runs parallel to the one 
found in the political context. This is a concept:
[w]hose roots lie in the chance philosophy of John Cage, in the relation of 
prop and performance sought by Fluxus, in the interplay of score and 
interpretation developed in concrete poetry and vanguard dance, in the 
orchestrated chaos of the happenings, the improvisational work of the Living 
Theatre or the insurgence of Provo and Situationist interventions (Holmes 
2008: 178-9).
Indeed this artistic context can help bring out the constituent elements 
of processual practice. As Holmes (2008:179) summarises: “In these 
approaches process can be defined as the generative matrix constituted by 
the meeting of catalytic artefacts, more-or-less conscious group interactions, 
and the dimension of singular chance inherent to the event.”
In the previous chapter we saw Guattari refuse the forced choice 
between spontaneity and the State apparatus.200 Deleuze (2004:199), in an 
introduction to a collection of Guattari’s work, says:
From the start we have to be more centralist than the centralists. Clearly, a 
revolutionary machine cannot remain satisfied with local and occasional 
struggles: it has to be at the same time super-centralized and super-desiring. 
The problem, therefore, concerns the nature of unification, which must 
function in a transversal way, through multiplicity, and not in a vertical way, so
20 0  For Deleuze and Guattari (1984) such a forced choice is an example of the paralogism 
of exclusive disjunction, one of the three illegitimate syntheses of desiring production.
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apt to crush the multiplicity proper to desire. In the first place this means that 
any unification must be the unification of a war machine and not a State 
apparatus... In the second place, this means that unification must occur 
through analysis, that it must play the role of an analyzer with respect to the 
desire of the group and the masses, and not the role of a synthesizer 
operating through rationalization, totalization, exclusion, etc.
Our focus has changed to making sense of this proposal for an 
analytical war machine, which we will then place in relation to contemporary 
social movement practice. As we come to do so we should bear in mind the 
constituent elements of processual practice in the artistic context. In the next 
chapter we will proceed by examining the conceptual development of the 
analytical war machine through reference to Deleuze and, in particular, 
Guattari’s theory and practice of group interactions. These are by no means 
peripheral or formal elements of the political, somehow separable and 
subordinate to content.201 Indeed we will argue that such group experiences 
can provide some of the passion that Guattari links to the processual. We 
can agree with Holmes (2008:179) when he says that: “Group processes of 
self-understanding and decision-making (are) one of the ways that 
adherence to a political project is developed and sustained over time.”202
As we examine Deleuze and, particularly, Guattari’s theory of groups in 
the next chapter we will find that the fetishised role of the analyst is 
displaced up an ever-increasing level of scale until they conclude that 
conditions of analysis must be established in the mass itself. Following this 
problematic leads Deleuze and Guattari to move away from their group 
theory in their later work, replacing it with theories of territory. We will follow
201 As Guattari says:
It's always the same old trick: a big ideological debate in the general assembly, and 
the questions of organization are reserved for special committees. These look 
secondary, having been determined by political options. Whereas, in fact, the real 
problems are precisely the problems of organization, never made explicit or 
rationalized, recast after the fact in ideological terms. (Deleuze 2004a: 264).
202  One of the examples that Holmes has in mind here is the foundational role that 
consciousness-raising groups had for the second wave feminist movement.
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them in this in the subsequent chapter that examines some of the institutions 
and technologies used by contemporary social movements in terms of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s key territorial concept of the refrain.
Before we get to that point, however, we need to clarify the analytical 
problems with which we are faced. To do so lets return to the context in 
which Guattari made his processual definition of the left: the rise of 
neoliberalism. As we discussed in the previous chapter this complicates a 
post-68 valorisation of the unification of the war machine over the synthesis 
of the state apparatus. The analysis of the war machine must be 
distinguished from the transcendental operation of capitalist value. Any 
adequate criteria for analysis cannot be rooted in a transcendent position of 
judgement; it must be a project of immanent analysis. Yet if punctual 
struggles are not enough to save us, then the criteria must transcend the 
experience of any specific state of affairs. We need a processual analysis 
but to be adequate to contemporary circumstances we must think this 
analysis in relation to a critique of established values. It is precisely on this 
point that Deleuze, following Nietzsche, critiques Kant and it is for this 
reason that we will begin the next section with an exploration of this 
critique.203
Kant’s Compromised Event
As Deleuze (2006a: 85) explains: “Kant's genius, in the Critique of Pure 
Reason, was to conceive of an immanent critique.” For Kant we must 
distinguish between those concepts that are immanent to the domain of 
experience and those that are transcendent to it. The three classic 
transcendent concepts identified by Kant are God, the World and the Soul. 
These are thinkable but not knowable -  they lie outside the limits of
20 3 We should point out that the conceptions of synthesis and analysis Deleuze refers to 
above are not the same as Kant’s conceptions of those terms or indeed the distinction he 
makes between them. The post-Kantian traditions of analytical philosophy, such as logical 
positivism, are not the major point of reference for Deleuze here.
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knowledge because they lie outside the domain of possible experience. It is 
not possible that we could experience the World in its totality, for example. 
Such concepts refer to a problem not an object. To treat them as objects, 
that is to pose questions based upon their perceived status as objects, is to 
pose a false problem, to fall prey to transcendent illusions (Smith 2007).
They cannot, therefore, provide the criteria for immanent critique.
Instead, Kant seeks such criteria in concepts, which he calls the 
categories, deduced through thinking the conditions of possible experience. 
For example, “Causality is a category for Kant since we cannot conceive of 
an object of our possible experience that has not been caused by something 
else” (Smith 2007:4). Immanent critique then implies a project of total 
critique. Not only our experience but also the conditions of our experience 
must be subject to critique. Kant is a critical philosopher because he wants 
to go beyond given, surface experience. Our experience must be 
transcended to establish their conditions of possibility. It is for this reason 
that Kant calls critique using immanent criteria, transcendental critique.
Deleuze (2006a), following Nietzsche, argues that Kant fails in his 
project of immanent critique and that the roots of this failure lie in the very 
form of Kant’s transcendental method.204 Kant seeks ideal, universal 
principles against which the real and material must be judged. He seeks 
knowledge of the noumenal, things-in-themselves, by deducing from the 
conditions of possible experience. However, by basing critique in this 
domain, established values are protected from criticism. A critique of capital 
in terms of possible experience, for instance, could not identify its fetishisms, 
its transcendent illusions. As Nietzsche (1979:55) says of the noumenal: 
“knowledge of it would be the most useless of all knowledge: more useless 
even than knowledge of the chemical composition of water must be to a 
sailor in danger of shipwreck.” A critique of established values must be 
based on the genesis of real experience, its preconditions and
204 As Deleuze (2006:85) says, it is “primarily a Nietzschean idea to say that Kant's 
critique failed.”
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presuppositions. This materialist critique can contain only specific and 
perspectival concepts. As Deleuze (2006a: 83-4) puts it:
Kant merely pushed a very old form of critique to the limit, a conception which 
saw critique as a force which should be brought to bear on all claims to 
knowledge and truth but not on knowledge and truth themselves, a force 
which should be brought to bear on all claims to morality, but not on morality 
itself.
Kant then is “the perfect incarnation of false critique” (Deleuze 
2004:139), contenting himself with “producing inventories of existing 
values or criticising in the name of established values” (Deleuze 
2004:138). Kant sets up the philosopher in the persona of a judge, 
adjudicating on false applications of ideal principles. This is what 
Deleuze and Guattari (1998: 367) call a “State-form inspired... image 
of thought."205 Indeed Kant’s failed immanence only sets the stage for 
a fetishised repression. “When we stop obeying God, the State, our 
parents, reason appears and persuades us to continue being docile 
because it says to us: it is you who are giving the orders” (Deleuze 
2006a: 86).
Kant’s critique fails, as Nietzsche informs us, because he is 
unable to pose the critique in terms of values.206 It is the failure to 
think the event, that is to think the transformation of values, or in 
Nietzschean terms trans-valuation, that turns “total critique... into a 
politics of compromise” (Deleuze 2006a: 85). As Deleuze (2004: 138) 
says: “As long as we're content with criticizing the ‘false’ we're not 
bothering anyone (true critique is the criticism of true forms, not false
2 0 5  “ It is not at all surprising that the philosopher has become a public professor or State 
functionary. It was all over the moment the State-form inspired an image of thought" 
(Deleuze & Guattari 1988: 367).
206 «one of the principal motifs of Nietzsche's work is that Kant had not carried out a true 
critique because he was not able to pose the problem of critique in terms of values” 
(Deleuze 2005:1).
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contents. You don’t criticize capitalism or imperialism by denouncing 
their ‘mistakes’).”
We can say then that Deleuze seeks to complete Kant’s project of 
immanent critique by establishing the preconditions and presuppositions of 
established notions of morality, truth and reason.207 208Such total critique, 
however, is “strictly inseparable... from a creation no less radical: 
Nietzsche's trans-valuation, and Marx's revolutionary action” (Deleuze 2004: 
1 3 6 ).2°8 ^ js precisely the event of trans-valuation that demands an 
immanent analysis rather than the mere application of established values. 
The position of the judge should not be distinct from that of the legislator, 
and as Deleuze (2006a: 85) explains, “to legislate is to create values”.209 If
20 7  As we shall see later Deleuze’s project is to eliminate transcendent presuppositions and 
so create a conceptual apparatus that presupposes only a plane of immanence. An analysis 
that does not rest on a transcendent illusion, or fetish, opens up the field of potential, 
allowing a joyful politics of potentially infinite experimentation to increase the capacities of 
the social body. It is in this sense that we can understand a Deleuzian philosophy, and 
politics, as a practice of freedom.
208 This passage is worth quoting in full: “For Nietzsche, as well as for Marx, the notion of 
value is strictly inseparable 1) from a radical and total critique of society and the world (look 
at the theme of the "fetish" in Marx, or the theme of "idols" in Nietzsche), and 2) from a 
creation no less radical: Nietzsche's trans-valuation, and Marx's revolutionary action” 
(Deleuze 2004:136). Deleuze here is highlighting the role of the fetish in hiding established 
values from critique. Such values are not ideal and transcendental but are themselves the 
product of determinate social relations. But this identification of the genesis of values is 
inseparable from the creation of new values. The process of defetishisation requires 
revolutionary action.
209 “The point is... that the philosopher, as philosopher, is no t a sage, that the philosopher, 
as philosopher, ceases to obey, that he replaces the old wisdom by command, that he 
destroys the old values and creates new ones, that the whole of his science is legislative in 
this sense” (Deleuze 2006a: 86). Or as Marx (1968:30) would say, “The philosophers have 
only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it."
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we wish to follow the maxims Dare to Know we must also follow the maxim 
Dare to Struggle, Dare to Revolt and, more than this, Dare to Create.™
When we recall that Kant’s critiques date from the same period as 
Jefferson’s we can see the centrality of the problematics of revolutionary 
events to the philosophy of the period. Indeed we can link these events 
together and consider them as a single international revolutionary wave, 
including not only the American and French revolutions but also the Haitian 
revolution and the substantial republican agitation in many other countries. It 
is fair to say that Jefferson (2006) saw the fates of the American and French 
revolutions as connected, while the Haitian revolution was inspired in part by 
the proclamations of revolutionary France.210 11 In this light we could see 
Deleuze’s project here as the attempt to re-open the revolutionary event 
obscured behind Kant’s politics of compromise.212
2 1 0  For Hardt and Negri (2009:17) something approaching these maxims is necessarily 
implicit in Kant, who “opens the possibility of reading the Enlightenment injunction against 
the grain: ‘dare to know’ really means at the same time also ‘know how to dare.1" Their 
project here is to find a minor Kant beneath the major Kant.
211 In relation to the interconnectedness of the revolutions C.L.R. James (1989) argues that 
the shock of the Haitian revolution, and the sustained British attempts to suppress it, 
provided breathing room for the revolutionary regimes of France and America, which might 
otherwise have been wiped out. We might further emphasise this connection between these 
revolutionary events and Enlightenment philosophy by citing Buck-Morss' (2009) argument 
that Hegel’s theory of the master slave dialectic was inspired by the Haitian revolution.
2 1 2  The compromise of Kant’s attitude to the French revolution can be deduced from his 
article W hat is  Enlightenm ent? in which he banishes 'daring to revolt’ during his affirmation 
of ‘daring to know’. “Argue as much as you like and about whatever you like, but obey!”
(Kant 1991:59). This attitude is further nuanced however with his distinction between 
enthusiasm and fanaticism in The Critique o f Judgment. Here Kant (2000:144-5) defines 
fanaticism as “a belief in our capacity of seeing something beyond all bounds of sensibility." 
Enthusiasm is “a transitory accident which sometimes befalls the soundest Understanding", 
while fanaticism is a “monomania... a disease that unsettles it." Kant casts the French 
revolutionaries as pathological fanatics but admires those spectators who show enthusiasm 
for it. Indeed Toscano (2006) positions Kant’s within a Lutheran lineage. Martin Luther was
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This casts republican politics as an interrupted process and the 
Enlightenment conception of reason as a compromise that becomes a fetish, 
with the results of a process coming to appear as the precondition of the 
process. As Deleuze (2006a: 85) puts it:
Kant concludes that critique must be a critique o f  reason b y  reason itself. Is 
this not the Kantian contradiction, making reason both the tribunal and the 
accused; constituting as judge and plaintiff, judging and judged? Kant lacked 
a method which permitted reason to be judged from the inside without giving it 
the task of being its own judge... Transcendental principles are principles of 
conditioning and not of internal genesis. We need the genesis of reason itself.
The realm of reason that we readily access is generated amidst the 
possibilities of our particular circumstances, our real experience. We cannot 
treat the reason we find there as unproblematically universal and continuous. 
“Reason is always a region carved out of the irrational -  not sheltered from 
the irrational at all, but: traversed by it and only defined by a particular kind 
of relationship among irrational factors... the rational is always the rationality 
of an irrational.” (Deleuze 2004:262). To assume a universal necessary 
reason would be to ignore the irrationalities tied to established values. 
However, to pose a critique in terms of values we need to create new values, 
that is create new worlds. The creation of new values gives a point of 
external reference, allowing the effects of established values to become
appalled by the revolutionary events provoked by his daring to know. He castigated those 
who rose up during the Peasants’ War as fanatics who must be wiped out for raising the 
banner Omnia Sunt Communia. Thomas Müntzer, the foremost proponent of the slogan, 
was in fact a disaffected follower of Luther. Enthusiasm then is “a passion for the ideal that 
does not flow over into the "fanatical" effort to achieve it hie e t nuncf (Toscano 2006). 
Interestingly one of the doctrinal disagreements between Luther and Müntzer was over the 
doctrine of continued revelation, the living word of God. It was through this doctrine that 
Biblical lessons could be applied to contemporary situations, such as the rule of the princes 
(Wu Ming: 2010).
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clear.213 You can’t, after all, ask a deep-sea fish to describe the concept of 
wetness as its total immersion gives it no point of comparison. The genesis 
of reason then is the creation of new values. We must become legislators to 
rescue reason from its role as judge and plaintiff.
To return to the conceptual apparatus we discussed in the last chapter, 
such an area of rationality with a boundary of irrationality can be termed the 
full body or socius. Again let’s use the example of capital. “Everything about 
capitalism is rational, except capital or capitalism. A stock market is a 
perfectly rational mechanism, you can understand it, learn how it works; 
capitalists know how to use it; and yet what a delirium, it's nuts" (Deleuze 
2004: 262). Capital has only one aim, self-valorisation; its own self­
expansion. The sheer inherent meaninglessness of this axiom becomes the 
line of irrationality that traverses our deployment of reason. Within the socius 
of capital, decisions about the distribution of social wealth and the production 
of new wealth -  that is, decisions whether to proceed with one course of 
action or another -  are reduced to the question of whether the profit ratio for 
a particular enterprise will meet or beat the market average. The increase of 
zeros on an accounting sheet is the bottom line for the whole of capitalist 
society. Many seemingly rational decisions we take in our every day lives 
only appear rational within a range of potential structured by this calculus.
Consider the following example. In 1998 consumers in Europe and the 
USA spent $17 billion on pet food, while a UN-commissioned report 
estimated the cost of ensuring universal access to basic health and nutrition 
in all developing countries at only $13 billion (UN 2008:37).214 Lets add to
It is in this light that we can understand Ceasare Casarino when he says: “(U)nveilling 
in and of itself does not constitute the primary goal of collective practice, does not constitute 
a telos unto itself. Unveiling is simply a by-product of collective praxis: it is what happens 
when we do things together. Whenever we pursue common projects, we also unveil." 
(Casarino, Negri 2008:104-5).
2 14  $13 billion is the estimated additional cost needed to achieve universal access to basic 
social services in all developing countries.
-  173 -
this the fact that roughly 30,000 children die daily from preventable causes 
linked to poverty (UNICEF 2003), and the assumption that most people 
would value the life of a child above the life of a dog. When we present such 
statistics so starkly, that is abstracted from the ‘realism’ attached to capital’s 
socius, this appears to be an irrational distribution of social wealth.215 It is, 
however, the irrational outcome of rational decisions made within a limited 
range of potentiality. The reasoning deployed is the rationality of an 
irrationality. However, while such a statistic can illustrate a socius’s moment 
of non-sense, it does not constitute a critique on the basis of values. It is not, 
on its own, sufficient basis for total critique because it fails to escape 
capital’s system of measure. The statistic still presupposes money as a 
universal equivalent that can commensurate the incommensurable. How can 
a luxury yacht, for example, be made commensurable with life-saving access 
to clean water? Such a task of commensuration is only made possible by 
resting the application of reason upon a body of irrationality.216 Perhaps we 
might think of it as a symptom that can indicate we are in the presence of a 
fetishism even if, on its own, this revelation is not enough to fully unveil and 
escape it.
Such symptoms can, however, provoke collective action that may break 
with existing values and thereby create new ones. We can illustrate this 
sequence through reference to a video interview with Augusto Finzi, a 
worker activist from the chemical factories of Porto Maghera, near Venice, 
which became a focus of worker militancy in the 1960s and 1970s. Finzi 
describes how early struggles at the factories were focused on fighting the 
use of short-term contracts and the subcontracting of labour. Following a 
large and very militant strike in 1968, workers won a flat-rate pay rise;
2 1 5  As Marx (1982:343) says of capitalist subjectivity: “you may be a model citizen, 
perhaps a member of the R.S.P.C.A., and you may be in the odour of sanctity as well; but 
the thing you represent when you come face to face with me has no heart in its breast."
216  From this angle money allows an infantile abdication from the difficult task of making 
democratic decisions on values.
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subsequent struggles were aimed at direct employment and the 
achievement of wage parity for blue- and white-collar workers. We might say 
that there was an egalitarian motivation for these struggles, although some 
militants also saw the strategic aim as preparing the ground for further 
struggle by overcoming the divisions in the workforce put in place by 
management. These struggles threw up innovative forms of struggle and 
organisation (Edwards 2009), and although the victories remained within the 
value system of capital they had the effect of strengthening the potential for 
further collective action. Attention then began to switch towards the 
hazardous nature of working with chemicals, as worker enquiries, led by 
Finzi, began to uncover the high rates of cancer amongst employees, former 
employees and the surrounding communities. The struggles that followed 
began to exceed the possibilities of capital’s axioms for they not only 
critiqued the results of capitalist value but also necessarily erected new 
values to guide the struggle. Work-related illness and death aren’t 
necessarily recognised under the values system of the market, although 
struggles can force their recognition as ‘externalities’. Such externalities can 
be brought within the market’s value system -  or ‘internalised’ -  through the 
mechanism of compensation. The workers at Porto Maghera, however, 
refused that value system, and posited new values based on the 
irreversibility of serious loss of health, or death.217 They didn’t want more pay 
for work which was killing them; they wanted less work. Struggles switched
2 1 7  We might interpret this as a moment of defetishisation, in which the infantilism of 
capitalist subjectivity is unveiled. Capitalist subjectivity, and in particular the subjectivity of 
the consumer treats the arrow of time as reversible. This is an infantile temporality that 
underlies the irresponsibility of capitalist subjectivity, not just in terms of human lives but 
also in terms of the environment. Robert Nadeau (2008:1) reveals the roots of neoclassical 
economics in “in the equations of a soon-to-be outmoded mid-19th century theory in 
physics.” The presupposition of a closed system that tended towards equilibrium allows a 
reversibility of time’s arrow that we simply don’t find in reality. Much of the danger with 
climate change lies in the triggering of bifurcation points, or events, that prevent the return to 
equilibrium of the previous semi-stable state through a simple reversal of our original 
actions.
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to control over the conditions of work, over the duration of work and to the 
refusal of work altogether. The slogan of the time, Factory Work Makes Us 
Sick, became transformed through struggle into the strategy of The Refusal 
of Work, which posited increasing collective control over our lives as the aim 
of political and economic struggle. A process of collective struggle and 
analysis created new values based on the question: what sort of life might 
we lead?218 We can see here the processual interrelation between daring to 
know, daring to revolt and daring to create.
The Excess of Value and the Value of Excess
Orthodox economists might object that there are no value judgements 
involved in their ‘dismal science’ but merely the neutral task of making 
different ethical positions equivalent through an objective system of 
measure. The theoretical framework established in the previous chapter 
would attach such a claim of objectivity to the operation of the socius of 
capital, which obscures the social specificity of established values. As we 
discussed in Chapter Two, orthodox (neoliberal) economics has a far from 
straightforward position on human nature. It presupposes a transcendent 
and fetishised model of human behaviour, which allows it to posit a socially 
and historically specific notion of value as a universal one and so declare 
that no alternative form of social organisation is possible. However, 
neoliberal politics is distinguished by its active intervention into society, 
creating institutions that are designed to bring about the forms of behaviour 
that its theoretical apparatus presupposes as pre-existent. As McMurty 
(1998:13) puts it: “economists explicitly deny any value judgement is at work 
in their analyses, even though they presuppose a value system in every step 
of the analysis they make.”
218 Finzi talks about this history in a moving video interview included on DVD Porto 
M arghera: The Last F irebrands (2006). He died of work-related cancer shortly after the 
interview was completed.
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Similarly it makes little sense to claim a value-free notion of efficiency 
that exists in isolation from socially determined means and ends. If we look 
back at Olsen’s positing of a cost/benefit analysis as the axiom of collective 
action, we can now see how it erects a fetish of capital’s subjectivities and 
exempts established values from critique. A cost/benefit analysis can only 
take place through a shared conception of value, of what is valued. The 
reason that moments of excess provoke further collective action is not simply 
because the cost of participation is lowered by repertoire innovation. 
Moments of excess are moments of trans-valuation. By opening up political 
and social possibility, by provoking questions about the different sort of lives 
we might live, such a moment changes the very basis upon which a 
cost/benefit analysis can take place. These moments transform questions of 
motivation.
At this point we need a different conception of value, one that can 
escape the fetishised concept of capitalist value by positioning it as one 
amongst other value systems. We can turn for this task to anthropological 
approaches to value. Indeed, the study of the value systems of ‘other’ 
societies as, in part, a means of better understanding those of our own, has 
been a foundational problematic for social anthropology.219 We might think
219 We should also note the role of these early anthropological studies in producing the 
concept of fetishism, the origins of which lay in colonial interpretations of West African 
religious practices, which Graeber (2007:120) summarises thus: “An African intends to set 
out on some project, to go off trading for example. He heads out in the morning and the first 
thing that he sees that strikes him as in anyway unusual or extraordinary, or just that 
randomly strikes his fancy, he adopts as a charm that will enable him to carry out his 
project.” The use of the term fetish to describe this practice, rather than the traditional 
Christian concept of idolatry, developed amongst sixteenth and seventeenth century 
Portuguese merchants living along West African coast. Graeber (2007:118) argues that the 
term fetishism was created in order to “avoid some of the more disturbing implications of 
their own experience” in particular the risk that experience of other value systems can lead 
to recognition of the arbitrary nature of your own. The Portuguese merchants were, after all, 
engaged in the pursuit of gold, ‘a soft yellow metal’ with limited inherent use value. To do so 
they had to put themselves at very considerable risk. A European had around a fifty-fifty 
chance of surviving a year in one of the coastal trading ‘castles’ (Graeber 2007:119).
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back, for instance, to Mauss’s seminal studies of gift economies, which 
played such an important role in Bataille’s conception of the expenditure of 
excess. Indeed the anthropologist David Graeber (2005:18) positions these 
studies within an anthropological tradition that understands values as a way 
of ’evaluating]... not things, but actions’. When we talk about value, we are 
really talking about the process of valuing, an action that takes place within a 
determinate set of social relations, which we can call a value system. This is 
true even when social relations are mediated through objects. As McMurty 
(1998:7) says: “[A] value system connects together goods that are affirmed 
and bads that are repudiated as an integral way of thinking and acting in the 
world.” Interpreting this literature De Angelis (2007) argues that we should 
talk about value practices rather than value systems, to illustrate that 
capitalist value actually exists alongside many other value practices and so 
must be constantly (re)created. Anti-capitalist social movements can be 
seen, in this light, as the frontline in a struggle between value practices. As 
Graber (2005: 58) says:
The ultimate stakes of politics... is not even the struggle to appropriate value;
it is the struggle to establish what value is... Similarly, the ultimate freedom is
not the freedom to create or accumulate value, but the freedom to decide
Graeber interprets the concept of fetishism as an orientalist inversion, which protected the 
European value system from considerations of its own arbitrariness by placing the 
arbitrariness onto the Africans, who were then constructed as child-like fetishists “willing to 
ascribe divine status to a completely random collection of material objects” (Graeber 2007: 
144). Conceptualising these objects as fetishes, however, involved the overlaying onto 
African practice of the fetishistic aspects and assumptions of European religions. The 
African understanding of the objects was in fact quite different; they functioned as catalysts 
to the creation of new social relationships. For Graeber (2007:138) “A fetish is a God under 
the process of construction.” A certain amount of fetishism is “inevitable, both in the 
realization of value... and especially in moments of transformation or creativity... The 
danger comes when fetishism gives way to theology, the absolute assurance that the gods 
are real" (Graeber 2007:144).
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(collectively or individually) what it is that makes life worth living. In the end, 
then, politics is about the meaning of life.220
Continuing, Graber (2005: 58) suggests:
Any such project of constructing meanings necessarily involves imagining 
totalities (since this is the stuff of meaning), even if no such project can ever 
be completely translated into reality— reality being, by definition, that which is 
always more complicated than any construction we can put on it.
We can position this within our discussion of meaning, totalities and the 
socius in Chapter Four. A sense of totality is created when the results of a 
process come to appear as the preconditions of the process. In these 
circumstances a body appears to miraculate itself by producing its own 
preconditions and thus takes on an appearance of self-sufficiency. A totality, 
then, is a fetish because it appears to sustain itself in isolation from its 
surrounding relations. When Bataille argues that meaning is created by the 
expenditure of excess, he is saying that the mechanisms by which we 
incorporate excess into the body, create a body’s value system. These 
mechanisms are value practices.
It is apparent, then, that value is not just produced by social relations 
but, as we have seen with the notion of the socius, also falls back upon 
social relations and determines them in turn. We can say then that value 
plays a role in determining the form taken by organisation. We can find a 
similar argument located within the debate over Marx’s labour theory of 
value and, in particular, in Diane Elson’s (1979) essay The Value Theory of 
Labour. Elson was arguing, on the one hand, against those who saw the 
utility of the labour theory of value in its proof that the capital relation was 
inherently exploitative, and on the other, against the Sraffian Marxists who
220 yve would add that questions about the meaning of life and the creation of values are 
rarely provoked in everyday life but are one of the symptoms we identified in moments of
excess.
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saw in it an explanation of price-magnitudes. In opposition to those positions 
Elson (1979:123) argues that:
[T]he object of Marx’s theory of value is not price at a ll.... My argument is that 
the o b je c t  of Marx’s theory of value was labour.... It is not a matter of seeking 
an explanation of why prices are what they are and finding it in labour. But 
rather of seeking an understanding of why labour takes the form it does, and 
what the political consequences are.221
For Elson “the fundamental question about human labour in all societies is, 
how is it determined?” (1979:129). In the capitalist mode of production, 
labour is ‘determined’ by means of the category value, and we can 
understand this ‘non-deterministic determination’ as organisation. In other 
words, value organises labour. A critique that incorporates established 
values is also a critique of contemporary forms of organisation and the 
impact of capitalist value on our lives. Capital is value in process, that is, in 
the process of self-expansion, what Marx calls self-valorisation. It is this 
process that determines labour. But if the point of Marx’s analysis of value is 
unearthing its determining role on labour then this opens up the possibility of 
the famous Operaist Copernican inversion.222 When we look at value from 
the perspective of its actual effects on labour, we see that ultimately:
221 As Marx’s (1982:174) says: “ It [political economy] has never once asked the question 
why this content [i.e. work or human activity] has assumed that particular form, that is to 
say, why labour is expressed in value, and why the measurement of labour by its duration is 
expressed in the magnitude of the value of the product’."
222 Operaism o  was an intellectual current, developed primarily within Italian Marxism, 
which sought to understand the working class as active and capital as reactive. As a 
consequence they inverted the orthodox Marxist tendency to position capital as the central 
point of analysis, focussing instead on working class life and struggles. As this current has 
spread into social movements it has become more widely known as autonomism or 
autonomist Marxism. Of the original Operaist theorists Negri has become the most well 
known; however, the classical statement of the Operaist Copernican inversion was provided 
by Mario Tronti (1979:1):
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What we value within this mode of production is not wealth understood as 
things or resources —  material or immaterial, natural or human-made —  but 
continual competitive process. And this is how value organizes: by imposing a 
regime of constant reorganization. (Harvie, Milburn forthcoming 2011).
If we return to Guattari’s (1996:260) definition of the left as “a 
processual passion” we could ask if this constant reorganisation is in fact 
processual? How does it differ from the continual transition that we marked 
as a symptom of the processual? Such questions address one of the more 
persistent and tired accusations made of Deleuze and Guattari, that their 
analysis is complicit with contemporary forms of capitalism. Best and Kellner 
(1991:107), for instance, critique Deleuze and Guattari’s “productivist 
imaginary”, which they equate with a modernist, even futurist ethic “of 
frenzied, permanent self-revolution” that doesn’t radically break “from 
capitalist and consumerist behaviour.” Such a critique is merely updated by 
Zizek’s (2003) image of a yuppie reading Deleuze and Guattari as a How To 
guide for neoliberalism.
We can draw out the distinction between a Guattarian processual 
politics and the constant reorganisation associated with capital, and in 
particular neoliberal capital, through reference to a passage from the 
Grundrisse:
Capital as such creates a specific surplus value because it cannot create an 
infinite one all at once; but it is the constant movement to create more of the 
same. The quantitative boundary of the surplus value appears to it as a mere 
natural barrier, as a necessity which it constantly tries to violate and beyond 
which it seeks to go. (Marx 1977: 334-6)
We too have worked with a concept that puts capitalist development first, and workers 
second. This is a mistake. And now we have to turn the problem on its head, reverse 
the polarity, and start again from the beginning: and the beginning is the class 
struggle of the working class. At the level of socially developed capital, capitalist 
development becomes subordinated to working class struggles; it follows behind 
them, and they set the pace to which the political mechanisms of capital’s own 
reproduction must be tuned.
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Now we can see the consequences of understanding capital as value in 
process, or as the process of the self-expansion of value. Capital’s process 
of constant reorganisation is aimed not at the creation of difference but at the 
creation of the same. As Casarino says, in his reading of the same passage: 
“In capital, Marx discovers repetition without difference: capital is infinite 
repetition of the same whose structural limit is precisely qualitative 
difference” (Casarino, Negri 2008:31). The constant repetition of the same 
traps difference into a trivial novelty. Have anything you want, as long as it’s 
a commodity. Do anything you want, as long as you can pay for it, which 
means as long as you go to work, which means as long as your actions are 
conditioned and subordinated to the needs of capital. The prospect of 
difference and freedom becomes trapped in endless servitude. Similarly the 
effects of the constant reorganisation imposed by capital, and associated 
most strongly with neoliberal capital, are social entropy and powerlessness.
A processual politics then does not valorise reorganisation or productivity in 
the abstract; only capital does that.
We should remember that the context for Guattari’s processual 
definition of the left was its disorientation in the face of neoliberal 
‘radicalism’. It is for this reason that we have tried to trace a processual 
politics as a critique of established values. This is not, however, just an 
intellectual pursuit. The critique of established values is tied to the creation of 
new values, which, if we accept the maxim value organises, means the 
creation of new forms of organisation. While we can position economic value 
as one value amongst others, we must also have criteria for evaluating 
between different values practices. This requires not just a form of analysis 
that can operate across periods of transvaluation but also ethical criteria of 
evaluation based on the forms of life tied to those values. Ultimately a 
processual politics can only be guided by an immanent ethics.
To approach this problem we can return to the previously cited 
passage from the Grundrisse. In Casarino’s reading of the passage, he asks 
the question: If capital ‘creates a specific surplus value because it cannot 
create an infinite one’ then we can ask what an ‘infinite’ surplus value would
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entail. “Such an infinite surplus value would not be surplus value in any 
sense whatsoever: being infinite, it would be immeasurable, it would be 
unaccountable in terms of value -  in short, it would be surplus without valud' 
(Casarino, Negri 2008: 31).
For Casarino this conception of surplus beyond value is an important 
point of connection between “Marx and the thinker of immanence... par 
excellence, namely Spinoza” (Casarino, Negri 2008:31). What he detects is 
a shared image of thought, which presupposes that specific forms of value 
close off an open field of potential. This image of thought makes possible 
“the intuition of another way of living surplus”; and it is here “that Spinoza 
and Marx are at their most revolutionary” (Casarino, Negri 2008:35). The 
concept of a surplus without value, however, also seems a point of 
connection with Bataille, and in particular, the concepts of unemployed 
excess and the general economy. This might illuminate the form of 
organisation that we can compose in relation to a surplus without value. 
Bataille uses the sun, which gives without expectation of return, as the figure 
of the general economy. We can’t inhabit the sun, just as we can’t inhabit the 
general economy; however, we form bodies based on different means of 
incorporating the excess that it gives off. Similarly we can’t inhabit a surplus 
without value but we can compose organisational forms that valorise surplus 
without value. This would mean that a processual politics is a form of 
organisation that presupposes a surplus without value; it presupposes an 
infinite surplus. Such a presupposition disrupts bodies that presuppose only 
a specific surplus, or, rather a specific means of incorporating surplus. To 
return to Guattari’s definition of the left, such a perspective forces us to 
problematise the specific, historically situated values or positions that the left 
adopts at any particular time.
When we return to the problematic of the event, or more specifically, 
the moment of excess, we can interpret the expansion of political possibility 
as precisely this experience of a surplus without value, a glimpsing of infinite 
excess. We experience this excess as an increase in freedom, in the sense 
of an increase in the field of potential; the world re-potentialised. An
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analytical war machine must then be a form of organisation that adopts the 
perspective of excess but does not mistake any specific enclosure of excess 
for a new universal. A processual politics based on the valorisation of 
surplus without value accords with the definition of a war machine as a form 
of organisation that “territorializes on deterritorialization itself” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1988: 381 ).223
A processual politics is a pragmatic politics. While it values the process 
of exceeding, of overcoming transcendental illusions and fetishisms in order 
to expand the field of potential, it also accepts the need for actual bodies 
from which to exercise that freedom. Within these bodies, however, it adopts 
the perspective of excess, but as Casarino makes clear, “The condition of 
possibility of [the intuition of another way of living surplus] lies in an 
understanding of surplus as immanence itself’ (Casarino, Negri 2008: 35). 
The perspective of excess, then, raises the ethical problem of immanence, 
which Deleuze and Guattari interpret as the very problem of philosophy. How 
to open up thought without either falling prey to transcendent illusions or else 
falling into chaos, entropy, or catatonic schizophrenia. As Deleuze and 
Guattari (1994:42) put it: “The problem of philosophy is to acquire a 
consistency without losing the infinite into which thought plunges.” To 
address this problem we will turn, more fully, to Spinoza “the Christ of 
philosophers” who “showed, drew up and thought the ‘best’ plane of 
immanence -  that is the purest, the one that does not hand itself over to the
2 2 3  In fact Deleuze and Guattari are actually describing nomads in this passage, however 
nomads are closely connected to the production of the war machine. The war machine 
emerges from the way that nomads occupy space. In opposition to sedentary societies, the 
nomads are most at home when they are abroad In the world; they are at home when they 
are on the move. Of course this also applies to organisational forms and an image of 
throught. In reference to this terminology we can say that capitalism constructs a failed war 
machine, one that must fall back Into transcendence. As Sunn (2005:27) says: 
“Capitalism... only deterritoriallzes in order to bring about a more powerful 
reterritorlallzation. When Capitalism breaches limits it does so In order to Impose Its own 
limits, which It projects as the limits of the universe."
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transcendent or restore any transcendent, the one that inspires the fewest 
illusions, bad feelings, and erroneous perceptions” (Deleuze, Guattari 1994: 
64).
The Passion of the Christ of Philosophers
Spinoza’s ethics rest on the presupposition that existence has only one 
substance, and indeed has need of only one substance. As this substance 
can’t be immanent to anything prior then it must be immanence in itself; this 
is then the positing of a plane of immanence. To maintain this plane Spinoza 
rejects any concept that presupposes a point of transcendence that would 
rise above it, what Deleuze would call a transcendent illusion. Theologically 
this means rejecting the notion of a supernatural God who sits above this 
world to impose order and meaning upon it. Spinoza’s God is, instead, co­
extensive with nature, a conception that re-casts nature, and the substance 
of nature, as the cause of itself, or as a self-organising dynamic.224 The 
positing of a singular substance also provides the basis for a critique of a 
certain tradition of humanism that would replace God, with the subject or the 
self, as the privileged unit of experience.225 Descartes, for instance, founds 
his philosophical system on the ‘undoubtable’ premise Cogito ergo sum: I 
think, therefore I am. This presupposes a conscious subject while adopting
224  One way of understanding Spinoza’s pantheism is by returning to Nietzsche's critique of 
atheism for failing to break with Christianity: disbelief in God still retains God at the centre of 
the belief system. Spinoza, on the other hand, pushes belief in God so far that he removes 
any room for a transcendent, supernatural God. If God is absolute, reasons Spinoza, then 
there can be nothing outside of God, therefore God must be co-extensive with nature. We 
might say that rather than reject God, Spinoza radicalises, or déterritorialises God, he 
pushes through God until he comes out the other side. If God is everywhere, God is 
nowhere.
2 2 5  More specifically the subject or self replaces the soul as the substance that separates 
man from nature.
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the perspective of a disembodied rationality.226 We can take this as a 
commitment by Descartes to more than one substance of being because the 
mind must be of a different substance to the body.227 This mind/body 
dualism is, however, really the prioritising of the mind over the body. Indeed 
the positing of more than one substance to being usually involves the valuing 
of one substance over the another; if one substance doesn’t transcend the 
other and therefore give us a better view of it then there is little point in 
discerning the distinction between the substances.228
Spinoza’s positing of a singular substance of being can be seen as a 
materialist corrective to Descartes’ idealism; he places reason back within 
the body. There is a danger in this move, however, as Hardt (1993:74) 
warns:
Materialism should never be confused with a simple priority of body over 
mind, of the physical over the intellectual. Rather, materialism repeatedly 
appears in the history of philosophy as a corrective to idealism, as a denial of 
the priority of mind over body. Spinoza corrects Descartes just as Marx 
corrects Hegel. This materialist correction is not an inversion, but the 
proposition of an equality in principle between the corporeal and the 
intellectual.
226  For Deleuze, to presuppose the subject as a given is to mistake a result for a 
precondition. It is to fall prey to a fetishism or a transcendent illusion. As Colebrook (2002: 
74) says: “We do not begin as subjects who then have to know a world; there is experience 
and from this experience we form an image of ourselves as distinct subjects.*
2 2 7  For Descartes there is also a third substance, God, but later philosophies of the subject 
do away with the need for God while retaining the mind/body dualism.
228  The positing of a single substance of being is then a kind of realism, an orientation, 
contra Hallward (2006), to act in the world begins with a belief in the world. As Deleuze 
(1995:176) says: “What we most lack is a belief in the world, we've quite lost the world, it's 
been taken from us.” A belief that we are part of a world, constructed by and constructing 
wider flows of movement, gives us access to a potential malleability that exceeds the 
perspective of our specific bodies and subjectivities.
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Spinoza posits an ontological parallelism between the body and the 
mind, or between thought and extension, as two equal expressions of the 
same substance. From this we can say that an immanent, materialist ethics 
must operate at the corporeal level, as well as at the level of the rational, 
conscious subject. Indeed it must also operate at the level of the social, or 
the socius, within which subjects and bodies are embedded. It would be a 
mistake, then, to cast Deleuze as an anti-rationalist. However, Deleuze’s 
rationalism, following Spinoza, is an embodied and embedded one. As such 
it is always a bounded rationality; it is the rationalism of the mole and not of 
the eagle. This means that ethical evaluation must always begin in the 
middle, amidst the messy, base material of pre-existent bodies and the 
experience of their interactions.
For Deleuze (1995:100) this leads to the distinction between ethics 
and morality:
Morality presents us with a set of constraining rules of a special sort, ones 
that judges actions and intentions by considering them in relation to 
transcendent values (this is good, that’s bad...); ethics is a set of optional 
rules that assess what we do, what we say, in relation to the ways of existing 
involved.
Transcendent judgements evaluate bodies through reference to a pre- 
established standard. We can see how this is inadequate for our problematic 
of establishing forms of analysis that can be applied across a transformative 
event. Transcendent judgement elides the event by holding the analytical 
criteria, and hence the values that inform them, above the transformative 
process. An immanent ethics on the other hand is pragmatic, judging the 
modes of existing according to the tenor of life they produce. “There are 
never any criteria other than the tenor of existence, the intensification of life” 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 74).
Spinoza (1996:75) establishes such an immanent ethics through his 
concept of conatus or striving. “Each thing, as far as it can by its own 
powers, strives to persevere in its being.” This striving to persevere becomes 
a striving to increase a body’s power of acting, in order to maximise its ability
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to persist.229 Spinoza has a specific conception of a body, defining it through 
its capacity to act or be acted upon, or to be more precise, its power to affect 
or be affected. This is a definition of bodies in terms of their relations or 
possible relations, that is, their composibility, their ability to compose new 
relations with other bodies and thus compose new bodies. As Deleuze 
(1997:218) explains:
In short, relations are inseparable from the capacity to be affected. So that 
Spinoza can consider two fundamental questions as equivalent: W h a t is  th e  
s tru c tu re  o f  a  b o d y ?  And: W h a t ca n  a  b o d y  d o ?  A body's structure is the 
composition of its relations. What a body can do corresponds to the nature 
and limits of its capacity to be affected.230
So a striving to persist is not a striving to persist as the same but a 
striving to connect with other bodies and so compose ever more powerful 
bodies. It is within the unrest of this striving that we can root immanent 
ethical evaluation. As Hardt (1993: 92) explains:
When two bodies meet, there is an encounter between two dynamic 
relationships: Either they are indifferent to each other, or they are compatible 
and together compose a new relationship, a new body; or, rather, they are 
incompatible and one body decomposes the relationship of the other, 
destroying it, just as poison destroys the blood.
229 w e can see how tf,jS casts the definition of life quite widely, it includes anything that 
comes into being, strives to persist and then ceases to be. The more affects something has, 
the more it can interact with the bodies around it, the more it can express its being and so 
the greater its ability to persist. This definition doesn’t separate sentient life from other flows 
of life by presupposing another substance is in operation, such as a soul or a self, but it 
does allow distinctions to be drawn. For instance, the ability to anticipate dramatically 
increases the ability to act. “The mind as far as it can, strives to imagine those things that 
increase or aid the body’s power of acting” (Spinoza 1996: 77).
23° This presents us with a complex phase space for an encounter between even just two 
bodies. We are dealing with changing relations between bodies, which are themselves 
defined by their relations and so also in a process of change.
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Compatible encounters are experienced as joyful and incompatible 
ones are experienced as sadness. As Deleuze (1978:10) says:
[Bjroadly speaking, when I am affected in chance encounters, either I am 
affected with sadness or with joy. When I am affected with sadness, my 
power of acting diminishes, which is to say that I am further separated from 
this power. When I am affected with joy, it increases, which is to say that I am 
less separated from this power.
This gives us the first criterion for immanent ethical selection: we 
should orient ourselves towards joyful encounters and away from sad ones. 
We should attempt to maximise our powers to act by maximising our 
connections. This gives us the outlines of a political project based on the 
composition of powerful collective bodies.
We can apply this to our symptomology of excess. We experience such 
joyful collective affects of increasing capacities as the intensification of life. 
Joyful experiences are disruptive; they draw us beyond ourselves through 
the creation of powerful new collective bodies. In these moments the plane 
of immanence is experienced as surplus, as the exceeding of our bodies and 
subjectivities and then, perhaps, as the creation of new ones. These are 
powerful passions, which offer us “nothing less than the perception of one’s 
vitality, one’s sense of aliveness, of changeability (often signified as 
‘freedom’)’’ (Massumi 2002:36).231
231 Of course contentious political action is not the only arena of powerful affective 
experiences. In fact we can think of most crowd experiences in this fashion. Much of the 
appeal of sport, for instance -  both playing and spectating -  is the experience of being 
drawn out of ourselves by collectivity but in these cases the environment erects strong 
parameters around the experience. We might also draw parallels with religious crowds or 
congregations. We might speculate that when people talk of being moved by the spirit of 
God, or of feeling his love they are in fact experiencing affective connections established 
horizontally in the crowd, which they come to understand as the property of a transcendent 
entity. In this reading a Spinozan God is a defetishised Christian, or Jewish, God.
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There is, however, another layer to Spinoza’s ethics, the distinction 
between actions and passions. Actions are active affections, which are 
internally caused, or rather, which express their own cause. Passions are 
passive affections; they have an external cause and as such are separated 
from their cause.232 Passions then involve the separation of a body from its 
power to act, as they are passions for something that appears external. “The 
affection is passive because it is explained by the external body, and the 
idea of the affection is a passion, a passive feeling” (Deleuze 1992:239). A 
passive affection can also be either joyful or sad, depending on the 
composibility of the bodies that encounter each other, their powers of 
affection. A sad passive affection results in the decrease in power, or the 
decomposition, of either one or both bodies.233 A joyful passion increases a 
body’s power to act but it still retains a level of impotence as we understand 
the joy to be beyond our control and as such it is not fully within our power to 
sustain or repeat that joyful affect. As Deleuze (1992:240) explains: “All 
passion cuts us off from our power of action; as long as our capacity to be 
affected is exercised by passions, we are cut off from that which we are 
capable.”
We might think of joyful passions as potential way stations on the path 
to active affections. ‘The ethical question falls then, in Spinoza, into two 
parts: How can we come to produce active affections? But first of all: How 
can we come to experience a maximum of joyful passionsT (Deleuze 1992:
232 nBy affect | uncjerstand affections of the body by which the body’s power of acting is 
increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time the ideas of these 
affections. Therefore, if we can be the adequate cause of any of these affections, I 
understand by the affect an action; otherwise, a passion" (Spinoza: 1996:70).
233 vve can thjnt< 0f such C|ear cut sad or j0yfu| encounters as limit points on a continuum 
that allow ethical distinctions to be drawn; actual encounters are likely to involve more 
complicated interactions between joy and sadness; “the sadness of what I hate brings me 
joy, etc” (Hardt 1993:94).
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246).234 In joyful passive affections, “[a] man’s power of acting is not yet 
increased to the point where he conceives himself and his actions 
adequately.” (Spinoza 1996:147). The route from joyful passive affects to 
active affects lies in a body comprehending and expressing their cause. For 
Spinoza we do this by forming common notions. “When we encounter a body 
that agrees with our own, when we experience a joyful passive affection, we 
are induced to form the idea that is common to that body and our own.” 
(Deleuze 1992:282).
We can think of the creation of common notions then as processes of 
defetishisation in which bodies strive to increase their capacities by acting in 
common. A common notion is an adequate idea and for Spinoza:
The adequate expresses (or envelops or comprehends) its cause; the 
inadequate is mute. Like the active, the adequate is linked forward to what it 
can do; but it is also linked backward to its internal genealogy of affects, the 
genealogy of its own production. The adequate gives full view to both the 
productivity and the producibility of being (Hardt 1993 118).
But once again we must emphasise that the composition of common 
notions is not a purely intellectual pursuit. It involves the expression both of 
the body and the mind, extension and thought; as Deleuze and Guattari 
make clear, it involves the composition of both a machinic assemblage of 
bodies and a collective assemblage of enunciation. Conatus then drives the 
interdependent imperatives: Dare to know, Dare to revolt, Dare to create.
Of course these are far from straightforward processes. Spinoza has a 
pessimistic analysis of actuality; encounters tend towards the passive and 
the sad. Indeed for Spinoza the state of nature would tend towards sad, 
passive affects, being dominated by chance encounters and little 
understanding there is minimal chance of joyful encounters. “There is only 
one way of making the state of nature viable: by striving to organize its
234 We should point out that active affects are always joyful as joy is a measure of active 
expression; “there is no active sadness... only joy can be active” (Deleuze 1992:274).
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encounters? (Deleuze 1992:260-1). By organising encounters we can 
become the cause of them and make joyful encounters repeatable. An ethics 
of maximising joyful, active affections then is a matter of political 
organisation. Let’s return to the specific form of political organisation with 
which we began this chapter and our reading of alter-globalisation 
movement process through Guattari’s concern with a processual passion. To 
make a judgement on organisation through reference to its anticipated 
conditioning of some far-off end point would be to risk falling into moral 
judgements. However we can make ethical judgements on political 
organisation based on the affects they create in the here and now.
Deleuze (1978:4) suggests that such an ethics is the basis for 
Spinoza’s rendering of the fundamental problem of politics:
How does it happen that people who have power [p o u v o ii] , in whatever 
domain, need to affect us in a sad way? The sad passions as necessary. 
Inspiring sad passions is necessary for the exercise of power. And Spinoza 
says, in the Theological-Political Treatise, that this is a profound point of 
connection between the despot and the priest -  they both need the sadness 
of their subjects.235
2 3 5  The translators highlight the word pouvo ir in this passage to indicate that the English 
word pow er encompasses two distinct meanings that in the Romance languages relate to 
two separate words: in French they are pouvo ir and puissance, in Italian they are potenza  
and potere, and in Latin potentia  and potestas ; although we should point out that in 
everyday usage the distinction may not be so distinct. Protevi (2009: 50) provides a useful 
description of the sense the words carry here:
[W]e can say that pouvo ir is transcendent power: it comes from above. It is 
hylomorphic, imposing form on the chaotic or passive material of the mob. In its most 
extreme manifestation, it is fascistic: it is expressed not simply as the desire to rule, 
but more insidiously as the longing for the strong leader to rescue us from the chaos 
into which our bodies politic have descended. Puissance, on the other hand, is 
immanent self-organisation. It is the power of direct democracy, of people working 
together to generate the structures of their social life.
There have been many attempts to translate this distinction into English, including talking of
Power with a big P and power with a small p, or talking of power-over and power-to. In
relation to Spinoza we can see that the power (potentia) to affect or be affected is closer to
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ln relationships of domination the proliferation of sad passions is 
obvious. However many exercises of power (pouvoii) involve joyful, although 
passive moments, in which our joy is achieved through investment in a 
seemingly transcendent object, such as a leader, a priest, a football team or 
a commodity. When we are removed from that object we cannot repeat the 
joyful affect and we come to see it as a property of that transcendent object. 
Indeed the sad affects that are produced by separation from the object can 
lead to an addictive seeking out of that object. We can see this as a critique 
of both the reflective joy of the strong leader and the fleeting joy of 
consumption. The interruption of a processual politics leads to the 
investment of desire into social relations that ultimately separate us from our 
own power to act, a moment of joy leading to ultimate sadness and passivity. 
As Deleuze and Guattari (1984:29) say: “the fundamental problem of 
political philosophy is still the one that Spinoza saw so clearly... why do men 
fight for their servitude as stubbornly as though it were their salvation?”236
A processual politics must start then with: “The devaluation of sad 
passions, and the denunciation of those who cultivate and depend on them” 
(Deleuze 1992:270).237 In fact can’t we see such an imperative in the alter-
capacity while power (potestas) as domination produces sad affects by separating bodies 
from their power (potentia) to act.
23® A Spinozan ethics then provides an answer to one of the more familiar critiques of 
Deleuze and Guattari, encapsulated by Best and Kellner (1991:108) when they say: 
“Deleuze and Guattari have no theory of why revolutionary desire is better than Fascist 
desires.” Protevi (2009: 50-51) provides an answer in a nice vignette:
The Nazis at the Nuremburg rallies were filled with joyous affect, but this joy at being 
swept up into an emergent body politic was passive. The Nazis were stratified: their 
joy was triggered by the presence of a transcendent figure manipulating symbols -  
flags and faces -and by the imposition of a rhythm or a forced entrainment -  marches 
and salutes and songs. Upon leaving the rally, they had no autonomous power 
(puissance) to make mutually empowering connections. In fact, they could only feel 
sad at being isolated, removed from the thrilling presence of the leader... Political 
affect then includes an ethical standard: Does the encounter produce active joyful 
affect? Does it increase the puissance  of the bodies, that is, does it enable them to 
form new and mutually empowering encounters outside the original encounter?
2 3 7  Indeed for Deleuze (1992:270) this is “the practical object of philosophy".
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globalisation movement’s distaste for representative politics? Beyond this a 
processual politics must also attempt to maximise the chance of joyful 
passive encounters and where these occur to create common notions that 
will ward off sadness and fetishisation and enable joyful activity in which we 
actively create our own values. The passion of a processual calling is not 
then an attachment to certain procedures, and nor does it involve the 
erection of a new universal model of democracy based on these procedures. 
The passion is, rather, a passion for freedom: the joyful passion of 
increasing capacities, the feeling of increasing, collective power (puissance). 
It is a striving to increase our capabilities, to increase our freedom to act 
beyond the limiting superstitions of religion, sovereignty and capital.
A political concern with certain procedures, the refusal to divorce 
organisational process from the collective production of aims, masks a 
passion for the joyful affect of increased capacities that those procedures 
make possible. Of course this can fall into a bureaucratic fetish, it can 
become a passionate attachment for a set of procedures. When applied in 
inappropriate situations those procedures can produce sad affects; who 
hasn’t felt their powers sapping during long and frustrating meetings? Even 
when consensus decision-making is done correctly, there is no guarantee 
that the bodies that encounter each other will be compatible at that particular 
time and place. The aim of such procedures, however, should be to 
maximise the chance of joyful encounters and minimise the chance of the 
development of fetishisms that cut us off from our power to act. An analytical 
war machine is more than just a set of decision-making processes; it must 
be tied to a politics of defetishisation, the self-expansion of valuing surplus 
without value, combined with a continual process of composing common 
notions, facilitating the never-ending exploration of our power of acting in 
common.
We might conclude by asking what role such concepts as justice or 
equality might play in this political schema. We are certainly not dismissing a 
sense of justice as a motivating factor in collective action and indeed both 
justice and equality can be seen as prerequisites for the maximisation of
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affective joy. However we would agree with Eric Alliez when he says: 
“equality can’t work for real as any kind of universal, beyond a strategic point 
of departure” (Alliez, et al 2010:155). An ethics of radical immanence must 
presuppose a radical egalitarianism but not as a generic or platonic principle. 
It must instead be enacted through a lived process of disentanglement from 
the social consequences of fetishised values. We can, once again, relate this 
to different conceptions of communism within the Marxist tradition, and 
indeed within the writings of Marx himself. In the Critique of the Gotha 
Programme Marx (1968c: 323) declares:
What we have to deal with here is a communist society, not as it has 
d e v e lo p e d  on its own foundations, but, on the contrary, just as it e m e rg e s  
from capitalist society: which is thus in every respect, economically, morally 
and intellectually, still stamped with the birth marks of the old society from 
whose womb it emerges.
This statement is made during a critique of a programmatic notion of 
equality, “equal right here is still in principle -  bourgeois right1 (Marx 1968c: 
323). Communism and equality are not then programmes but problematics. 
Indeed we can say that communism is a problematic based on equality but 
that this equality is also a problematic. Indeed that is what problematics are - 
-  problems leading not to resolution but to new problems.
As Deleuze and Guattari (1984:293) remark: “A revolutionary machine 
is nothing if it does not acquire at least as much force as these coercive 
machines have for producing breaks and mobilizing flows”. While a generic 
egalitarianism can operate as a point of departure, ultimately it is only the 
joyful experience of the self-expanding circuit of increasing collective 
capacities that can provide the dynamism to overcome that of capital and 
other coercive machines. There is a sense of contagion to joyful affects, the 
potential of entering a positive feedback loop. We can see such a conception 
In Hardt and Negri (2009: 379) when they say:
The path of joy is constantly to open new possibilities, to expand our field of 
imagination, our abilities to feel and be affected, our capacities for action and
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passion. In Spinoza’s thought, in fact, there is a correspondence between our 
powers to affect (our mind’s power to think and our body’s power to act) and 
our power to be affected. The greater our mind’s ability to think, the greater its 
capacity to be affected by the ideas of others; the greater our body’s power to 
act, the greater its capacity to be affected by other bodies. And we have 
greater power to think and to act, Spinoza explains, the more we interact and 
create common relations with others.
An increase in our field of potential is an intensification of life. However, 
there is a danger in a runaway feedback loop of intensification. Too much 
intensity risks the loss of any consistency, the loss of the room for analysis. 
The political task is to retain control over the level of intensity. If the 
watchword for Anti-Oedipus is Destroy, Destroy, then for A Thousand 
Plateaus it is Caution, Caution. It is this problematic that will guide our 
reinterpretation of movement repertoires in the next chapter. In terms of the 
overall orientation of the thesis we could say that we are moving from the 
diagnostic mode of the symptomology, to the therapeutic model of Spinoza’s 
ethic -  although in a processual politics diagnosis is only ever temporary and 
analysis is itself therapeutic. We can agree with Hardt and Negri (2009:194) 
when they suggest that:
[It] makes sense that Spinoza thinks of ethics in a medical framework -  curing 
the ills of the body and mind, but more important, identifying how our 
intellectual and corporeal powers have become corrupted, turned against 
themselves, become self-destructive. Maybe this ethical and therapeutic 
model explains why Freud was so fascinated by Spinoza.
We will follow this connection in the next chapter, when we look to 
practical examples of processual politics and analytical war machines, 
beginning with Guattari’s analytical practice in both political and psychiatric 
contexts.
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Chapter Six
How Do You Make Yourself an Analytical War Machine?
In the early morning of the first of June, 20031 found myself in a field next to 
the small French village of Saint-Cergues. It was a beautiful morning with a 
huge expanse of blue sky stretching over the Alpine mountains that surround 
the village on three sides. Somewhere up in those mountains was the resort 
town of Evian where the leaders of the G8 countries were about to start their 
annual meeting. Of course the leaders were already there but Evian was 
nowhere near big enough for the 20,000 ancillary staff the meeting needed. 
For the most part these were billeted in the nearby Swiss city of Geneva. 
Saint-Cergues sits along side one of the main roads from Geneva to Evian 
and I was there as part of a crowd of 5,000 people aiming to blockade that 
road and prevent or delay the meeting, We had been stopped from getting 
any closer to Evian by a line of riot police stretching across the road, backed 
up by an impressively armored water cannon.
I was stood with a group of friends discussing how, with our old heads 
on old shoulders, we knew how to stay out of too much trouble, when we 
heard the bang of a tear gas canister exploding high in the air followed by a 
fizz as one of the pellets dispersed by the explosion, landed nearby. 
Disregarding our previous thoughts we ran over to the pellet, which was 
spewing out gas, and tried to extinguish it with our bottles of water. Our 
ineffectual efforts left us enveloped in a cloud of the stinging, choking gas 
until a young German ran over shouting, "hey, look this is better" as he 
pulled up a clod of earth and thumped it over the tear gas pellet, putting it 
straight out. We retreated to get the catch of the gas out of our throats but 
the tear gas canisters kept coming over. Soon, without any overt 
coordination a team of people was ferrying clods of earth from the fields onto 
the road where another group were using them to extinguish the gas.
Despite a continuous attack with tear gas, pepper spray canisters and 
concussion grenades the blockade continued for another six hours. This
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stability allowed a layer of more formal organisation to be established. A 
spokes council was called to which affinity groups, informal groups of 
friends, and people who had spontaneously self-organised into groups could 
send delegates to enable more efficient coordination. This was achieved 
despite interruption by tear gas, the absence of a shared language and 
disparate traditions of protest. But impressive as this self-organised 
constituted form was it only rested on top of the constituent affect that 
animated it.
For instance, during the course of the blockade two large burning 
barricades were built across the road. The first barricade was built entirely 
spontaneously but later the spokes council made a decision to build a 
second as police advances appeared to show an intention to capture the 
first. People went out to look for materials and a huge pile of wood was 
discovered amongst some trees. Without recourse to the spokes council 
people spontaneously organised to collect the wood. A line of people passed 
the logs through some bushes while others ferried them back to the 
barricade like a line of ants. I along with others was unaware of the spokes 
council decision - 1 merely saw what was going on, decided it was a good 
thing to do and joined in.
The most important decision the spokes council had to make was when 
to collectively abandon the blockade. The decision to leave was prompted by 
the feeling among the front liners that they’d been exposed to gas for so long 
that it was getting hazardous to their health. This information was 
transmitted through their delegates. The spokes council had provided 
coordination but had allowed a considerable level of heterogeneity. This, 
however, needed a clear, collective decision. Any stragglers left behind 
would be at the mercy of the riot police. The meeting deciding whether it was 
time to leave was interrupted by a tear gas attack but as it dispersed most 
participants seemed to think a consensus had been reached and word 
began to spread. After collecting everyone up we all marched off together. 
However a couple of people didn’t think that the previous spoke council 
process had been completed and called another meeting a mile or so down
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the road. Even though people had seemed happy with the decision made, 
some thought that improper procedure had been followed. The constituted 
nature of the spokes council model had become a problem as conditions 
changed. With the barricades abandoned the crowd was in a much more 
exposed position. A feeling of anxiety set in as several helicopters could be 
seen coming to land back at the site of the blockade. We didn’t know the 
intentions of the police. Maybe they were clearing the road to attack us or 
make arrests. This spokes council was undermined by the affect of fear and 
broke up in disarray.
The march continued along the road through countryside and 
occasional closed shop units when by some mad miracle we came across a 
shop with a couple of full swimming pools outside complete with slides and 
pool accessories. It was like a mirage in the blistering heat. A couple of 
people sprinted towards it. The first guy over the fence took off his shoes 
and threw them one after the other without breaking stride. The way he did 
it, the particular height to which he threw the shoes and the comedy dive that 
followed flipped the crowd into hilarious abandon. The danger was forgotten 
as people ran whooping towards the pool. The tension and anxiety was 
discharged and we ended the day with a joyful affect.
Introduction
The vignette above illustrates the complex interrelation of organisation levels 
and forms that go to make up an active collectivity. The more formal 
organisational repertoires rest on more informal ones as the situation moves 
between different levels of intensity and extensity. We can see the different 
sets of knowledges that are presupposed, learnt or shared. Perhaps most 
fundamentally we can see that the potential of different organisational forms 
rest upon, and are conditioned by, flows of affect and desire. As we try to 
think through what the concept of an analytical war machine could possibly 
mean in relation to contemporary movement practice, we need a 
conceptualisation that can operate on all these different levels. In this 
chapter we approach this problem by tracing a conceptual development in
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the work of Deleuze and Guattari between their theory of groups and their 
theory of territory. We begin by looking at Guattari’s experience of groups 
before moving to look more closely at his experience and theorisation of 
group analysis at the psychiatric hospital Le Clinique de La Borde. We then 
go on to examine the theory of groups in Freud and Sartre as context for an 
examination of Deleuze and Guattari’s distinction between subject and 
subjugated groups. After a brief examination of this distinction in relation to 
the March 22nd Movement we discuss the problem of a displacement of 
fetishism onto the analytical body up an increasing level of scale, before 
moving on to examine Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of territory in relation 
to analysis, as a more scalable concept than the group. We then think 
through some of the repertoires of the alter-globalisation movement in 
relation to this conceptualisation and in particular through Deleuze and 
Guattari’s territorial concept of the refrain.
In the previous chapter we traced Deleuze’s concern with the 
problematics of immanent analysis back to his earliest phase of work, 
allowing us some insight into subsequent conceptual development.238 In our 
use of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the BwO in Chapter Four we drew 
primarily upon Anti-Oedipus. The concept, however, undergoes development 
and is used differently in their later work. In A Thousand Plateaus, “the BwO 
becomes a matter of technique rather than of diagnosis or therapy” (Holland 
2005: 60). We have already examined the BwO as a tool of critique, 
concerned with conceptualising a body’s incorporation of its intellectual 
presuppositions and material preconditions. In A Thousand Plateaus,
238 we could very roughly split Deleuze’s writings into three consecutive stages. Firstly 
there are his monographs on specific philosophers, including books on Kant and Nietzsche, 
in which he settles his account with the history of philosophy. Secondly there are his books. 
The Logic o f  Sense and Difference an d  Repetition, where he directly outlines his own 
project. The third collaborative phase, beggining with the publication of Anti-O edipus  and 
continuing until his death, is triggered by both the events of ’68 and the linked event of his 
collaboration with Guattari.
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however, there is a more constructive tone, as indicated in the title of the 
chapter, or plateau: How Do You Make Yourself a Body Without Organs?
This change of emphasis is undoubtedly related to the different 
circumstances and the different problematics with which they were 
entangled. Anti-Oedipus addresses the problematics emerging from “the 
hopes and despair following May '68” (Deleuze 2004a: 194). The proximity to 
such a major event made diagnosis the most pressing task. A Thousand 
Plateaus, however, was published in 1980 as the world began to solidify into 
what Guattari would call the years of winter.239 In these circumstances the 
most pressing problems became less those of diagnosis than those of 
construction. The task was to break free from the clagging entropy of the 
time by constructing a new BwO and therefore revealing the full body of the 
socius. We should not, however, see this as a fundamental break in the 
concept. In the previous chapter we saw that Deleuze had already 
established, in his earlier book on Nietzsche, the inseparability of the two 
moments of critique: the tracing back to obscured values and the creation of 
new values. Perhaps the most we could point to is a change of emphasis as 
the concept was reworked in line with contemporary problematics.
With this, however, we encounter another danger of engagement with 
Deleuze and Guattari: that we subsume the work of Guattari under the 
apparently pre-existing philosophy of Deleuze. Such a subsumption is 
perhaps the dominant trend in the contemporary Anglo-American treatment 
of their work, and is in line with a de-politicised reading that also separates 
Deleuze and Guattari from the political problematics with which they were 
engaged. This tendency risks the construction of a fetishised repetition of 
Deleuze overcoded by desires for a new master theorist. Deleuze does 
come to his conceptual apparatus through an engagement with the history of
239 in 1986 Guattari published a collection of his work entitles Les Années D'Hiver, 1980- 
1985, which translates as The Years o f  Winter. The title’s description was not just geo­
political but also personal as Guattari suffered from prolonged bouts of depression during 
this period.
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philosophy. However, he found this inheritance deadening and sought to 
escape it through the creation of an alternative materialist lineage to that of 
the dogmatic image of thought.240 Guattari, however, came to his conceptual 
apparatus through militant political and psychiatric practice. It is only with the 
event of their collaborative writing that the deadening grip of the philosophy 
of past generations was broken for Deleuze and, arguably, the high water 
mark of ‘post-structuralist’ theory was reached. An event was born in the 
collision between Deleuze’s crystalline acuity and Guattari’s intense 
conceptual creativity.241 A Thousand Plateaus, in particular, still represents a 
rupture in thought that seems to resist attempts to enclose it within academic 
respectability. The attempt to excise Guattari by returning to and privileging 
Deleuze’s earlier work, which fits more easily back into the history of 
philosophy, can be seen as an attempted domestication: the obscuring of the 
event of Deleuze and Guattari behind a politics of compromise.242 It is for
240  “The history of philosophy has always been the agent of power in philosophy, and even 
in thought. It has played the repressors role: how can you think without having read Plato, 
Descartes, Kant and Heidegger, and so-and-so's book about them? A formidable school of 
intimidation which manufactures specialists in thought -  but which also makes those who 
stay outside conform all the more to this specialism which they despise. An image of 
thought called philosophy has been formed historically and it effectively stops people from 
thinking” (Deleuze, Parnet 2002:13).
241 We are still struggling, here, to escape a personological fetishism. Such creativity was 
itself born amidst the collective intelligence of practice.
242  Couldn’t we push this line of argument further? Why does so little of contemporary 
‘Deleuzian’ theory take place within the cramped space of contemporary social movement or 
anti-capitalist problematics? The theorising taking place within the Anglo-American academy 
rarely goes further than that safest of all academic radicalisms, ideology critique. And it's fair 
to ask why you would really need Deleuze for that. We could speculate that there has been 
a desire to open some space for thought by providing academic respectability for the study 
of Deleuze but we might again ask why this has taken such an un-reflexive form. There has 
been little attention paid within Deleuze studies to the disciplining mechanisms of academic 
institutionalisation. This is particularly surprising during a period of radical neoliberal 
restructuring of education and considerable student-led resistance.
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this reason that when we ask: How Do You Make Yourself an Analytical War 
Machine?as a technique in the construction of a BwO, we position the 
question back amidst the problematics in which Deleuze and Guattari posed 
it. It is also for this reason that we know turn to our attention to Guattari’s 
practice as a means of reopening the political problematics of that time.
A Group Star
“Felix was a man of the group, of bands or tribes, and yet he is a man alone, 
a desert populated by all these group and all his friends, all his becomings” 
(Deleuze, Parnet 2002:13). Guattari operated through groups, joining, 
forming or splitting them prodigiously. He started in 1946 as a precocious 16- 
year-old militant in the youth hostelling movement. Imbued with the spirit of 
the Liberation, this movement formed “a cluster of anti-didactic practices 
emphasizing autonomy and self-reliance” (Genosko 2002: 5). He was soon 
also a militant in the far-left, starting in the youth wing of the Communist 
Party, and then moving between various Trotskyite groupuscles before 
participating in the journal La Voie Communiste. As he sought to cross 
boundaries, and connect together different sectors and struggles, he was 
frequently expelled for exceeding the limits that groups set themselves. 
Despite their faults however such group experiences were central to 
Guattari’s intellectual development. During the events of May *68 it was one 
of the groups he had founded, FEGRI (Federation des Groupes d’etudes et 
de Recherches Institutionelles), that occupied the Theatre de L’Odeon 
creating one of the movement’s key assemblies and turning it from a site of 
performance to a site of production and continuous discussion.243 By the 
time of his meeting with Deleuze, Guattari was already a well-known activist 
dubbed “Mister Anti” by the French press. (Genosko 2002: 2).
243As we shall see later in the chapter Guattari also participated in that other great 
institution of the ’6 8 , the March 22nd Movement.
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Deleuze on the other hand was a man apart, almost unique amongst 
his milieu for having never joined the Communist Party. Indeed when they 
agreed to write together, Guattari assumed that Deleuze would be brought 
into the ferment of his various groups. Instead it led to a period of retreat 
from group work: “as soon as we agreed to work together, Deleuze 
immediately closed all the other doors. I hadn’t anticipated that’ (Guattari 
2009: 82). The collaboration came at a time when Guattari was trying to free 
himself from the entropy that had gripped his post-68 political collectives. As 
he says of that scene, “I was hoping that a collective development could be 
pursued, but instead a certain prohibition on thinking set in” (Guattari 2009: 
83). The relationship with Deleuze deterritorialised Guattari’s conception of 
groups, breaking him from a mythic commitment to the inevitable productivity 
of the group.244 This did not, however, entail a repudiation of militant group 
practice, which, for Guattari remained an essential component in breaking 
from Oedipal society. As Guattari (1984: 29) says: “I believe that no one who 
had the experience of being a militant in one of those youth organisations or 
mass movements, in the Communist party or some splinter group, will ever 
be just the same as everyone else." Despite this, it would be foolish to 
presuppose that collectivisation is always the most productive move.
Perhaps instead we can extract from Guattari’s practice the notion of a 
productive distance or rhythm to adopt in relation to groups. The need for 
immersion in the intensity of collectivity must also allow room for 
disengagement and analysis to avoid entombment as a group solidifies.
Alongside his militancy in far left groups, Guattari pursued group work 
in a different context, his psychoanalytic practice. This took place chiefly at 
Le Clinique de La Borde, a psychiatric hospital founded by Jean Oury, a 
mentor from Guattari’s activism in the youth hostelling movement. Guattari 
was hired in 1955 when La Borde was established as an experiment in 
institutional analysis. It might appear that Guattari’s practice in political group
244 “It’s true. Deleuze, carefully, with a light touch, broke down a kind of myth about groups 
that I had had” (Guattari 2009:84).
- 204 -
would be more relevant than his psychiatric practice but in fact this dividing 
line soon breaks down. Guattari was hired at La Borde because of his 
political experience. Oury thought he could introduce elements of militant 
practice into the psychoanalytic institution. His psychoanalytical practice, 
then, aimed to bring politics, and the social, into psychoanalysis, while his 
political practice included analysing groups on the level of desire and 
desiring production. As Deleuze (2004a: 193) puts it: “A militant political 
activist and a psychoanalyst just so happen to meet in the same person, and 
instead of each minding his own business, they ceaselessly communicate, 
interfere with one another, and get mixed up -  each mistaking himself for the 
other.”
From Transference to Transversality
La Borde was established as an experiment in the adaptation of the 
analytical process to the institutional context of the psychiatric hospital. The 
traditional institutional form for psychoanalysis is the dyadic relationship 
between the analyst and the analysand, mediated through a contractual 
agreement.245 In this context the analyst guides the process of transforming 
the analysand back towards a predetermined norm. The role of the analyst is 
to interpret the behaviour and speech of the analysand through the 
application of an interpretive grid.246 This structure keeps both the 
subjectivity of the analyst and the interpretive grid notionally beyond the
245 One of the innovations at La Borde was their treatment of schizophrenics, who as a 
group had been marginalised within psychoanalysis. As Deleuze (2004a: 201) explains:
Freud’s stroke of genius was to show that bourgeois families and the frontiers of the 
asylum contained a large group of people (‘neurotics') who could be brought under a 
particular contract, in order to lead them, using original means, back to the norms of 
traditional medicine... one of the principle consequences of this was that psychosis 
remained on the horizon of psychoanalysis, a general source of clinical material, and 
yet was excluded as beyond the contractual field.
246 Without wishing to overdo it, we should draw attention here to an isomorphism in the 
role of the analyst as transcendent guide in psychoanalytic transformation and the role of 
the vanguard party in revolutionary social transformation.
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scope of transformation. The analyst, then, with his pre-accomplished 
knowledge, has a certain authority, which allows the analysand the 
confidence to enter into a disruptive period of transformation. In practice, 
however, the structure is not so clear-cut, though the general institutional 
form of the dyadic relationship is placed beyond transformation, it does enter 
the analysis through the phenomenon of transference.
Transference is the libidinal tie between the analysand and the analyst, 
in which, for Freud, “the patient sees in [the analyst] the return, the 
reincarnation, of some important figure out of his childhood or past, and 
consequently transfers on to him feelings and reactions which undoubtedly 
applied to this prototype” (Freud 2006:29). Transference can bring 
advantages for analysis if, for example, it increases the patient’s openness 
to the influence of the analyst. “If the patient puts the analyst in the place of 
his father (or mother), he is also giving him the power which his super-ego 
exercises over his ego, since his parents were, as we know, the origin of his 
super-ego” (Freud 2006:30). It can also be a strong source of resistance to 
analysis in the form of the Oedipal desire to kill the father. The analyst, 
however, can also turn this resistance to their advantage.
The transference is made conscious to the patient by the analyst, and it is 
resolved by convincing him that in his transference-attitude he is re­
experiencing emotional relations which had their origin in his earliest object- 
attachments during the repressed period of his childhood. In this way the 
transference is changed from the strongest weapon of the resistance into the 
best instrument of the analytic treatment (Freud 1995: 26).
Transference, then, turns the analyst into a mirror upon which original 
traumas can be restaged and recognised by the patient, and ultimately 
resolved. The question raised at La Borde was how this transference plays 
out when the analysis occurs in a different institutional structure.
The context for Guattari’s approach can be traced through his critique 
of the psychoanalytic interpretive reduction of social relations to the Oedipal 
triangle of the father, the mother and the self. As Deleuze and Guattari 
(1984:96-7) argue:
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There is no Oedipal triangle: Oedipus is always open in an open social field... 
The father, the mother, and the self are at grips with, and directly coupled to, 
the elements of the political and historical situation -  the soldier, the cop, the 
occupier, the collaborator, the radical, the resister, the boss, the boss's wife -  
who constantly break all the triangulations, and who prevent the entire 
situation from falling back on the familial complex and becoming internalized 
in it.
The operation of transference in psychoanalysis, however, reinforces 
Oedipal isolation as “desire is re-established in a drastically reduced space, 
a miserable little area of identification (the analyst’s couch, his watching eye, 
his supposedly attentive ear)” (Guattari 1984: 55).
At La Borde the basic therapeutic unit was the group, and transference 
in this context was used to move away from Oedipal reduction towards an 
engagement with the full complexity of social forces. The defining 
characteristic of the institutional analysis at La Borde was:
[Precisely a determination never to isolate the study of mental illness from its 
social and institutional context, and, by the same token, to analyse institutions 
on the basis of interpreting the real, symbolic and imaginary effects of society 
upon individuals. (Guattari 1984: 208).
The group, or institutional context, then, triangulates the dyad of analyst and 
analysand. ‘The analyst is no longer the mirror; rather, it’s the group. This 
places the group in the position of the analyst, thus making it an analyzer 
(Genosko 1996:15). The institutional form and the institutional object are 
therefore brought within the scope of analysis and transformation.
It is in this context that Guattari develops the concept of transversality, 
in which the one-way libidinal tie of transference is disrupted by the analysis 
of, and experimentation with, multi-directional transversal libidinal ties. 
Guattari (1984:17) opposes transversality to both “verticality” and 
“horizontality”. The former refers to the vertical lines of bureaucratised 
authority, while “horizontality” refers to an inert seriality, in which different 
sectors, patients, roles, etc remain separated form each other, “a state of
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affairs in which things and people fit in as best they can with the situation in 
which they find themselves.” Verticality, then, is associated with paranoid 
investments in which all communication and meaning is channelled through 
a few key individuals.247 Guattari contrasts a coefficient of paranoid 
investments to its inverse, a coefficient of transversality, the maximisation of 
which “tends to be achieved when there is maximum communication among 
different levels and, above all, in different meanings” (Guattari 1984:18).
There is in transversality a sense, derived from Sartre, of the productive 
nature of an encounter with alterity. At La Borde an effort was made to 
construct groups with unusual mixtures of participants as a means of 
engineering encounters that would not otherwise occur. We might think of 
this as a means of revealing and disrupting the usually obscured operation of 
power as it conditions our experience. Overcoming verticality, for instance, 
meant experimenting with the distortions in social relations caused by the 
hierarchy of roles and careers. As Guattari (2006:144) explains: “What we’re 
trying to do... is to upset the caste imaginary that marks these patients, 
nurses and doctors (not to mention all the numerous sub-castes).” The 
ultimate aim of such experiments with transversality was to “change the data 
accepted by the super-ego into a new kind of acceptance of initiative” 
(Guattari 1984:13).248
2 4 7  Despite Guattari’s association with the anti-psychiatry movement of David Cooper, R.D. 
Laing, e t at, he was critical of their practice precisely on their failure to break with an Oedipal 
model and its paranoid investments. The following testimony from a participant in R. D. 
Laing’s Kingsely Hall commune provides an insight into the dangers of paranoid 
investments in group analysis:
I later realised, this community functioned like a large spooked wheel with Laing at the 
centre. All communications had to pass through him. All relationships were centred on 
him. He knew what everyone was thinking and doing, but most of the residents were 
dimly aware of what was happening on their periphery. This led to a lot of paranoia. 
The principle projective processes had to do with jealousy, who was closest to him, 
and who had been shunted to the outer circle. Much of the psychotic interactions had 
to do with these highly charged, but vigorously denied jealous emanations (Berke 
2003:112).
24® As Dosse (2010:46) elaborates:
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Among the most important transversal techniques developed at La 
Borde was La Grille (the grid), which was drawn up as a means of breaking 
down the psychoanalytic “predetermined grid of interpretation” (Deleuze 
2006b: 89), and encouraging “spatial permeability, freedom of movement 
(Dosse 2010: 44). As Deleuze (2006b: 79) explains, “[t]he old psychiatric 
hospital locks you away in an enclosed space that has coordinates on a 
grid.” At La Borde the institutional and interpretive grids were brought out 
into the open and transversal techniques were introduced to disrupt them. 
Positions within the grid, jobs, roles, etc were rotated and swapped to try to 
prevent the predetermined grid of interpretation from falling into place. As 
Guattari (1984:103) elaborates:
Consider what we call at the La Borde clinic the g r id : in all the various forms 
and stages of its existence, it involves the emergence of an abstract machine. 
The problem was to connect the fluxes or time, of labour, of function, of 
money and so on, on a rather different mode from the one normally prevailing 
in other establishments of the same kind which can be characterized by the 
existence of a relatively static organogram of function. The work time-table -  
written down on paper -  the circulation of functions inscribed in a semiology 
of gestures, the modification of hierarchical categories inscribed in a juridical 
and social semiology, all these are specific manifestations of the same 
abstract machinism that conveys a certain (local, and not very important) 
mutation in production relations.
Of course the process of analysis goes beyond the formal organisation 
of the institution. The grid was overlaid with Freud’s distinction between the 
manifest and latent content of an encounter with the intention of unearthing 
the latent dimensions of communication.
I think it convenient further to distinguish, in groups, between the ‘manifest 
content’ -  that is, what is said and done, the attitudes of the different
The exchanges amongst the community members were designed to bring people out 
of their morbid compulsions, including the repetition compulsion, by constantly 
creating new group-subjects. The goal of practising institutional psychotherapy like 
this was not to create relationships p e rs e  but to ‘develop new forms of subjectivity'.
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members, the schisms, the appearance of leaders, of aspiring leaders, 
scapegoats and so on -  and the 'latent content', which can be discovered only 
by interpreting the various escapes of meaning in the order of phenomena.
We may define this latent content as 'group desire'” (Guattari 1984:15).
As will be evident from previous chapters, we can treat such breaks in 
meaning as symptoms. Group analysis, then, includes the construction of 
organisational symptomologies. Indeed when Guattari (1996:137) was 
asked how to organise institutional practices he replied:
[It] consists in marking the indicative elements, the experienced sequences of 
non-sense as a symptom, as institutional lapses which, instead of being 
pushed to the side, marginalized, will see themselves confer a field of 
expressions, a gamut of possibilities that they did not have before.
Such symptoms, however, are not read interpretively, as signs of an 
underlying condition, but constructively, as indications of new possibilities. 
The symptoms indicate blockages in group desire, which obscure the 
potential for transformation. A symptomology then can be used to identify, 
organisational forms, semiotic content, moments of creativity, etc, that can 
be detached from their normal series and turned into mutant nuclei of 
enunciation, opening new universes of reference and potential.249 As 
Guattari (1996:200) explains:
Analysis is no longer the interpretation of symptoms according to a pre­
existent, latent content, but the intervention of new catalytic centres 
susceptible of bifurcating experience. A singularity, a rupture in sense, a cut, 
fragmentation, the detachment of semiotic content -  for example, in a dadaist
24^ As Guattari (2009: 66) says:
Lapses, parapraxes and symptoms are like birds tapping at the window. It’s not a 
matter of ‘interpreting’ them, but of tracking their trajectory to see if they can serve as 
indicators for new universes of reference susceptible of acquiring sufficient 
consistency to change the direction of the situation
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or surrealist fashion -  can be at the origin of mutant centres of 
subjectification.250
These nuclei of enunciation could take the practical form of 
engagement with the outside world through, for example, producing plays or 
a newspaper.251 Or they could involve an organisational or semiotic 
innovation. By initiating a process of collective creation the group attempts to 
break with the conditioning of experience by the socius and gain control over 
its own constitution. The analytical question then becomes:
How do certain semiotic segments acquire their autonomy, putting themselves 
to work to generate new fields of reference? It is on the basis of such a 
rupture that an existential singularization, consecutive to the genesis of new 
coefficients of freedom will become possible. Such a detachment of a ‘partial 
object’ from the field of dominant significations corresponds at the same time 
to the promotion of a mutant desire (Guattari 1996:198).
This approach displaces notions of conscious intention and control, with a 
conception of subjectivity produced through an array of both social and pre­
personal processes. This creates a problematic reminiscent of a processual 
politics. In the dyadic relationship the transcendence of the analyst and the 
interpretive grid provided confidence that the disruptive transformative 
process will turn out well. But where can that confidence come when, “you 
throw yourself into analysis without knowing what you are going to find” 
(Guattari 1996:136)?252
250  Amongst the Dadaist or surrealist techniques to which Guattari is referring here is the 
found object or readymade. Duchamp’s famous work Fountain, for instance, involves the 
detachment of a urinal from its usual context and associations, and its insertion into the 
artistic context from which a whole new mode of enunciation becomes possible. We will 
return to this technique later in the chapter.
pc 1
The production of a newspaper at La Borde and be can seen as one of the techniques 
imported into the psychiatric context from militant political practice.
2 5 2  Indeed, Guattari (1996:198) completes this connection when he says: “ It is precisely 
this notion of process that to me is fundamental. One abandons the idea that one must seek
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We can find the solution to this problem, partly, in the concept of group 
phantasy, the partly unconscious image that a group has of itself, created 
through processes of both projection and introjection. The analytical 
techniques are interventions into this phantasy to attempt to construct it as a 
transitional object, which can provide the affect of confidence in the 
transformational process.253 We might ask though what role there is for 
those, like Guattari, who have specialised knowledge of the field of 
transversality. Guattari wanted to avoid the priestly role of interpreting signs 
in relation to foundational texts. Transversal techniques were used to ward 
off the paranoid investments that might come from looking to him as a 
source for confidence in the outcome of analytic process. As Guattari says: “I 
think of my active participation, and that of other personnel or communitarian 
elements, as catalytic. Either my work is effective, and I'm a good catalyser, 
or it is not, and I’m not, and in that case the process must be interrupted” 
(Ettinger, Guattari 2002: 241). This, however, seems merely to displace the 
problem without resolving it. We will have to return these considerations later 
in the chapter.
The Theory of Groups in Freud and Sartre
Guattari’s experience of institutional analysis fed into the development of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of groups, more specifically, their non­
absolute distinction between subject groups and subjugated groups. We 
shall, in the next section, go on to discuss this distinction in relation to 
political groups. Before that, however, it will be useful to position their theory 
in relation to some philosophical precursors, namely the group theories of 
both Freud and Sartre.
to master an object or a subject - 1 am no longer ‘either master of myself or master of the 
universe."
253 0  yy Winnicot’s concept of the transitional object and has entered popular 
consciousness through the example of the safety blanket (Genosko 2002).
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Freud’s theory of groups, as laid out in Group Psychology and the 
Analysis of the Ego, is developed through reference to the Crowd Theory of 
Gustave Le Bon. Crowd Theory as a whole was a reactionary genre 
developed in the shadow of the 1871 Paris Commune, which, coming after a 
century of collective action, had forced the crowd to the centre of the political 
stage. These experiences produced real analytical difficulties for the 
emergent liberal ontological narrative of the rational, autonomous liberal 
individual.254 In response, a series of French and Italian writers brought the 
newly emerging ‘sciences’ of sociology and psychology to bear on the 
problem, discovering that far from being a force for progress, the crowd 
events of recent history were atavistic eruptions of primitive, irrational 
behaviour.255 On top of this, Crowd Theory found the means of resolving 
crowd phenomenon with an individualist ontology through the figure of the 
crowd leader. Though their opinions on the mechanisms involved differed, 
there was general agreement that crowds formed in relation to leaders and 
that at least part of the collective subjectivity of the crowd was in fact a 
reflection of the individual subjectivity of the leader (King 1990).
We can see such a schema at work in Le Bon’s bestselling book The 
Crowd: a Study of the Popular Mind. Le Bon (2001: 2) begins by setting out 
the distinction between the individual mind and the crowd mind.
Under certain given circumstances, and only under those circumstances, an 
agglomeration of men presents new characteristics very different from those 
of the individuals composing it. The sentiments and ideas of all the persons in 
the gathering take one and the same direction, and their conscious 
personality vanishes. A collective mind is formed; doubtless transitory, but
^ 54  In actual fact most crowd theorists, and Le Bon in particular, limited the necessary 
scope of rationality by making distinctions based on race and class.
The paradigmatic problem with which Crowd Theory framed crowds was the juridical 
one of assigning individual responsibility within collective acts. The perceived phenomenon 
which the theory seeks to explain is that of an individual of good character swept up by a 
crowd into acts they would otherwise not consider.
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presenting very clearly defined characteristics. The gathering has thus 
become what, in the absence of a better expression, I will call an organised 
crowd, or, if the term is considered preferable, a psychological crowd. It forms 
a single being, and is subjected to the la w  o f  th e  m e n ta l u n ity  o f  c ro w d s .
The mechanics of this mental unity are threefold. Firstly, “the individual 
forming part of a group acquires, solely from numerical considerations, a 
sentiment of invincible power” which in turn leads to a loss of inhibitions. 
Secondly, the crowd causes an affect of contagion where “every sentiment is 
contagious, and contagious to such a degree that an individual readily 
sacrifices his personal interest to the collective interest” (Le Bon 2002:6-7). 
Lastly, and most importantly, membership of a crowd mentality, lowers the 
participant’s intelligence and leads to a heightened suggestibility. This leaves 
the crowd open to hypnotism by crowd leaders with any suggestion 
immediately reinforced by the mechanism of contagion.
Le Bon’s crowds can come together without leaders, its hypnosis can 
be self-induced, but he makes clear that crowds “are so bent on obedience 
that they instinctively submit to whoever declares himself their master” (Le 
Bon 2002:75). The crowds suggestibility needs leaders and crowds 
automatically seek them out. This schema was designed to play on the 
predominant bourgeois fears of the time. As the leading crowd agitators of 
the late nineteenth century were of a socialist or anarchist bent, then the 
danger, seemingly embodied by the Paris Commune, was that the 
suggestible masses of the newly teeming cities would be led to embrace a 
primitive, atavistic communism. In response Le Bon offered his book as a 
guide to the counter-manipulation of crowds by established elites.256
When Freud (2001) comes to consider group psychology he takes Le 
Bon as his starting point, fully accepting his description of crowd 
phenomena. His sole point of criticism is that hypnotism is an inadequate
256 Although as Le Bon’s book was a contemporary best seller and has remained in print 
continuously to this day, we might suppose that it chiefly served as a titillating group 
phantasy for bourgeois readers.
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explanation of the mental unity of the crowd. For Freud formation of the ego 
takes place, in part, through identification with external objects that act as 
ego ideals.257 This identification, as one of the earliest libidinal ties, is usually 
with the father. However in certain situations another object takes the place 
of the father as the ego ideal. So for Freud (2001:116) a crowd consists of a 
“number of individuals who have substituted one and the same object for 
their ego ideal and have consequently identified themselves with one 
another in their ego.” This common object is the leader. Each individual in 
the crowd has a libidinal investment in the leader. However the leader as a 
single person cannot reciprocate all the libidinal energy that has been 
invested in him. There is a surplus that gets invested in the other participants 
of the crowd, who can identify with one another as common egos since they 
share the same ego ideal.
Despite its long-lasting popularity Le Bon’s description of the crowd is 
unable to account for a significant amount of crowd behaviour. Not all 
crowds act stupidly or irrationally, for example.258 Freud’s conception has the 
advantage of identifying the crowd with the circulation of sublimated libidinal 
bonds. This allows him to account for crowds without diagnosing a 
necessary reduction in intelligence. There is though much crowd behaviour 
that still seems to escape Freud’s description. His account seems limited to 
crowds in their most paranoiac form; indeed the image brought to mind is of 
a Nuremburg rally gripped by the oratory of Hitler.259 We can suppose that 
Freud would advocate the adoption of a better father figure but the anti­
democratic political message of his theory is clear. Just as there can be no
2 5 7  It would be technically more correct to describe this identification as an investment of 
libidinal energy, an object cathexis.
258 yye can thjnk back here t0 the vignette with which we began this chapter. Little of the 
phenomena cited there is explainable within Freud’s schema.
259  Indeed this may not be a coincidence. Gonen (2003) provides a detailed tracing of the 
influence of Le Bon’s theory on both Hitler and Mussolini.
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family without a father, so there can be no society without leaders. Indeed 
Deleuze and Guattari (1984:102) describe Freud’s schema as:
[T]he disgrace of psychoanalysis in history and politics. The procedure is well 
known: two figures are made to appear, the Great man and the Crowd. One 
then claims to make history with these two entities, these two puppets, the 
Great Crustacean and the Great Invertebrate.
What is of interest, though, is that as both the Great man and the 
Crowd are formed in relation to the Oedipal triangle then the libidinal 
relationship between them can only be an instance of transference. Indeed, 
as Freud (1995:26) makes clear, transference is not a product of clinical 
neurosis nor is it a product of the analytic relation. “Transference is merely 
uncovered and isolated by analysis. It is a universal phenomenon of the 
human mind.”260 In light of our discussion of Guattari’s institutional analysis, 
we can raise the idea of the possible transformation of this crowd 
transference into a transversal relation. To return to Guattari’s vocabulary, 
Freud’s crowd is merely a description of a group with a high coefficient of 
paranoid investments. There are many other potential group formations but 
these are obscured by the presuppositions of Freud’s theory of the 
unconscious. As Deleuze and Guattari (1988:29-30) put it:
Freud tried to approach crowd phenomena from the point of view of the 
unconscious, but he did not see clearly, he did not see that the unconscious 
itself was fundamentally a crowd. He was myopic and hard of hearing: he
260 yye should position Freud’s critique of Le Bon in relation to the development of 
psychoanalysis. Freud's rejection of hypnotic suggestion as a psychiatric treatment, in 
favour of symptomological techniques, such as free association, was central to the 
emergence of psychoanalysis as a distinct therapeutic approach. We should note however 
Borch-Jacobsen’s (1989:150) argument that Freud fails in his attempt to rid psychoanalysis 
of the concept of hypnosis:
For it must be understood that hypnotic suggestion had returned Into psychoanalysis, 
as psychoanalysis. The dependence of the hypnotized subject on the hypnotist; the 
establishment of an elective, exclusive, somnambulic bond; suggestibility; even 
thought transmission -  all had come back up, at the core of analytic treatment, in the 
form of transference.
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mistook crowds for a single person. Schizos, on the other hand, have sharp 
eyes and ears. They don't mistake the buzz and shove of the crowd for 
daddy's voice.
If Freud only accounts for neurotic and paranoid groups, then Deleuze 
and Guattari find additional resources in Sartre. In the Critique of Dialectical 
Reason, Sartre (2004) creates a non-absolute distinction between two types 
of groups: the practico-inert series and the fused group, or group-in-fusion. 
The first kind of group, the series, is not actively formed and so can easily be 
mistaken for a spontaneous grouping. For Sartre, however, any passive 
group is determined and conditioned by external forces. When Sartre (2004: 
265) describes the series he uses the example of a bus queue:
[T]he small gathering which slowly forms around the bus stop, apparently by a 
process of mere aggregation, a lre a d y  h a s  a serial structure. It was produced 
in  a d v a n c e  as the structure of some unknown group by the ticket machine 
attached to the bus stop... [Each member of the series] a c tu a lis e s  his being- 
outside-himself as a reality shared by several people and w h ich  a lre a d y  
ex is ts , a n d  a w a its  h im , by means of an inert practice, endowed by 
instrumentality, whose meaning is that it integrates him into an ordered 
multiplicity by assigning him a place in a prefabricated seriality (Sartre 2004: 
265).
The second type of group, the group-in-fusion, can be defined in 
counterpoint. If the inert series is formed by pre-existing and external 
structures and, we might say marked by the conditioning of the socius, then 
the “reality of the praxis of a (fused) group depends on the liquidation... of 
the serial, both in everyone and by everyone in everyone, and its 
replacement by community” (Sartre 2004:387). This is, however, a non­
absolute distinction: the fused group emerges from seriality and is haunted 
by the prospect of a fall back into seriality. The two do not form a 
symmetrical binary. Indeed, as Jameson (2004: xxvi-xxvii) says, “the group- 
in-fusion is hardly a social form at all, but rather an emergence and an 
event.” We can make this clearer by following Sartre’s (2004) example of the 
storming of the Bastille in formation of a group-in-fusion.
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As might be expected in Sartre, the fused group is formed through 
encounters with alterity, but there is a marked sequence to these 
encounters. Firstly the group is broken from its seriality by the emergence of 
an external threat; in the case of the French Revolution this was sparked by 
a feared repression from newly arrived Royalist troops. As Jameson (2004: 
xxviii) explains, the “formerly serial individuals are united by the threat (or the 
Look) of an external third, which the emergent group must interiorise in order 
to retain its coherence and its dynamic.” As the city becomes an active 
group, the external threat is re-discovered within the body of the city in the 
form of the Bastille, whose weapons are a source of danger but also, 
potentially, of hope. As the group acts, by storming the Bastille, control is 
gained over the source of alterity and a fused group is formed.
Now the group no longer has to depend on the look of the outsider or the 
enemy: a structure has been evolved such that the group carries its own 
source of being within itself, and moreover this structure is a profoundly 
democratic one, for in it there are no leaders, only agitators (in other words, 
thirds who attempt to verbalize the implicit feelings and aims of the group), 
and at this stage in the group’s development everyone is a member, or third 
(Jameson 1974:253).
This sequence extends beyond a simply movement of conscious 
intention. The Bastille is more than just a physical threat. It is a transferential 
object, a mirror upon which the group can project its phantasy and in the 
transformation of that group phantasy the transforming subjectivities within 
the group can recognise one another in their process of transformation.
From Subjugated Groups to Subject Groups
Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of subjugated and subject groups, which 
plays an important role in Anti-Oedipus, bears the inheritance of Freud, 
Sartre and the practice of institutional analysis. A subjugated group, for 
instance, carries elements of both Freud’s paranoiac groups and the inert
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seriality of a passive group determined by the conditioning of the socius. As 
Deleuze (2004a: 193) summarises:
Groups are subjugated no less by the leaders they assign themselves, or 
accept, than by the masses. The hierarchy, the vertical or pyramidal 
organization, which characterizes subjugated groups is meant to ward off any 
possible inscription of nonsense, death or dispersal, to discourage the 
development of creative ruptures, and to ensure the self-preservation 
mechanisms rooted in the exclusion of other groups. Their centralization 
works through structure, totalization, unification, replacing the conditions of a 
genuine collective ‘utterance’ with an assemblage of stereotypical utterances 
cut off from both the real and from subjectivity” .
Subject groups, on the other hand, can be seen as a rendering of 
Sartre’s fused groups overlaid with Guattari’s experience of group analysis.
[They] are defined by coefficients of tra n s v e rs a lity  that ward off totalities and 
hierarchies. They are agents of enunciation, environments of desire, elements 
of institutional creation. Through their very practice, they ceaselessly conform 
to the limit of their own nonsense, their own death or rupture (Deleuze 2004a: 
193).
The inheritances from Freud and Sartre are clearly visible in this 
passage but there are also points of originality where the inheritance is 
exceeded. In order to grasp these points more fully we can turn to the 
conceptual developments we have explored in previous chapters. For 
instance, the notion that subject groups ‘conform to the limit of their own 
nonsense, their own death or rupture’ might seem obscure at first yet it 
becomes clearer when we overlay this with the concept of antiproduction 
and the BwO.261
Similarly the distinction between subject group and subjugated group 
can be usefully overlapped with our previous distinction between a war 
machine that acts as an analyser of desires, and a State apparatus that acts
261 We shall explore this shortly, In relation to the March 22nd Movement.
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as a synthesizer of interests. In this light the concept of subject and 
subjugated groups can explain how “a group can be revolutionary from the 
standpoint of class interests and its preconscious investments, but not be so 
-  and even be fascist and police-like -  from the standpoint of its libidinal 
investments” (Deleuze, Guattari 1984: 348). Interests are based on what is 
possible within a particular socius; they are orientated towards established 
values.262
Once interests have been defined within the confines of a society, the rational 
is the way in which people pursue those interests and attempt to realize them. 
But underneath that, you find desires, investments of desire that are not to be 
confused with investments of interest, and on which interests depend for their 
determination and very distribution. (Deleuze 2004a: 262-3).
This analysis can help explain how political parties, based on 
transcendent syntheses of pre-existing interests, often find themselves out of 
synch with the new desires crystallised by an event. Certainly one of the key 
problematics addressed by Anti-Oedipus is how to avoid falling into the 
reactionary role played by the French Communist Party during the events of 
May ‘68.263 “(T)he bureaucrats of the revolution” (Foucault 1984: xii) not only 
failed to break reason from the presuppositions of the existing socius but 
also invariably elided the event by overlaying it with a pre-existing 
interpretive grid.
By contrast Deleuze and Guattari’s favourite example of an analytical 
war machine was a very different group active in the same events, the March 
22nd Movement. As Deleuze (2004a: 201) says:
The March 22nd Movement is exemplary... because while it was insufficient as 
a war-machine, it nonetheless functioned exceedingly well as an analytic and
26 2  This is what Deleuze and Guattari (1984) mean when they say that the BwO is a 
surface upon which production takes place.
263 On the role of the Communist Party during the May events see, for example, Cohn- 
Bendit, Cohn-Bendit (1969).
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desiring group which not only held a discourse on the mode of truly free 
association, but which was able also "to constitute itself as an analyzer of a 
considerable mass of students and workers," without any claims to hegemony 
or avant-garde status; it was simply an environment allowing for the transfer 
and the removal of inhibitions. Analysis and desire finally on the same side, 
with desire taking the lead.
The March 22nd Movement played a key role in sparking the events of 
May 68. Founded during an occupation at the University of Nanterre, which 
began on the 22nd of March, it was a loose grouping of anarchist and leftist 
students that managed to act non-dogmatically while also avoiding an avant- 
garde status (Cohn-Bendit, Cohn-Bendit 1968).264 What made the March 
22nd Movement effective, however, was its ability to aid the “crystallisation of 
desire on a wide social scale” (Deleuze 2004a: 269). Indeed this is not just 
Deleuze’s view; a contemporaneous comment by a militant of the March 22nd 
Movement (cited in Labro 1969:100) concurs: “In the last analysis the only 
function that March 22... had was one of interpretation. They found the 
watchwords that would crystallize things”.
As the events of May began to gain traction, the fundamental political 
form that emerged, apart from the great assembles of the Sorbonne and the 
Theatre de l’Odèon, was the comités d ’action (action committees), with 
around 460 springing up in Paris by May 31st.265 26Within these wider
264 March 2 2nd avoided a vanguard position, in part, through its faith in spontaneity. Yet this
ideological position probably contributes to Deleuze's (2004a: 201) judgement that it is 
“insufficient as a war-machine”.
266 r oss (2 0 0 2 : 76) provides a useful description of the com ités d ’action:
Small groups of perhaps ten or fifteen people, most of whom had belonged to no pre­
formed political group, began to organize -  by profession in some cases, in 
neighborhood or factory in others -  after the general strike began in mid-May, largely 
with the goal of providing material aid to the strikers and producing agit-prop to extend 
the strike.
Some lasted only a few months while others continued for some years after the events. It is 
interesting to note that this size of between ten to fifteen people is the same as the number 
settled upon at La Borde as the ideal size of an analytical group.
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movement forms, however, a group like the March 22nd Movement could 
catalyse analysis by finding forms of expression to crystallise emerging 
desires. Despite the importance of texts and slogans in May *68 this 
expression does not have to take a linguistic or textual form; indeed the 
process is often at its most effective when an action concept becomes a 
form of expression.266 We could, for example, conceptualise the initial 
construction of barricades in the Latin Quarter on the pivotal night of the 11” 
12 of May as a form of expression that crystallised desire. This 
contemporary account suggests such a conception: ‘Thus according to M 
22, the first barricades were exemplary: they were built, not for their 
defensive effectiveness, which was fairly low, but as ‘a collective action in 
which everyone worked and gave proof of extraordinary imagination’" 
(Willener 1970:166). The barricades made latter that night were more 
effective and took on a real defensive function but the initial barricades were 
more expressive than functional. They crystallised the emerging combative 
mood. To think this in the light of Guattari’s analytical practice we could see 
the exemplary use of barricades as the detachment of a partial object and its 
turning to expression. This creates a rupture from which new nuclei of 
enunciation can be built.
Similarly styles of organising and even modes of speaking can act as 
moments in the crystallisation of new desires.26 67 This testimony from a 
participant in the Sorbonne assembly provides an interesting example.
The important thing was to be able to express yourself. Foresight, practicality,
etc., were quite secondary. Building the future, yes but with words and for the
266 yye can see ^ere beginnings of an overlap with the Social Movement Theory 
concept of movement repertoires.
26 7  Hardt and Negri (2004) also talk of the way physical style, the manner of walking or of 
holding the body become altered through the experience of moments of excess. There are 
many testimonies of how the deployment of such elements of style by the Black Panther 
Party acted as a crystallisation of desire in sections of the black community in the 1960s and 
70s. See, for example, Hilliard (1993).
- 222 -
sheer pleasure of it. This reminded me of the automatic writing practised by 
the Surrealists. Here, it was automatic speaking (Germ. Grad, cited in 
Willener 1970: 27).268
The mention of Surrealist techniques aimed at breaking with habitual 
patterns of thought seems significant and suggests a connection to Bataille’s 
concept of nonproductive expenditure. Indeed, openness to moments of 
non-productivity seems an integral element in a processual analysis in which 
a collective understanding of the situation has to emerge rather than be 
imposed. To remove collective discussion from ‘foresight’ and ‘practicality’ 
may risk a certain amount of redundancy and drift but it also contains the 
possibility of revealing, and breaking with, the conditioning of possibility by 
the presuppositions of the existing socius. The line between productive and 
nonproductive discourse and action becomes indistinct in a situation in which 
the possible and the practical are in transformation. In these circumstances a 
technique to avoid “an assemblage of stereotypical utterances cut off from... 
the real” (Deleuze 2004a: 193) is the detachment of an element from its 
function and its turn to expression. The task of an analytical war machine 
then is to construct a link between nonproductive excess, the transformation 
from function to expression, and the creation of the new. There are, of 
course, numerous obstacles to overcome in this task. Firstly there is the risk 
of the proliferation of redundancies leading to a fall into political catatonia, 
inactivity and thus the return of seriality. But secondly, there is the related 
risk of becoming trapped in horizontality, with expression remaining limited to 
the personal or sectional. This would be the failure to become a truly
268 Automatic writing was a Surrealist technique aimed at releasing creativity by loosening 
conscious control over the writing process. Of course such non-productivity is not a position 
we can occupy exclusively but isn’t an allowance for some nonproductive activity an 
essential element in any form of creativity? Certainly the best discussions I have taken part 
in have worked out mechanisms through which participants can take a concept and run with 
it without any clear idea where they are going. Similarly doesn’t the best writing always take 
the form of a surprise to the author?
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collective assemblage of enunciation and therefore its failure to become 
mutational.
As Guattari (1984: 214-5) makes clear, the March 22nd Movement 
pursued a processual politics:
Those involved set out to interpret the situation, not in terms of some 
programme laid down at successive congresses, but gradually, as the 
situation itself unfolded in time... They refused to present their movement as 
the embodiment of the situation, but simply as something upon which the 
masses could effect a transference of their inhibitions, and the way to a new 
understanding and a new logical formulation outside of any framework of 
conformism.
In this process a collective assemblage of enunciation can construct a group 
phantasy to act transversally as a transitional object. We can, once again, 
find contemporary testimony of the group fulfilling this function:
The tactics of the Mouvement du 22 Mars were really just that -  a new sort of 
image... So a sort of social experiment was carried out: they set about 
creating a certain image of society in people’s minds... it was a very new kind 
of experimental politics (Rolle in Willener 1970: 76).
As a counter to this we should recognise that the French Communist 
Party played the role of the Bastille, a threat internal to the body of the 
movement. “[T]he CP served as a projection: it was the Rorschach of the 
other groups. Through it, they imagined everything that the Left must not be, 
everything that a revolutionary organization can be, everything that socialism 
must be” (Lourau in Willener 1970:86).
This entanglement of group phantasies should make it clear that we 
are not dealing with a simple binary of organisational models. As Guattari 
(1984:37) explains:
In reality... we are dealing not so much with two sorts of groups, but two 
functions, and the two may even coincide. A passive group can suddenly 
throw up a mode of subjectivity that develops a whole system of tensions, a 
whole internal dynamic. On the other hand, any subject group will have
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phases when it gets bogged down at the level of the imaginary: then, if it is to 
avoid becoming the prisoner of its own phantasies, its active principle must be 
recovered by way of a system of analytic interpretation.
There is in this an obvious danger of a recursive dynamic. Just as the 
relation of transference can lead the analysand to fetishise the analyst, so 
the same relationship can be repeated at a higher level of scale. If the group 
acts as an analyst for the wider movement, or the mass, then it too can 
become subject to fetishism. The problem of the subject group then is how to 
act as a catalyst to analysis in the mass while avoiding the paranoid 
investments that misrecognise any transformation as derived from the 
properties of the analyst rather than the wider field of relations within which 
the analyst is situated.
The processes of fetishisation take many forms and come from many 
directions; as such they can be understood in relation to several of the 
concepts we have already discussed. We can, for instance, see such a 
danger in Sartre’s distinction between the series and the fused group, which, 
threatens to replicate the orthodox Marxist distinction between an inert, 
passive working class and an active minority; the fused group as the new 
party. We can see the same potential dynamic in an analytical group, as 
analyst or group gains specialist knowledge of the concept transversality and 
its techniques then it can become separated from the mass.
In a similar vein, but with perhaps more seriously consequences for our 
project, Balibar (1993:7) points to an aristocratic potential in Spinoza’s 
ethical project “to free oneself from the passions”. Such a project involves 
the combating of “sad passions not only by reinforcing joyous passions but 
by developing active affects, which would immediately result from an 
adequate knowledge of causes” (Balibar 1993:7). But this runs the risk of 
becoming “a reality, either as the ‘end’ of history or as the project of a society 
of free persons, bound together by friendship and by the common enterprise 
of knowledge and living together, without internal or external conflict in the 
midst of the crowd of others” (Balibar 1993:7). The danger, of course, is a 
self-isolating dynamic in which a group gains privileged knowledge of causes
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and thus privileged access to joyous affects. In response we might accuse 
Balibar of betraying Spinoza’s materialist parallelism in his over emphasis on 
the intellectual over the corporeal. But the same potential dynamic could 
work on a more directly corporeal level. As Massumi (2002b: 34) reminds us, 
“joy is not the same thing as happiness... It’s on a different axis. Joy can be 
very disruptive, it can even be very painful.” However, bodies can be 
familiarised with the disruption that comes from joy, they can be trained to 
respond to joy with open affects. We could imagine, then, the development 
of an elite of bodies sharing a common receptivity to joyous affects. This 
would be a novel supplement to the critique of summit hopping, with more 
experienced activists seeking out the company of those bodies most 
compatible to theirs, those that will, at least in the short term, maximise their 
joy.269
Light out for the Territory
When Deleuze and Guattari come to write A Thousand Plateaus the theory 
of groups disappears. It is, to a large extent, replaced by the concepts of 
assemblages and territory. We can see this as, in part, a response to 
problems such as those discussed above. If the subject group as analyst 
takes on a fetishised form in relation to the mass, then the mass itself must 
become the analyzer. On this level of scale territorial concepts allow more 
purchase than a theory of groups. As we examine Deleuze and Guattari’s 
concept of territory we will see that it carries an inheritance from their
269 \ f le might rep|y ^ a t this problem would be a blockage in desiring production and its 
unblocking is precisely the object of analysis. But we could push the previous line of 
argument further by overlaying it with Protevi’s (2009) definition of ‘the warrior' as a body 
that has become addicted to high intensity situations. This brings to mind the image of an 
activist addicted to joy, compulsively seeking out intensive highs and becoming less and 
less able to relate to more quotidian situations. If Balibar’s suggestion of “a society of free 
persons” dedicated to ridding themselves of the passions brings to mind a monastery, then 
when overlaid with Protevi’s definition the monks become warrior monks, ‘summit hoppers’ 
as Knights Templar.
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concept of groups. We might even go so far as to say that the concept of 
territory is the theory of groups overlaid with re-worked concepts drawn from 
the field of ethology. However, it is not just the problem of group fetishism 
that provokes this move. It also represents a further movement away from 
the positioning of the human subject as the privileged unit of experience. The 
concepts of assemblages and territory allow the complexification of analysis, 
as a wider diversity of elements is brought within its scope.
I am convinced that analysis will get out of this deadlock only if it ceases to be 
the exclusive concern of a specialist or psychoanalyst, or even an analytic 
group, as these cannot avoid constituting themselves as authorities. Analysis 
must become a process defined by what I have called assemblages of 
analytic enunciation; it must be founded not only on speech and composed of 
individuals, but also defined by a specific social, economic, institutional, 
micropolitical operation and a non-linguistic semiotics (Guattari 2009: 42).270
“Territory”, as Guattari (2006:421) explains, “describes a lived space, 
or a perceived system in which a subject ‘feels at home.’” Deleuze and 
Guattari develop their concept of territory in relation to Konrad Lorenz’s 
(1967) ethological research into territorial animals. Their critique is based, in 
particular, on Lorenz’s identification of aggressiveness as the basis of 
territory. They call it an “ambiguous thesis, which has dangerous political 
overtones... [and] little foundation” (Deleuze, Guattari 1988:316). Deleuze 
and Guattari, instead, identify territorial behaviour with expression, and more 
specifically the building of an abode through expressed qualities, either 
selected or produced. This leads Deleuze and Guattari (1994:183) to say: 
“Perhaps art begins with the animal, at least with the animal that carves out 
a territory and builds a house.”
270 in the next section we will concentrate on the concept of territory rather than 
assemblages but, without wishing to elide the distinction between the concepts, Deleuze 
and Guattari (1988:503) do make it clear that the concepts overlap, “[e]very assemblage Is 
basically territorial."
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We can see Deleuze and Guattari’s critique of Lorenz then as a means 
of decentring ethology’s focus on the internal milieu of drives and instincts. 
By linking territory to expression the interior milieu is understood through its 
orientation to the exterior milieu. Following Deleuze and Guattari’s argument, 
then, we can position the concept of territory within a line of development in 
which additional dimensions of expression allow greater interaction with the 
surrounding milieu. This means, of course, an increased capacity to affect 
and be affected, and so carries the traces of a Spinozan conception of 
conatus.
Lorenz (1967) links aggression, colour and territory in his examination 
of coral fish, whose bodies, he says, act as a poster to display the internal 
level of aggressivity.271 Displays of aggression in defence of territory, 
however, don’t explain the creation of territory; indeed it already 
presupposes that the animal is in its territory. As Deleuze and Guattari 
(1988:315) put it: “Functions in a territory are not primary; they presuppose 
a territory-producing expressiveness.” In poster fish the creation of territory 
involves a repetition in expression that breaks it from internal function.
[C]olor is a membrane state associated with interior hormonal states, but it 
remains functional and transitory as long as it is tied to a type of action 
(sexuality, aggressiveness, flight). It becomes expressive, on the other hand, 
when it acquires a temporal consistency and a spatial range that makes it a
271 As Lorenz (1967:13) explains:
When one examines the aggressive and the more or less non-aggressive species, it 
is evident that there is a connection between colouring, aggressiveness, and 
sedentary territorial habits. Among the fish that I examined... extreme aggressiveness 
associated with territorial behaviour and concentrated on members of the same 
species, is found almost exclusively in those forms whose bright poster-like colour 
patterns proclaim their species from afar.
Lorenz (1967:14) does understand this colouring as expression but in his schema it 
remains subordinated to function:
In many of these fish the degree of their emotion can be measured by their colouring, 
which also shows whether aggressiveness, sexual excitement or the flight urge is 
uppermost... In other words, the colours of all these fish are a means of expression.
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territorial, or rather territorializing, mark: signature (Deleuze, Guattari 1988:
315).
Territory, then, is created then through the repeated transformation of 
an element from function to expression. Faeces and urine, for example, are 
detached from a purely digestive function and turned into signs that mark a 
territory. “One puts one’s signature on something just as one plants one’s 
flag on a piece of land” (Deleuze, Guattari 1988:314). Through this process 
territorial animals produce dimensions of expression that interact with and 
transform the surrounding milieu. Poster fish, for example, produce 
expression through a specialised function of its body; it uses its body as a 
placard. This is an example of internally generated expressivity, but territorial 
animals can also select a component of the external milieu and turn that to 
expression. Deleuze and Guattari (1988:315) use the example of the brown 
stagemaker bird, which “lays down landmarks each morning by dropping 
leaves it picks from the tree, and then turning them upside down so the paler 
underside stands out against the dirt: inversion produces a matter of 
expression.” This allows Deleuze and Guattari (1988:315) to say: “There is 
a territory precisely when milieu components cease to be directional, 
becoming dimensional instead, when they cease to be functional to become 
expressive. There is a territory when the rhythm has expressiveness."
Deleuze and Guattari follow this construction through a conception of 
motifs and counterpoints. “Expressive qualities entertain internal relations 
with one another that constitute territorial motifs” (Deleuze, Guattari 1988: 
317). These rhythmically repeated motifs interact with the external milieu 
creating territorial counterpoints.272 It is this rhythmical interaction between 
the two that creates style out of signature. The expressive objects “no longer 
constitute placards that mark a territory, but motifs and counterpoints that 
express the relation of the territory to interior impulses or exterior
272 Deleuze and Guattari (1994:185) use the concept of counterpoint to capture the 
entrainment of one territory with another. For example: “The spider's web contains ‘a very 
subtle portrait of the fly,’ which serves as its counterpoint”.
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circumstances, whether or not they are given. No longer signatures, but a 
style” (Deleuze, Guattari 1988:318). Birds like the blackbird or the 
nightingale have to learn to sing, as their song never repeats. Their song 
moves from motifs to counterpoints as they incorporate the songs of other 
birds, and indeed other milieu components, even including, famously, the 
sound of lawnmowers and the like. Style then is expression as it becomes 
mutational, in which “motifs and counterpoints... form an autodevelopment" 
(Deleuze, Guattari 1988:319).
The example of selecting components and transforming them into 
expressive qualities is isomorphic to the analytical process of detaching 
partial objects to use as mutant nuclei of enunciation. This can now be 
conceptualised as an act of deterritorialisation followed by a concomitant re- 
territorialisation. Deleuze and Guattari (1988:316) indicate such a 
connection when they say, “[tjerritorial marks are readymades... Take 
anything and make it a matter of expression.” We will recall that 
readymades, such as Duchamp’s ‘Fountain’, are objects extracted from their 
functional series with the purpose of breaking our habitual conception of 
them, opening new universes of reference.273 As Lazzarato (2008) puts it: 
“Duchamp uses a readymade to undermine the dialectical logic of exclusive 
disjunction of the type ‘either/or’, and to allow the logic of inclusive 
disjunctions of the ‘and’ [type]”.
The turn from function to expression can be seen as a moment in the 
loosening of behaviour from adherence to pre-given goals. We can then 
make a connection with Bataille’s concept of nonproductive expenditure.274
2 7 3  Guattari (1996:164) illustrates how this artistic strategy can reveal an object’s hidden 
potential for expression:
Marcel Duchamp’s Bottlerack functions as the trigger for a constellation of referential 
universes engaging both intimate reminiscences (the cellar of the house, a certain 
winter, the rays of light upon spider’s webs, adolescent solitude) and connotations of 
a cultural or economic order -  the time when bottles were still washed with the aid of 
a bottle wash.
27^ Indeed there is some evidence of a connection between territorial expression and 
nonproductive expenditure. Bird and Federspiel (2008), for example, suggest a connection
- 230 -
Indeed when Deleuze and Guattari (1988:221) say, “it is always on the most 
deterritorialized element that reterritorialization takes place", there is an 
overlap with Bataille’s notion that it is the expenditure of excess that provides 
meaning and purpose to productive activity and not the other way around. As 
we saw with our previous discussion of antiproduction not all territories are 
the same. We can make a distinction through the relation to exteriority and 
interiority, with Deleuze and Guattari (1988: 354) conceiving of the war 
machine as “a pure form of exteriority”, and the State-form as “a form of 
interiority” (Deleuze, Guattari 1988:360). The aim then is to construct a set 
of positive deterritorialisations that “prevails over the reterritorializations 
which play only a secondary role” (Deleuze, Guattari 1988: 508). We can 
then connect such style to the war machine’s form of exteriority, which “ is 
such that it exists only in its own metamorphoses” (Deleuze, Guattari, 1988: 
360).
Tracing these connections between territory and the theory of analytical 
groups allows us to pose the question of how to build an analytical territory. 
Deleuze and Guattari (1988:320) associate territory with the maintenance of 
a critical distance. This discussion is carried out, at first, in terms of “the 
critical distance between two beings of the same species... I growl if anyone 
enters my territory, I put up placards.” At a more abstract level, though, 
territory “is a question of keeping at a distance the forces of chaos knocking 
at the door.” In an early essay on transversality Guattari (1984:18) re-uses a 
parable about porcupines employed by both Freud and Schopenhauer.
One freezing winter day, a herd of porcupines huddled together to protect 
themselves against the cold by their combined warmth. But their spines 
pricked each other so painfully that they soon drew apart again. Since the 
cold continued, however, they had to draw together once more, and once
between mimicry in birdsong and ostentatious waste. “Since copying a sound that's not part 
of the species' own repertoire comes at a certain expense, time and energy expended in 
mimicking suggest a healthier suitor. Hence vocal repertoire may help females decide which 
males to mate with."
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more found the pricking painful. This alternate moving together and apart 
went on until they discovered just the right distance to preserve themselves 
from both evils.
Guattari relates this example to transversal communication but isn’t this 
also a discussion of critical distance? There is an optimal distance between 
openness to the outside and a collapse into chaos. Or, on a temporal 
register, we can say that there is a rhythm in a transversal analytical territory 
between immersion in intensive situations, which are open to the outside and 
a drawing back from intensity to keep the forces of chaos at bay. The 
building of an analytical territory must involve experimentation with the right 
critical distance, to create the conditions within which analysis can take place 
yet avoid a stratified, closed-up territory cut off from the forces of the outside. 
To discuss this further, let’s return to the problematics of the alter- 
globalisation movement and the relation between moments of excess and 
analytical war machines.
Territory of the Movement and Movement of the Territory
In the previous chapter we discussed the alter-globalisation movement’s 
concern for process through the prism of a processual passion for joyful 
encounters. When participants talk of movement process, they often mean a 
decision-making process based on consensus. The process has undergone 
continuous development within social movements for over forty years. This 
has resulted in a fairly developed and highly structured process. The group 
Seeds for Change, who provide training in consensus decision-making, 
provide a useful definition:
Consensus is a decision-making process that works creatively to include all 
persons making the decision. Instead of simply voting for an item, and having 
the majority of the group getting their way, the group is committed to finding 
solutions that everyone can live with. This ensures that everyone's opinions, 
ideas and reservations are taken into account. But consensus is more than 
just a compromise. It is a process that can result in surprising and creative
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solutions -  often better than the original suggestions (Seeds for Change
2006: 1).
A diverse range of techniques and technologies has been developed in 
relation to this aim. However, thanks, in part, to training groups such as 
Seeds For Change, a fairly standard set of procedures has come to 
dominate movement process. These include a set of hand signals to be used 
by the participants, the specific role of meeting facilitators and the 
spokescouncil model for scaling the process to larger groups.275 In this 
section we will see what is to be gained from thinking this process through 
the concept of an analytical territory. As such we might ask whether there 
are components that carry an analytic function? Or indeed, if there are 
components that can be detached and turned to expression as nuclei of 
mutant enunciation?
When viewed through this problematic we might think, for instance, of 
the role of the facilitators. Their job is not just to note the order in which 
people raise their hands; it also contains an analytical dimension. They 
should, for instance, take the various dimensions of group dynamics into 
account during their structuring of the meeting. They may prioritise female 
speakers if they detect a gender imbalance in those speaking. They must 
also attend to the affective state of the group, detecting tiredness or, 
perhaps, the development of animosities and the hardening of positions. 
There is an armoury of techniques they can use then to intervene and 
address these dimensions of the meeting. Indeed we could understand the 
entire aim of the consensus process as the maximisation of the flows of 
information, and therefore the prevention of the paranoid investments and
27® Notes from Nowhere (2003:115) provide a concise description of the operation of a 
spokescouncil:
Affinity groups, and clusters of affinity groups chose spokespeople who are 
empowered to speak for the group. The spokespeople sit in a circle, with their affinity 
group behind them. In this way, groups can confer during the meeting and participate 
via their spokesperson, but only spokespeople address everyone, vastly reducing the 
amount of time required for inclusivity.
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control over information that is familiar in some, more traditional left 
practice.276
At the Hori-Zone, the convergence camp built to support the protests 
against the 2005 Gleneagles G8 summit, a specialised facilitation working- 
group was formed. Their role was “to make processes transparent and to 
involve everyone in the decision-making process” (Trapese Collective 2007: 
60). When those involved in the group describe their role they certainly seem 
aware of the danger of the organisational distortions that can arise through 
the monopolisation of information and knowledge.
We also had to pro-actively dismantle any informal leadership that grew out of 
the relatively small group of people who organised the set-up of the camp and 
had more knowledge and experience of how things worked. There was a lot of 
awareness around these issues (Seeds for Change 2007:9).
We could even see the facilitators’ role in synthesising disparate 
proposals into new proposals that everyone can live with as, in part, a 
transversal technique to combat the inert seriality of distinct groups 
remaining separate from each other, what Guattari calls horizontality. One of 
the aims of consensus process, especially when tied to forms of direct 
action, is precisely the collective development of a common project.
We can, here, refer again to the example of the large spokes council 
meeting in which I participated at the Hori-Zone on the 5 July 2005.277 The 
action concept for the protests, at least those linked to the camp, had still not 
been decided and there were a couple of different proposals on the table. 
One was to blockade the M9 motorway close to the camp, the other to 
blockade the A9 closer to the summit. Each one would involve very different 
forms of action. The M9 proposal was for a mass walk-out from the camp,
276  For examples of the close control over flows of information and its use to control and 
manipulate meetings during the organisation of European Social Forum in
see Maeckelbergh (2009).
277 yye referre(j  f0 this meeting in Chapter Three.
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which would confront the police and push through to the road. The A9, being 
further from the camp, favoured dispersed groups who would spend the 
preceding night hiding in the woods before congregating and performing 
pulsed, swarming attacks on the road and the summit. After a remarkably 
well-facilitated process involving several hundred people, the meeting 
agreed on the latter action format. Despite this, however, the M9 action still 
went ahead, organised by those who were left in the camp after those 
committed to the A9 action had left for the woods. At the debrief meeting 
following the day of action this forking within the camp was seen as a 
strength rather than a weakness. The decision taken was not binding but the 
process of maximising the flow of information allowed participants to gauge 
the intentions of others as they made their own decision.
This example, however, also reveals some of the limitations of the 
model, particularly when linked to the form of the summit protest. The 
consensus process works best, for instance, amongst fairly cohesive groups 
committed in advance to the same broad objective. It relies, of course, on a 
common commitment and understanding of consensus decision making.278 
But more fundamentally to work effectively it requires a fixed point of 
reference. At the Gleneagles protests the object was provided by the 
summit, the accepted aim was to disrupt the summit and the decision under 
discussion was the tactical one of how best to do that. We could say then 
that consensus process is better at tactical decisions than strategic 
decisions. As the decision in the Hori-Zone meeting was a tactical decision it 
did not have to be binding -  this allows the movement principle of 'unity in 
diversity’. The big stalling point for the alter-globalisation movement, 
however, has been the difficulty it has had in making strategic decisions, that 
is, how to collectively transform and generate its own objectives.
We could refer again to Maeckelbergh’s (2009) discussion of the different conceptions 
of consensus at work during the 2005 European Social Forum. In a split between, what 
came to be known as the verticals and the horizontals the former favoured a decision- 
oriented ‘consensus’ and the latter a process-oriented consensus.
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A consensus process might appear to be ill-suited to this task. The 
pressure to come to consensus, for instance, can provide a bias towards the 
status quo. It is more difficult to achieve near unanimity on a proposal for a 
radical break with normal practice. Indeed Guattari (2009:55) associates 
consensus with “oppressive redundancies” and “a situation in which 
participants say exactly what they are expected to say.” A consensus 
process, although it can contain techniques to allow moments of expression, 
is fundamentally orientated towards common agreement on a shared 
objective. As such it is biased against the kind of nonproductive expenditure 
from which radical change can emerge and with which a group can 
transform its objective and orientation.279
When analysed on this formal level and compared to Deleuze and 
Guattari’s concept of subject groups we could point to some more limitations. 
For example, the treatment of consensus process as a potentially universal 
model tends, in contemporary social movements, to produce group 
phantasies that are overcoded by a certain type of activist mentality, which 
we referred to in the previous chapter as the linear accumulation model of 
the activist. This group phantasy played its part in the dispute around the 
2005 European Social Forum as it produced the expectation that groups with 
very different organisational models and traditions should automatically 
adopt the consensus model.280
Perhaps the most pertinent analytical dimensions to consensus 
process, however, are revealed less in their formal organisational properties 
than in the manner of their use and the problematic to which they respond. 
Rather than judging the process for its formal properties we should think 
about the role they can play as a component in the creation of a wider
279 The question of whether nonproductive expenditure can be formally included 
constituted forms overlaps with discussions of the right to resistance (cf Neg )
2^9 Indeed an analysis that sees certain procedures as creating a territory in 
participants feel at home when they are abroad would have some real explanatory power 
here.
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analytical territory. We can approach this point through the following account 
of the 6 August anti-summit protests around the A9 near Gleneagles:
For the road blockades at Gleneagles, for instance, we had adopted swarm 
tactics — people had to get themselves to the general area along a seven 
kilometre stretch of road at the same time and then cohere together and block 
the road. As the police came and dispersed us, we had to work out ways of 
cohering back together at a different part of the road. This went on all 
morning. But at certain times consensus decision-making meetings were 
called. We would retreat away from the road and assess and analyse how 
things were going and what to do next. On the morning of the blockade we 
took part in three of these meetings, each involving over 100 people... In this 
way the consensus and spokescouncil meetings were used to reduce the 
level of intensity and slow down the speed of decision-making. They were 
also a way of providing reassurance, a way of reaffirming our mutual trust and 
collectivity (Free Association 2006:13-14).281
We can see here, just as we saw in the opening vignette, that 
extensive forms, such as consensus meetings, take their place alongside 
more intensive situations. The form of decision making that takes place in 
structured meetings is different to the forms of decision making that take 
place in more intensive situations. In the later, decisions can be made at a 
more directly affective level, only reaching the level of the conscious subject 
in retrospect. Again a flavour of this can be found in the following account:
[0 ]n  the Wednesday of the blockades, in the fields next to the road that 
intensity was ten-fold. Decisions were made so quickly you barely had time to 
think. Look! that lot in the next field are trying to get on the road, the police are 
going to block them. Let’s charge down here and draw the police off. Great 
idea, I’ll join in. Next time, hey, the police aren’t falling for it. They don’t 
believe our fake charges any more. That means we’re unopposed. Here we 
go. Over the fence. On the road. Block the traffic. Yeh, this is actually
281 I should make clear, once again, that this text was written by a collective writing group I 
am involved with, and as such it is partly my own account.
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working. W e’re running rings around them. We’re too smart for them. W e’re 
thinking too fast (Free Association 2005b: 18).
We can also see this distinction operating over a greater temporal 
scale during larger moments of excess. Take Narot’s account of ‘68, 
mediated through Ross’s (2002:102) description:
May and June, he insists, had a temporality all of their own, made up of 
sudden accelerations and immediate effects: the sensation that mediations 
and delays had all disappeared. Not only did time move faster then the frozen 
time of bureaucracy it also surpassed the slow, careful temporality that 
governs strategy and calculation.
This returns us to the conception that moments of excess can operate 
as ruptures within the trajectory of a movement, a point at which their 
problematics are shifted and suggests the analytical territory, or war 
machine, as a mechanism for mediating these shifts. It is in the combination 
of moments of excess and mediating analytical war machines that shifts in 
strategy emerge.
It is this that we have talked about previously as the production of a 
critical distance or rhythm.282 We can perhaps relate this to the note of 
caution that enters Deleuze and Guattari’s work. A Thousand Plateaus 
contains many warnings about the need for careful experimentation.
This is how it should be done: Lodge yourself on a stratum, experiment with 
the opportunities it offers, find an advantageous place on it, find potential 
movements of deterritorialization, possible lines of flight, experience them, 
produce flow conjunctions here and there, try our continuums of intensities 
segment by segment, have a small plot of new land at all times (Deleuze, 
Guattari 1988:161).
282 As Deleuze and Guattari (1988:313) make clear a rhythm is the communication 
between two different milieus. “There is a rhythm whenever there is a transcoded passage 
from one milieu to another, a communication of milieus, coordination b 
heterogeneous space-times."
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ln order to experiment with intensive situations you need some safe 
space to retreat to in order to assess, ‘a small plot of new land’. “You have to 
keep enough of the organism for it to reform each dawn” (Deleuze, Guattari 
1988:160) after a wild night’s destratifying. Could we use this notion of safe 
space to understand the role of extensive forms of organisation during 
moments of excess?
If we consider the institutional form of the convergence centre or 
convergence camps, then they certainly seem to emerge in response to this 
problematic. Convergence centres were developed as a point of contact and 
assembly, to provide space for the organisation of actions, and to allow the 
movement to cohere. The convergence camp is a development of the 
centres that allows for a longer duration of action and protests, and a greater 
level of self-organisation. They are large, often rural, self-managed camping 
spaces with a specific form of layout and organisation. The basic 
organisational form is the barrio or neighbourhood, in which people camp 
around a kitchen. It is these neighbourhoods that feed into the running of the 
camp and sometimes even the organisation of the actions. Following 
discussion in the neighbourhoods delegates, or spokes, are sent to camp­
wide meetings. The neighbourhoods themselves can be based around the 
geographical area of the participant’s origin, the country or city; or perhaps 
around some other factor of affinity.283 This model was first developed at a 
‘No Border’ camp in Strasbourg in 2002, which had around 3,000 
participants. The camp model was first employed at a summit protest during 
the 2003 anti-G8 protests around Evian.284 As we have already indicated, 
during a week of protests such camps function as safe spaces to which to 
retreat after protests, direct actions, or other intensive occasions. Indeed the 
usual format is for large collective debriefing meetings to take place after
283 There is, for instance, often a queer neighbourhood.
» 4  Protest camps, of course, have a much longer and more diverse history but I would 
argue that they have no. taken quite this form before even it they have addressed a srmrlar 
problematic.
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protest and actions with the aim of analysing them and assessing the next 
move.
Their form, however, as a good fit with the concept of safe space, also 
indicates some of the dangers with the concept. We could point, for instance, 
at Raunig’s (2007:258) assessment of the original Strasbourg camp, as 
containing an inward-facing orientation as a “consequence of self­
administration in the succinct sense as closure and turning to the inside".285 
Perhaps ironically for a repertoire that first developed in the ‘No Border’ 
movement, convergence camps by necessity have strong borders around 
them, often with elaborate defensive structures and self-organised defensive 
patrols to defend the camp from the police, etc. The camps, then, reinforce a 
certain separation between those inside the boundary (activists) and those 
outside (the public, the mass) -  a distinction made even more solid if the 
camps take on an avant-gardist group phantasy, presenting themselves as 
exemplary. The Hori-Zone in Gleneagles, for instance, was also called the 
Eco-village and was constructed as a model of low environmental impact 
and democratic living.286
One of the problems of the concept of a safe space, then, is the ease 
with which it can fall into the sense of a liberated zone. This could leave the 
appearance that what is inside the camp does not need significant 
transformation but can instead act as a model to be adopted by the rest of 
the world. In response to this we propose that it is more useful to
285 Raunig (2007:258) goes on to argue that this orientation meant “there was no room left 
for discussions and preparing actions on these formal platforms of organisation. My 
experience of convergence camps as they have developed since that time is that while they 
certainly are used to organise and assess actions there is little scope for discussion of wider 
political issues, and therefore analysis of aspects such as the neoliberal, transcendental 
conditioning of experience.
286 Indeed it served as the model for the Camps for Climate Action; the climate camp 
concept emerged during the post-Gleneagles discussions amongst the network that had 
organised the Hori-Zone.
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conceptualise these movement practices through another of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s territorial concepts, the refrain (ritournelle).
Deleuze and Guattari (1988:311) introduce the concept with the 
following image:
A child in the dark, gripped with fear, comforts herself by singing under her 
breath. She walks and halts to her song. Lost, she takes shelter, or orients 
herself with her little song as best she can. The song is like a rough sketch of 
a calming and stabilising, calm and stable, centre in the heart of chaos... Now 
we are at home. But home does not preexist: it was necessary to draw a 
circle around that uncertain and fragile centre, to organize a limited space... 
Finally, one opens the circle a crack, opens it all the way, lets someone in, 
calls someone, or else goes out ones self, launches forth... One launches 
forth, hazards an improvisation.287
In Deleuze and Guattari’s (1988:323) usage the refrain has a couple of 
senses. There is a narrow sense of the concept of a refrain in which an 
assemblage is sonorous or ‘dominated by sound’”.288 The model for the use 
of refrains to create a territory is, of course, birdsong. We, however, are 
more concerned with the general sense of the concept in which a refrain can 
be “any assemblage of matters of expression that draws a territory and 
develops territorial motifs and landscapes (there are optical, gestural, motor, 
etc., refrains).” Used in this sense we can think of certain movement 
repertoires as refrains. So, in the woods and fields around the A9 near 
Gleneagles, spokescouncil meetings were used to lower the level of 
intensity, to slow down the speed of decision-making, to re-establish some 
coherence. The participants could do so because they all knew the refrain.
287 Deleuze and Guanari (1988:312) go on to make clear that these are not three _ 
successive movements In an evolution. They are three aspects ot a single, me Reham.
288 The, assign this apparent privilege to sound because its flexibility makes itthe cuning 
edge of deterritorialisation.
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Refrains are what we fall back on in moments of stress and uncertainty. 
They let us feel at home when we are abroad in the world. But they also 
allow us to open a crack in the circle and launch forth on experimentation.
The advantage of the refrain is that it is portable — it comes with you when 
you venture into new milieus and territorialise there, as they are expressed. 
We might think of the use of the refrain in Jazz: it is what links each player 
as they launch forth on an experimental, improvised solo. Just as the music 
threatens to lose all coherence, the ensemble can fall back on the familiar 
chorus, riff, or refrain, even if it now contains some variations. The refrain, 
then, allows the development of style.
Refrains can of course be excluding — you have to know the tune to join 
in -  but they do not, necessarily, depend on a clear inside/outside distinction. 
It is the notion of safe space that is more prone to such exclusive disjunction. 
Refrains are not always consciously chosen; they can apply to the pre- 
subjective and pre-conscious. Refrains can be corporeal, visceral, 
autonomic, operating of the level of the affective.289 But as territorial 
concepts they are orientated to the outside.They are the point of 
communication between a territory and its milieu.
So how are refrains created? Let’s return to movement practice. At 
certain points, certain practices, or other elements of the milieu, become 
expressive. We can think of the way that a consensus process became, for 
many participants, definitional of the alter-globalisation movement. However, 
refrains are also situational, they are the blocks of code that communicate 
with the external milieu. We can think then of how the refrains of movements 
change as the problematics of the movement change. New elements 
become expressive of the new situation and crystallise emerging desires. It 
is refrains “as the most deterritorialized factor, the most deterritorialized 
vector” (Deleuze, Guattari 1988:327) that assure consistency, “’the holding 
together’ of heterogenous elements” (Deleuze, Guattari 1988:323).
* »  O, course a M a r  retrain can ac. as a Prussian madeteine. t-igsenng the attecdve 
state that the body associated with it.
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The concept of the refrain certainly holds an inheritance from Guattari s 
experience of analytic groups. Deleuze and Guattari (1988:348) define the 
refrain as a “crystal of space time”, which has “a catalytic function . They 
describe the refrain as an example of a transversal, “a component that takes 
upon itself the specialised vector of deterritorialisation, reminding us that 
“what holds an assemblage together is... its most deterritorialized 
component” (Deleuze, Guattari 1988:336). It is, however, in Guattari’s 
(1996:201) work that the connection to analysis is most clear, when he 
characterises refrains as “virulent fragments of partial enunciation which 
work to ‘shift’ subjectivation.” It is these refrains that the movement sings to 
itself to feel at home when it is abroad.
Of course, there is nothing necessarily liberating about refrains. As a 
technique for creating the sense of an abode their function can be colonised 
by capital. Lazzarato (2003), for instance, argues that commercials and 
brands can function as refrains of a certain kind. The policy of McDonalds, 
for instance, is that their burgers should taste the same in each of their 
restaurants, no matter where in the world it is located. A little taste of home 
when abroad? This, however, is a refrain without an opening to the outside. 
The territory it constructs is the infantile, serial subjectivity of consumption. 
The metronomic tick of capital’s need to valorise is meter not rhythm.290
An analytic territory then cannot be constructed merely out of the use of 
refrains to lower intensity. It must also contain “a-signifying ritomellos 
constitutive of new existential territories” (Guattari 1996:133). These are 
refrains as rupture, when the refrain’s expressivity produces a moment of 
non-productivity. As Guattari (1996: 200) says, The refrain does not rest on 
the elements of form, material, or ordinary signification, but on the 
detachment of an existential ‘motif’... instituted as an ‘attractor in the midst
290 As Deleuze and Guattari (1988:313-14) explain:
It is well known that rhythm is not meter or cadence, even irregular meter or cadence: 
there is nothing less rhythmic than a military march... Meter is dogmatic, but rhythm is 
critical; it ties together critical moments, or ties itself together in passing from one 
moment to another...It is the difference that is rhythmic, not the repetition.
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of sensible and significational chaos." The role of the analytic war machine is 
to bring out the refrains, make them audible through revisiting the events and 
problematics from which they arose so as to allow collective innovation to 
take place. Perhaps the role of the analyst is the production of style, 
selecting refrains to act as provocations to the territory. It is with this sense 
that Lazzarato (2006:) says:
In the refrain, in the ra p p o rt d  so i, in the production of subjectivity, there is the 
possibility of unfolding the event, of escaping from the serialized and 
standardized production of subjectivity. But this possibility must be 
constructed. We have to create possibles. This is the sense in which Guattari 
speaks of the “aesthetic paradigm“: to construct political, economic and 
aesthetic devices where this existential transformation can be tested -  a 
politics of experimentation, not representation.
In Chapter Three we discussed the alter-globalisation movement's use 
of the summits of global governance structure as a stand-in for the dispositif 
of neoliberalism. We could now conceptualise this strategy as the 
detachment of a partial object from the wider milieu, in which our 
subjectivities are conditioned transcendentally. The summit then would take 
the place of the Bastille, an object upon which we could cast a group 
phantasy in order to break from our seriality. The movement’s compositional 
effects can be understood as the attempted internalisation of the object. Or 
rather the attempt to displace the problematic into a compositional one, in 
order to break that transcendental conditioning of our lives and gain control 
over the production of subjectivity, to auto-generate subjectivity. In this 
schema, however, it is not the summit that fulfils the role of the transitional 
object; it is rather the movement refrains that have emerged from its 
compositional efforts. It is these that provide the safety blanket, the mobile 
territory that the movement carries with it on its back. It is this that provides it 
with the confidence to enter a period of transformation, allowing it to 
experiment and explore.
At this point we can return to the problem of repetition that we raised, 
via Marx, at the beginning of the thesis. As movements shift problematics,
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and as new cycles of struggle emerge, we need a mode of repetition, of the 
figures and practices of past struggles, which will allow the production of the 
new. In an extraordinary piece of analysis Deleuze (1995:131) discusses 
the tennis playing styles of Bjorn Borg and John McEnroe, saying: “Each 
new style amounts not so much to a new trick* as to a linked sequence of 
postures -  the equivalent, that is, of a syntax, based on an earlier style but 
breaking with it.” What we need to develop, then, is a style of movement 
engagement that persists beyond any specific social movement. The 
conceptualisation of the repertoires, practices and problematics of previous 
movements as refrains might aid that process. If so, the refrains must be 
constructed so that they "constantly criticize themselves, constantly interrupt 
themselves in their own course, return to the apparently accomplished, in 
order to begin anew" (Marx 1968a: 100).
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusion
We began the thesis with a quotation from The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis 
Bonaparte out of which we posited the problematic of producing a mode of 
repetition that will not overcode the struggles of future generations but will 
provide the tools from which they can generate the new, and confront the 
problematics of their time. During the construction of our symptomology, in 
Chapter Three, we found that this search for antecedents is a recurring 
symptom of moments of excess, as people search for point of orientation 
during a period of disruption. In Chapter Five we examined the notion of *a 
generation’ contained in Jefferson’s argument that the laws of one 
generation should not bind another. It is from this notion that Jefferson 
(2007:56) proposes, “[e]very constitution, then, and every law, naturally 
expires at the end of 19 years." We critiqued this conception by suggesting 
that, as births don’t occur in twenty year bursts, then the concept of a 
generation only makes sense in reference to shared seminal experiences.291 
From this we can argue that generations are generated through events. This 
implies, of course, that the same groups, or individuals, can partake in 
several generations of struggle. When we talk about the traditions of past 
generation weighing “like a nightmare upon the brains of the living" (Marx 
1968a: 97), it is not unreasonable to count ourselves amongst the ranks of 
the living.
This is, in some respects, only a minor theme running through the 
thesis, yet it is important because it helps to illustrate what is at stake. If we 
are to participate in future generations of struggle then we must avoid the 
fetishisation of past experiences. Those of us with past experience in social 
movements can’t impose our previous practice, or process, on the
291 For Jefferson's generation, of course, this was provided by the American Revolution.
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movements to come. To this aim we have attempted to a find a mode of 
abstracting political problematics from the alter-globalisation movement, and 
of conceptualising the practices generated there, in a manner that will allow 
them to be picked up and built upon by future movements, even though 
those movements will be concerned with different ‘issues’ and problems.
To develop this approach we began in Chapter Two with a 
symptomatic reading of some other approaches to the study of social 
movements. We focussed, in particular, on the behaviourist and pluralist 
inheritance that runs through certain strands of the treatment of social 
movements in political science and Social Movement Theory. By doing so 
we sought to use the tracing of certain lacunae that we found there as a 
means of approaching the transcendental dimensions of neoliberal forms of 
power. It is this “structuring [of] the conditions of possibility of social life" 
(Hardt, Negri 2009:6) that so restricts the political options open to us and 
makes the expansion of possibilities found in moments of excess so vital.
In Chapter Three we suggested that the episodic, evental form taken by 
the alter-globalisation movement is a symptom of the movement’s struggle to 
get to grips with the slippery form of neoliberalism’s transcendental 
dimensions of power. The summit protest, we suggested, is used to put a 
place on the non-place of power; that is to say, it is used as a means of 
letting the movement’s compositional effects take place. We then sought to 
re-inhabit these compositional effects by constructing a symptomology, a 
grouping of experiences on the basis of their shared affective qualities.
It is from this symptomology that we developed, in Chapter Four, the 
concept of moments of excess. We also sought to reconceptualise the 
relation of such moments to the transcendental structuring of experience, 
through a reading of Bataille’s concept of nonproductive expenditure, and 
the vital role it plays in breaking with dominant notions of utility. It is only 
through moments of nonproductive expenditure that a society, an 
organisation, or a movement, can generate real difference. We then followed 
this concept into the work of Deleuze and Guattari through their reworking of 
nonproductive expenditure into the concept of antiproduction. We then
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examined the role that antiproduction plays in their concepts of the Body 
without Organs and the socius. It is through this conceptualisation that we 
sought to recompose the problematic of the relationship between moment of 
excess and everyday life, into an organisational question. In particular, 
Guattari’s proposal for analytical war machines to operate in relation to 
moments of excess marked a point of transition in the thesis. From that 
fulcrum the focus of the thesis shifted towards drawing up a diagram of a 
potential analytical war machine by reconceptualising the alter-globalisation 
movement’s practices, repertoires and organisational process.
Chapter Five began by showing how elements of the movement have 
sought to define the movement through reference to its organisational 
process. We then sought to resolve this desire with Guattari’s (1996:260) 
definition of the left as a “processual passion". We used the resolution of 
these two concepts of process as a means of exploring the form of analysis 
that can operate across the ruptures and discontinuities produced by 
moments of excess. To approach this problem we briefly examined Jefferson 
and Lenin’s theories of revolutionary transformation, before moving to 
Deleuze’s critique of Kant for his failure to Include the genesis of established 
values within the scope of his analysis. Within the contemporary socius it Is 
the form of economic value that structures the presuppositions of our 
everyday common sense understanding of the world. After examining this 
structuring we moved to a discussion of Spinoza’s ethics. We suggested that 
this ethics could operate in both the intensive conditions of a moment of 
excess and the more extensive conditions of everyday life. As such it can act 
as the basis for an analysis that can cross ruptures and discontinuities and 
can serve, then, as the ethical basis for a processual politics. Indeed we also 
proposed that the alter-globalisation movement’s concern with process was 
not, necessarily, an attachment to certain procedures, it can also be 
conceptualised as a stage in the development of a passion for the joyful 
affects of increasing collective capacities.
In Chapter Six we investigated the neglected area of Guattari’s practice 
in political and psychoanalytical groups. Examining the analytical concepts
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he developed in this practice, particularly the concept of transversality and 
the distinction between subject and subjugated groups, allowed us to 
reconceptualise Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of territory in terms of the 
analysis of group desires. This enabled us to reinterpret the practice of the 
alter-globalisation movement in terms of a nascent analytical territory. In 
Chapter Two we suggested that we conceive of social movements in terms 
of the problematics with which they are engaged. In Chapter Three we put 
forward the idea that summit protests had been used as a means of 
grappling with the problematic of neoliberal forms of power. In Chapter Six 
we used the concept of an analytical war machine functioning on the level of 
the territory, to reconceptualise the strategy of putting a place on the non­
place of power in terms of the detachment of a partial object from the wider 
milieu. It is the turning expressive of this partial object that helped generate 
the alter-globalisation movement. More precisely, summit protests allowed 
the movement to generate itself through the development of compositional 
refrains. A conceptualisation of movement practices as refrains, by 
highlighting their role in producing the comfort of home when we are involved 
in intensive moments of transformation, might help future generations of 
struggle to repeat the alter-globalisation movement’s practice in a way that 
can serve as a basis for authentic creation and the engagement with 
contemporary problematics.
This thesis, then, provides a novel and innovative reading of the 
political problematics of the alter-globalisation movement, and fundamentally 
reconceptualises some familiar repertoires and practices. At the same time, 
however, the thesis can be read as a novel and innovative interpretation of 
the political problematics contained in Deleuze and Guattari’s work.
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